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PURPOSE OF THE STUDY 
The purpose of this thesis is to address the lack of empirical research on the transatlantic 
acquisition performance of European companies that are cross-listed in the U.S.. 
Furthermore, this thesis is the first piece of empirical research studying the relation between 
M&A activity and cross-delisting. The objective of the study is two-fold. First, I examine 
the acquisition performance of cross-listed companies by comparing them to acquisitions 
by a control group. Second, I compare the acquisition performance of the cross-listers 
before cross-listing, during cross-listing, and after cross-delisting.  
 
DATA 
The data used in this study is gathered from multiple sources. First, a database of cross-
listed companies is collected by searching the websites of the U.S. exchanges, Thomson 
Financial SDC database (SDC), and Citigroup ADR service for European companies that 
have been cross-listed in the U.S. between 1.1.1980 and 31.12.2008. This yields a sample 
of 281 cross-listed companies. Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe is used 
as a control group. Second, I search SDC for M&A transactions by the cross-listers and the 
control group during the time period 1.1.1996 - 31.12.2008. This gives a sample of 105 
acquisitions by cross-listed companies prior to cross-listing, 451 acquisitions during cross-
listing, 72 acquisitions after cross-listing, and 951 acquisitions by the control group.  
I manually collect a unique database of publication hits in Business Week, Financial Times 
and Wall Street Journal around the announcement of an M&A transaction from LexisNexis 
database. Furthermore, I gather price data for individual companies, market indices, and 
money market funds from Thomson Financial Datastream database (Datastream). Data on 
financial statements, country of incorporation, and industry is from Thomson Financial 
Worldscope. I also collect exchange rate data from Datastream. 
 
RESULTS 
My results indicate that European companies that are cross-listed in the U.S. get a lot more 
visibility in prestigious business publications than their non-cross-listed peer companies. 
This suggests that the management of the cross-listed companies are likely to suffer from 
hubris. Furthermore, the regression analysis shows that there is a negative relation between 
the attained publicity and gains from acquisitions. In line with this notion, the cross-listers 
seem to make worse acquisitions than their non-cross-listed peers, however, the result is not 
consistently significant and appears to relate to other characteristics of the transactions, 
such as firm size and company status of the target firm. 
Cross-delisting seems to significantly decrease visibility in prestigious business 
publications. Furthermore, the results also indicate that M&A performance increases after 
cross-delisting, however, the result is not consistently significant. Same effect is visible in 
the regression analysis, but also it is statistically insignificant. There are no differences in 
acquisition performance or publication hits prior to cross-listing and during cross-listing.  
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TUTKIELMAN TAVOITTEET 
Tämän tutkielman tavoitteena on tutkia Yhdysvaltoihin tuplalistautuneiden eurooppalaisten 
yritysten menestystä transatlanttisissa yrityskaupoissa. Aiheesta ei ole toistaiseksi olemassa 
yhtäkään empiiristä tutkimusta. Tämä tutkimus on myös ensimmäinen, joka tutkii 
yrityskauppamenestyksen ja tuplalistautumisen purun välistä suhdetta. Vertaan 
tutkimuksessani tuplalistautuneiden yritysten ja kontrolliryhmän yrityskauppamenestystä 
sekä tutkin tuplalistautuneiden yrityskauppamenestystä ennen tuplalistautumista, sen aikana 
sekä tuplalistautumisen purun jälkeen. 
 
LÄHDEAINEISTO 
Tässä tutkimuksessa käytetty lähdeaineisto on kerätty useista eri lähteistä. Otos 281 
eurooppalaisesta yrityksestä, jotka ovat tuplalistautuneet Yhdysvaltoihin 1.1.1980 ja 
31.12.2008 välillä, on kerätty yhdysvaltalaisten pörssien internetsivuilta, Thomson 
Financial SDC –tietokannasta (SDC) sekä Citigroup ADR –palvelusta. Vertailuryhmän 
muodostavat Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe –osakeindeksin yritykset. 
Tuplalistaaja- ja kontrolliryhmän yrityskaupat ovat haettu SDC:stä aikaväliltä  
1.1.1996 - 31.12.2008. Otoksessa on 105 yrityskauppaa ennen tuplalistautumista, 451 
yrityskauppaa tuplalistautumisen aikana, 72 yrityskauppaa tuplalistautumisen purun jälkeen 
ja 951 kontrolliryhmän yrityskauppaa. 
Olen kerännyt manuaalisesti uniikin tietokannan Business Week-, Financial Times- ja Wall 
Street Journal –lehtien julkaisuista, jotka käsittelevät otokseni yrityksiä. Yksittäisten 
yritysten, osakeindeksien, rahamarkkinarahastojen ja valuuttojen hinta-aineisto on kerätty 
Thomson Financial Datastream tietokannasta. Tilinpäätöstiedot sekä yritysten perustiedot 
ovat Thomson Financial Worldscope –tietokannasta. 
 
TULOKSET 
Tulosteni mukaan tuplalistautuneet yritykset saavat kontrolliryhmään verrattuna 
huomattavasti enemmän näkyvyyttä liike-elämän julkaisuissa yrityskauppojensa ympärillä, 
mikä viittaa tuplalistautuneiden yritysten kärsivän mahdollisesti ns. hybris-ongelmasta. 
Lisäksi regressioanalyysin tulokset osoittavat, että yritysten saaman julkisuuden ja 
yrityskaupan tuottojen välillä on negatiivinen suhde. Tutkimuksen tulokset antavat viitteitä 
siitä, että Yhdysvaltoihin tuplalistautuneiden yritysten yrityskaupat ovat huonompia kuin 
kontrolliryhmän. Tulos ei kuitenkaan ole johdonmukaisesti merkitsevä ja näyttäisikin 
johtuvan muiden piirteiden eroista ryhmien välillä kuin yritysten tuplalistaus –statuksesta.  
Tulosten valossa näyttää siltä, että yritykset saavat huomattavasti vähemmän julkisuutta 
tuplalistautumisen purun jälkeen. Lisäksi tulokset tukevat teoriaa, jonka mukaan yritykset 
tekevät parempia yrityskauppoja tuplalistautumisen purun jälkeen. Tämä tulos ei 
kuitenkaan ole johdonmukaisesti merkitsevä. Regressioanalyysin tulokset ovat 
samansuuntaisia, mutta nekään eivät ole tilastollisesti merkitseviä. Tuplalistautuminen ei 
näytä vaikuttavan yritysten saamaan julkisuuteen eikä yrityskauppamenestykseen. 
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1 Introduction 
On November 18, 1996, Deutsche Telekom (DT) cross-listed its shares to the New York 
Stock Exchange. One of the key motivations for DT to seek a dual-listing was to ease 
acquisitions in the U.S.. And acquire they did. Between 2000 and 2007, the company acquired 
Powertel, Voice Stream, PCS One, Sun Com Wireless and a number of smaller wireless 
service providers frequently using its cross-listed stock as a method of payment. 
The most notable of the acquisitions, the Voice Stream deal, valued at $29.6 billion, was 
announced on July 24, 2000, after lengthy negotiations between the management of the two 
companies. Voice Stream was making losses at the time of the acquisition, yet, DT paid $7.8 
billion in cash and 829 million DT shares for it, giving the former shareholders of Voice 
Stream an ownership stake of 22% on the acquirer.  
The management of both companies praised the takeover as the deal of the century and the 
transaction made to the front page of Wall Street Journal and Financial Times and was also 
extensively covered by Business Week. The management of DT seemed to be very eager to 
give interviews and, as can be easily seen from Figure 1, the company received substantial 
coverage in important business publications surrounding the transaction. 
 
Figure 1: Visibility of Deutsche Telekom in prestigious business publication surrounding the acquisition of 
Voice Stream This figure shows the weekly number of times Deutsche Telekom was mentioned in the headline 
of Business Week, Financial Times, or Wall Street Journal as in LexisNexis database. Week 0 is the week when 
Deutsche Telekom announced the acquisition of Voice Stream, i.e. the week which includes the dates between 
July 24, 2000 and July 30, 2000. 
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 Enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation on July 30, 2002 as a response to such corporate and accounting 
scandals as Enron and Worldcom. Sarbanes-Oxley introduced major changes to the regulation of financial 
practice and corporate governance causing substantial costs of compliance. 
3
 “On March 21, 2007, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) adopted Exchange Act Rule 12h-6, 
which makes it easier for foreign private issuers to deregister and terminate the reporting obligations associated 
with a listing on a major U.S. exchange.” Doidge et al. (2008)   
When one listened to the management of DT describing the attractiveness of the deal, the 
transaction seemed to have a perfect strategic fit and to be reasonably priced, if not a bargain. 
Ron Sommer, DT‟s chairman and CEO at the time, commented the deal by saying: “This 
transaction is a unique opportunity to enter the U.S. wireless communications market, one of 
the most attractive in the world.” The shareholders, however, interpreted the deal as more 
likely to boost the management‟s ego rather than the company‟s earnings and the stock price 
fell 11.8% on the announcement date destroying over $16.4
1
 billion of shareholder wealth… 
Even though the acquisition of Voice Stream by DT was particularly large, it, nonetheless, 
resembled quite a bit other acquisitions made with cross-listed stock. A large number of these 
deals got a lot of publicity in the financial media, although they were perceived by the market 
as being shareholder value destructive. Clearly, something is not right in the acquisitions 
made by the cross-listed companies and the phenomenon should be carefully assessed. 
1.1 Background and motivation 
During the 1980s and 1990s, thousands of foreign companies cross-listed their shares to the 
U.S. stock exchanges, but in the 21
st
 century, this trend seems to have reversed, as the amount 
of cross-delistings from the U.S. have grown dramatically, driven primarily by the more 
stringent regulation
2
 and the relaxation of deregistering requirements.
3
 The motivation for 
cross-listing has been studied extensively (for a detailed summary, see Pagano, Panetta, and 
Zingales, 2002; Karolyi, 2006), but the knowledge on cross-delistings is more narrow (see, 
e.g., Doidge, Karolyi, and Stultz, 2008). Also cross-border mergers and acquisitions have 
become increasingly common during the last few decades, and the wealth effects of these 
transactions have been widely studied (see, e.g., Cakici, Hessel, and Tandon, 1996). Yet, there 
is not a single study on the relation between cross-listing and cross-delisting, and the returns 
from M&A transactions.  
A number of academic papers as well as more practitioner oriented publications hypothesize 
on the relation between cross-listing and M&A activity (see, e.g., Eiteman, Stonehill, and 
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Moffett, 1998; Pagano et al., 2002; Citigroup, 2005; JP Morgan, 2005). These authors suggest 
that cross-listing is likely to facilitate mergers and acquisitions, as cross-listed stock is 
considered as a more viable acquisition currency than foreign equity for cross-border M&A 
transactions where the target is a U.S. company. Consequently, the authors suggest that the 
decision to cross-list might be motivated by the desire to obtain this M&A currency. The 
literature argues that cross-listed stock is better M&A currency than foreign equity partially 
due to rational issues, such as the restrictions on the amount of foreign equity some U.S. 
institutional investors can hold in their portfolios, and the increased trading and holding costs 
of foreign equity, but also on a more behavioral factor, i.e. on the home bias of U.S. investors. 
This bias causes irrational preference of domestic over foreign equity. 
Being the first to empirically study the relation between cross-listing and M&A activity, 
Tolmunen and Torstila (2005) show that cross-listed firms are substantially more active in 
acquiring U.S. targets than are their domestically listed peers. Furthermore, the authors show 
that after cross-listing, the average size of the deal increases sharply as does the percentage of 
acquisition volume financed with equity. As it is commonly held that large and equity-
financed transactions have questionable consequences for shareholder wealth, it would be 
important to study the wealth effects of transatlantic M&A transactions by cross-listed firms. 
Furthermore, the overall understanding of the relation between cross-listing and M&A 
activity is rather limited. In addition to the paper by Tolmunen and Torstila (2005), this topic 
is only dealt with in one other study (Burns, Francis, and Hasan, 2007), which mostly 
concentrate on premiums paid in acquisitions. Neither study investigates the relation between 
cross-delisting and M&A, as cross-delistings were relatively rare prior to the change in 
deregistering requirements in 2007. Hence, the number of observations of M&A transactions 
by cross-delisted companies was too small for meaningful analysis at the time of drafting of 
these two articles. However, as the number of cross-delistings has grown dramatically, it is 
now more meaningful to study the topic. 
In this thesis, I seek to shed light on the obvious shortcomings in the existing literature on 
cross-listing and M&A activity by providing the first empirical evidence on the relation 
between acquirer wealth effects and cross-listing. In addition, I examine the effect of cross-
delisting on the acquisition performance of a company, thus, providing insights on a 
previously totally unknown topic, i.e. the relation between cross-delisting and M&A activity. 
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The sample which I use comprises U.S. acquisitions by European companies during the time 
period 1996 - 2008. Using my Sample 1, consisting of 451 acquisitions by 281 European 
companies that were cross-listed in the U.S. at the time of the acquisition, and 951 
acquisitions by a control group, I find that the cross-listed companies are much more 
prominent in prestigious business publications in the year leading to an M&A deal than their 
non-cross-listed peers, as the average number of publication hits are 30.6 and 12.8, 
respectively. The difference between the groups is also statistically significant, indicating that 
cross-listers are likely to suffer from greater hubris. The difference also remains robust after 
controlling for the size of the company, and it seems that cross-listing status increases 
publication visibility by an average of 11.4 hits. Hence, for example a cross-lister with a 
market cap of $100 million attains on average the same amount of publicity than a non-cross-
listed company with a market cap of $40 billion. Furthermore, my regression analysis 
indicates that publication hits seem to have a negative relation with acquisition performance, 
which is in line with the view that the prominence of a company acts as a proxy for 
managerial hubris. Consistent with these results, the acquisitions by the cross-listed bidders 
seem to be somewhat less value creative than those by the control group, average cumulative 
abnormal returns (CARs) being 0.19% and 0.55%, respectively. The difference, however, is 
not consistently statistically significant.  
The regression analysis shows that the difference in CARs between cross-listers and the 
control group is mostly driven by other deal characteristics than the cross-listing status, such 
as acquirer size and company status of the target firm, i.e. cross-listers fare worse in M&A 
partly because the companies themselves are larger and they acquire more frequently public 
companies than the control group. Nonetheless, also the regression analysis provides some 
very weak evidence hinting that cross-listing has a decreasing effect on the returns from 
M&A, even after controlling for a large number of deal, acquirer, and target characteristics. 
However, after controlling for self-selection, the coefficient for the cross-listing dummy is 
clearly insignificant. The effect of cross-listing to gains from acquisitions seems to be 
unaffected by firm size. 
Sample 2 consists of 451 acquisitions during cross-listing, 105 takeovers prior to cross-listing, 
as well as 72 acquisitions after cross-delisting. The analysis of Sample 2 reveals that there are 
no significant differences in the publicity received by the sample companies prior and during 
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cross-listing. It also seems that there are no significant differences in the acquisition 
performance of the companies prior to and during cross-listing. 
In line with the hypothesis, the results indicate that the publicity gotten after cross-delisting 
collapses from the high levels experienced during cross-listing. The average number of 
publication hits after cross-delisting is a meager 6.8, which is also statistically different from 
the publicity gotten during cross-listing. Furthermore, the acquisition performance of a 
company seems to improve after it cross-delists. The average CAR jumps to a significant 
0.72%, which is also statistically significantly different from the gains experienced during 
cross-listing under some specifications. Also regression analysis hints that cross-delisting 
might be positively related to returns from acquisitions, even when we control for other 
potential sources of value creation. However, potentially due to the small sample size, the 
results are statistically insignificant. There does not seem to be any significant differences in 
the effect of cross-delisting to gains from acquisitions for companies of different size. 
1.2 Research question 
This thesis seeks to study the relation between European companies cross-listing to the U.S. 
stock exchanges, and the subsequent wealth effects of the cross-border M&A transactions 
carried out by these companies. I form my hypothesis around the following research problem: 
Research problem: Are U.S. acquisitions by European companies cross-listed 
in the U.S. value creative? 
In the empirical part of this paper, I seek to verify nine hypotheses relating to the above 
question. My first hypothesis claims that cross-listed companies are more prominent in 
prestigious business publications surrounding their transatlantic acquisitions than non-cross-
listed companies. This is likely to be the case, as I argue that the management of cross-listed 
companies are more prone to hubris and, thus, to irrational empire building, than the 
management of their non-cross-listed peers. My second hypothesis states that there is a 
negative relation between the number of publication hits and gains from acquisitions. As my 
third hypothesis, I pose that the acquisition performance of the cross-listers is worse than the 
acquisition performance of their non-cross-listed peers. My fourth hypothesis suggests that 
the difference between the bidder returns of cross-listed and non-cross-listed companies is 
larger for larger companies, who have greater agency issues. My fifth and perhaps the least 
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interesting, although very important hypothesis from the viewpoint of the shareholders of the 
cross-listing company, states that acquisitions by cross-listed companies are wealth 
destroying. My sixth hypothesis states that cross-listing has a decreasing effect on the returns 
from acquisitions. The seventh hypothesis, which is perhaps the most interesting due to the 
absence of earlier studies on the matter, is that returns from M&A transaction increase after a 
company cross-delists. This is likely to be the case as cross-delisted companies are deprived 
from the viable M&A currency and, hence, they are not inclined to use it and can be more 
rational in their acquisitions. My eighth hypothesis states that cross-delisted companies get 
less publicity in prestigious business publications than cross-listed companies. As my ninth 
hypothesis, I argue that the effect of cross-delisting is stronger for larger companies.  
1.3 Contribution to the literature 
This thesis contributes to the prior finance literature by being, to the best of my knowledge, 
the first academic research paper to assess the relative and absolute acquirer wealth effects of 
cross-border M&A transactions by cross-listed companies. Especially important is the 
comparison of wealth effects of M&A transactions during cross-listing and after cross-
delisting, as I am the first to study the relation between cross-delisting and M&A activity. 
Furthermore, by collecting a unique database of publication hits, I am able to shed light on the 
relative prominence of cross-listed companies in prestigious business publications as well as 
on the relation between gains from acquisitions and visibility in these publications.  
In addition, as companies choose to cross-list and cross-delist, they are not just random draws 
from the population, and self-selection in my sample must be controlled for. Thus, I am able 
to assess the relative importance of the factors related to these decisions, most importantly to 
the cross-delisting decision, which has so far been studied by only two authors: Witmer 
(2005) and Doidge et al. (2008). On a less important note, as I also control for a large number 
of wealth creation factors in my regression analysis, I am able to evaluate many of the 
existing theories on acquirer wealth creation with a recent data set on a transatlantic setting. 
1.4 Limitations of the study 
The data and methodology used in this thesis pose two important limitations. First, the 
scarcity of available data causes problems in the generalization of the results presented in the 
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study. Although the number of cross-lister and control group acquisitions is sufficient to make 
meaningful generalizations, the 105 acquisitions by the cross-listed companies prior to the 
cross-listing, and the 72 acquisitions by the cross-listed companies after cross-delisting are 
clearly suboptimal. However, the limitations set to the transaction characteristics, such as 
transaction size, are important in increasing the reliability of my results and, hence, quality of 
observations is more important than quantity. 
Second, the usage of event study methodology to account for the wealth effects of M&A 
transactions has been criticized due to the use of short-term event window. It has been 
suggested that a short-term market reaction might send a distorted signal on the true value 
creation of a corporate transaction as investors often make mistakes in the valuation of an 
M&A deal. However, due to the more severe shortcomings of long-term wealth effect 
methodologies, event study methodology is widely used in prior literature to study the wealth 
effects of M&A. Hence, in the absence of a better methodology, I employ the event study 
approach, which also makes my results easily comparable to those of earlier research. 
1.5 Definitions of key concepts 
Merger 
Mergers are corporate transactions that are conducted to combine to companies. Most often 
the deals are first negotiated by the management of the two companies, and the ultimate 
merging decision is subject to shareholder acceptation. 
Tender-offer 
An offer made directly to the shareholders of a company to tender (sell) their shares at a 
specific price. 
Takeover 
A term used to refer to both mergers and tender offers. Used interchangeably with acquisition 
in this thesis. 
M&A 
The term mergers and acquisitions, M&A, is frequently used to refer to corporate 
transactions, both tender offers and mergers. 
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Acquirer 
The party in M&A transactions who is perceived as buying the other party, although in 
mergers this is often difficult to determine. Used interchangeably with bidder throughout this 
thesis. 
Target 
The party in M&A transactions who is perceived as being bought by the acquirer. 
ADR 
American depositary receipts, ADRs, are derivative instruments issued by a U.S. depositary 
bank to the underlying shares in a non-U.S. company. ADRs can be publicly quoted on a 
major U.S. stock exchange (Level II and Level III ADRs), or they can be OTC listed (Level I 
and SEC Rule 144A ADRs). Level I ADRs are traded through NASDAQ‟s Pink Sheets, 
whereas Rule 144A ADRs are traded through the trading system PORTAL. 
Cross-listing 
Cross-listing refers to the listing of a company‟s shares to a foreign stock exchange after the 
company‟s initial listing, i.e. if the company initially goes public via a foreign stock 
exchange, this is not regarded as a cross-listing, but rather a direct listing. 
Cross-delisting 
Cross-delisting is defined as the discontinuation of the company‟s cross-listing quotation. 
1.6 Structure of the study 
The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the most important previous 
research on cross-listings and cross-delistings. Section 3 discusses the key research on 
motives and wealth effects of domestic and cross-border M&A transactions. Section 4 
presents the research problem and hypotheses, which I seek to verify in the empirical part of 
my paper. Section 5 describes the data and methodology used in this study. Section 6 presents 
the empirical findings of the thesis. Finally, section 7 summarizes the findings of my thesis 
and relates them to the earlier literature on cross-listings and cross-border M&A, as well as 
discusses some possible areas for future research on the relation between returns from M&A 
and cross-listing and cross-delisting. 
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2 Cross-listing to foreign exchanges 
In addition to home market listing, thousands of companies around the world have also sought 
to list their shares in a foreign exchange since the beginning of the 1980s. Cross-listing one‟s 
shares is a costly procedure, yet, a large number of companies have chosen to opt for this 
route. In this chapter, I present the extant literature on cross-listing to foreign exchanges. 
First, I discuss the trend of cross-listing and delisting, then I elaborate on accessing U.S. 
capital markets, I go on discussing the motivation and costs of cross-listing, and I conclude 
the chapter by assessing the relation between cross-listing and M&A activity. 
2.1 Trend of cross-listing and delisting 
Cross-listing to a foreign exchange was still relatively rare prior to the 1980s. However, 
during the 1980s, it gradually started to become increasingly common for a stock quoted 
company to seek a dual-listing from a foreign market, usually being an overseas market. The 
motives for this decision are discussed in detail in section 2.3. During the 1980s and 1990s, 
hundreds of companies around the world cross-listed their shares to foreign exchanges (Dobbs 
and Goedhart, 2008). Many of these companies chose to cross-list their shares in the U.S. 
capital markets. However, as evidenced in Figure 2 on the next page, the amount of annual 
foreign listings to New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has seized to grow, and has in fact 
declined since 2002, yet still amounting to roughly 450 foreign listings annually. 
As can be seen from Figure 2, the turning point in the number of foreign listings to the NYSE, 
and to the U.S. exchanges in general, was the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley legislation on 
July 30, 2002. This law, also known as the Public Company Accounting and Investor 
Protection Act of 2002, was a response to such corporate and accounting scandals as Enron 
and Worldcom. Sarbanes-Oxley introduced major changes to the regulation of financial 
practice and corporate governance. These changes imposed substantial costs of compliance to 
companies listed in the U.S. and, hence, depressed the number of companies seeking a listing 
in the U.S.. In fact, Litvak (2008) showed that the cross-listing premia, defined as the 
difference in the Tobin‟s q of a cross-listed company and a non-cross-listed company matched 
with country of origin and propensity to cross-list, actually decreased after the adoption of 
Sarbanes-Oxley and has remained at these lower levels ever since. 
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Figure 2: Foreign listings on the New York Stock Exchange This figure shows foreign listings on the New 
York Stock Exchange between 1998 and 2007. The listing are divided into emerging market and developed 
market issuers according to the country of origin of the listing company. Source: Dobbs and Goedhart (2008) 
Delistings from the U.S. stock exchanges were very rare in the 1980s, but during the 1990s a 
number of companies chose to terminate their cross-listing in the U.S.. However, the number 
of companies cross-delisting was only a fraction of those that cross-listed in the U.S. during 
the same period. Nonetheless, after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley, the number cross-
delistings from the U.S. stock exchanges by companies from developed nations overrun the 
number of cross-listings. Hence, the number of foreign companies from developed nations 
listed in the U.S. stock exchanges started to fall somewhat, but not yet substantially. 
It is very probable that the number of companies that would have liked to delist their shares 
from the U.S. exchanges after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley was a lot larger than the 
actual amount of delistings that were seen at the time. This is due to the fact that until quite 
recently, it was very difficult for a U.S. cross-listed company to delist from the U.S. 
exchanges. It was possible to delist in theory, but in practice the delister would not be able to 
terminate their obligations, such as reporting, imposed on the company when it first cross-
listed in the U.S. (Doidge et al., 2008). In fact, firms were able to delist their shares from the 
exchanges, but substantial obstacles were placed in deregistering their shares. And when the 
shares could not be deregistered, the foreign firms would still have to adhere to the tight 
reporting requirements as specified in the original SEC filing. The relaxation of these 
stringent requirements, however, was quite often the reason, why a company was likely to 
seek for a delisting in the first place.  
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All of this changed with a new rule (Exchange Act Rule 12h-6) adopted by the SEC on March 
21, 2007. This rule made it easier for a foreign firm to deregister its shares, so that it would 
seize to have any obligations towards SEC or the U.S. exchange. Foreign companies were 
given the possibility to deregister their shares if less than 5% of the total global trading of 
their shares took place on U.S. exchanges. As a consequence, it is now much more realistic 
for those cross-listed in the U.S. to consider taking the step of deregistration. (Doidge et al., 
2008) 
According to Doidge et al. (2008), 59 firms immediately announced they would deregister as 
the new Exchange Act Rule 12h-6 was passed. Also Dobbs and Goedhart (2008) note that 
from May 2007 to May 2008, 35 large European companies announced that they would delist 
their shares from U.S. exchanges, including such household names as Air-France KLM, 
Bayer, British Airways, Danone and Fiat. Also Finnish Metso, Stora Enso and  
UPM-Kymmene delisted their shares during this period.  
Studying the reasons for cross-delisting, Doidge et al. (2008) found that delisted firms 
experienced substantially slower growth and lower stock returns than other U.S. listed foreign 
firms in the years preceding the decision. The authors conclude that foreign companies cross-
list their shares in the U.S. to raise capital at the lowest available cost to finance growth, and 
when those opportunities disappear, a listing becomes less valuable, and firms are more likely 
to deregister. As now most of the companies that wanted to get out from the U.S. stock 
exchanges, but were unable prior to 2007, have probably already delisted their shares, it is 
interesting to see where the number of foreign companies cross-listed in the U.S. exchanges 
will develop in the future. 
Case: Stora Enso 
I will conclude this section by discussing the motives of Stora Enso to cross-list in the NYSE 
in the first place, and to later delist its shares from the U.S.. Stora Enso, a Finnish paper, 
packaging, and forest products company with global revenues around EUR 11 billion (2008), 
cross-listed in the NYSE on September 1, 2000. The company cited the following reasons for 
its decision to cross-list: providing a trading location for new North American shareholders 
attained through the acquisition of Consolidated Papers on February 22, 2000, improving the 
share price, and easing acquisitions. Only roughly seven years later on December 7, 2007, 
Stora Enso applied for a delisting from the NYSE with the following motives: delisting 
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reduces costs and complexity, eurozone provides liquid and well-functioning capital markets, 
and trading volumes in the U.S. accounts for less than 5% of the worldwide average daily 
volume of Stora Enso. It seems that Stora Enso was seeking to cut its costs as it viewed the 
U.S. listing redundant as financial markets had become more global and liquidity available in 
the eurozone was sufficient for the company. Many companies that have subsequently 
delisted from the U.S. are likely to have had similar motives. 
2.2 Accessing the U.S. equity capital markets 
Company can seek a quotation on a U.S. exchange either as a direct listing to the exchange or 
through a cross-listing. In addition to listing to an exchange, a company can also opt for 
private placement or OTC quotation. In this section, I present the methods of accessing the 
U.S. capital markets starting with direct listing and going on to cross-listing and other non-
direct ways of listing. 
2.2.1 Direct listing 
Direct listing to U.S. exchanges without prior listing to other exchanges is possible to also 
companies outside the U.S.. In practice, however, very few companies outside U.S. or Canada 
opt for this route (Foerster and Karolyi, 1999), and those companies are likely to originate 
from tax havens and are often acquisition vehicles. In order to list on a U.S. exchange, a 
company must fulfill a number of requirements regarding number of shareholders, financial 
performance, and company valuation (NYSE web pages, 2008). Generally, a company must 
have a large number of shareholders in the U.S. before listing, the company must have been 
profitable for three years in a row, and it has to be of sufficient size. The exact values for 
these benchmarks vary by market place, which can be NYSE, the former American Stock 
Exchange nowadays called NYSE Alternext U.S. (AMEX) and National Association of 
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). After listing in one of these 
exchanges, a company will have to comply with U.S. GAAP requirements, which are likely to 
be more stringent than the regulations in the home country of the issuer. As direct listings to 
U.S. amongst European companies are rare and the specific topic of this thesis is cross-
listings, I now go on to discuss the practice of cross-listing and other non-direct ways of 
accessing the U.S. capital markets. 
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2.2.2 Cross-listing 
Cross-listing in the U.S. is usually carried out through American Depositary Receipt (ADR) 
programs. ADRs are derivative instruments issued by a U.S. depository bank and are created 
through the deposit of common shares in the issuer‟s home market. ADRs confer to their 
holders the same dividend and voting rights as the underlying shares, and trade in the U.S. 
like regular U.S. securities, although a small fee will have to be paid to the depository bank 
for each trade and for the cashing of dividends (Pagano et al., 2002). ADRs are usually 
sponsored, i.e. they are issued by a bank with the issuer‟s consent. However, also 
unsponsored ADRs exists, such as those of the UK based company Anglo American‟s ADRs, 
which are issued in NASDAQ by Citigroup and JP Morgan amongst others, without the 
consent of Anglo American. The ratio of ADRs to underlying securities can be decided by the 
issuer and, hence, need not be 1:1, although this is the most common procedure. Also the 
number of ADRs is not fixed, as brokers can create ADRs to meet demand by depositing 
additional home market shares by the depositary banks. 
ADR programs are categorized into four different types: Level I, Level II, Level III and SEC 
Rule 144A private placements (see Table 1 for summary of their characteristics).The most 
common way to cross-list in the U.S. is to file for a Level II ADR listing. A Level II ADR 
program entails listing of the company to NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ. In Level II programs, 
no new shares are issued and, hence, no new capital is raised as existing shares are used to 
satisfy investor demand and liquidity. Because Level II ADR securities are listed or quoted on 
a major U.S. exchange, Level II ADRs reach a broad universe of potential shareholders and 
increase the issuer‟s visibility through reporting in the financial media (JP Morgan, 2005). 
Level II ADR programs require only partial reconciliation for financials according to U.S. 
GAAP, however, when combined with full SEC registration, even Level II programs are 
relatively burdensome to the listing company. (Citigroup, 2005) 
Level III ADR programs, on the other hand, are in other ways quite similar to Level II 
programs, but they entail a public offering of new shares into the U.S. market. Due to the 
nature of the Level III program being quite similar to an IPO, this ADR type requires that the 
issuer files more numerous documents with the SEC and commits to more stringent reporting 
requirements than in the Level II programs (see Table 1 for details). According to JP Morgan 
(2005), Level III  ADR programs have a high profile and are followed closely by the financial  
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Table 1: American depositary receipt (ADR) program levels 
This table summarizes the key features of different ARD programs. NYSE refers to New York Stock Exchange, 
NASDAQ refers to National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations, and AMEX refers to the 
former American Stock Exchange nowadays called NYSE Alternext U.S.. QIBs stands for qualified institutional 
buyers. 
 Level I Level II Level III 144A Private 
placement 
Objective Broaden investor 
base with existing 
shares 
Broaden investor 
base with existing 
shares 
Raise capital with 
new issue, 
broaden investor 
base 
Raise capital and 
broaden 
shareholder base 
within QIBs 
Trading location OTC Pink Sheet 
Trading 
NYSE, NASDAQ 
or AMEX 
NYSE, NASDAQ 
or AMEX 
U.S. private 
placement market 
via PORTAL 
SEC registration Form F-6 Form F-6 Form F-1 and F-6 None 
U.S. Reporting requirements Exemption under 
rule 12g3-2(b) 
Form 20-F 
annually 
Form 20-F 
annually, F-2 and 
F-3 for 
subsequent 
offerings 
Exemption under 
rule 12g3-2(b) or 
agree to provide 
info on request 
U.S. GAAP requirements No reconciliation 
required 
Only partial 
reconciliation for 
financials 
Full reconciliation 
for financials 
No reconciliation 
required 
Indicative timing (from 
advisor appointment to 
launch) 
7 weeks 7 weeks 14 weeks 7 weeks 
Sources: Citigroup (2005) and JP Morgan (2005) 
press and other media through the capital raising phase, often generating significant visibility 
for the issuer. This, in addition to the need for capital, is likely to be one of the key reasons, 
why a company would opt for a Level III listing instead of Level II. 
In addition to Level II or III ADR programs, a foreign firm can also access the U.S. equity 
markets through Level I ADR offering or SEC Rule 144A private placement. Level I ADRs 
are a quick way to seek a quotation and develop shareholder base in the U.S.. Although not 
publicly quoted, Level I ADR programs are available for retail investors in the OTC market 
through NASDAQ‟s Pink Sheets (JP Morgan, 2005). No new capital is raised through Level I 
ADR programs and the programs are not subject to the requirements of U.S. GAAP. 
However, also the visibility generated through a Level I listing is quite limited. 
A Rule 144A ADR is the quickest, easiest, and most cost-effective way to raise capital in the 
U.S.. Under 144A, new shares are created and privately placed with institutional investors 
15 
with the possibility of resale of the securities to Qualified Institutional Buyers (QIBs) in the 
U.S.. The definition of a QIB is an institution that either manages at least $100 million in 
securities, or is a registered broker-dealer that owns or invests, on a discretionary basis, $10 
million in securities of non-affiliates. Rule 144A ADRs can be traded through PORTAL, 
which is an automated system that provides security descriptions and pricing information for 
144A issues. The liquidity of these securities, however, is somewhat limited as the bid-ask 
spread in Portal is quite wide. (JP Morgan, 2005) 
2.3 Motivation for cross-listing 
A number of papers have assessed the motivation for a company to cross-list outside its home 
markets (see Karolyi, 2006, for a recent summary). In this part, I present the key prior studies 
on the most documented benefits of cross-listing to the listing company. I have divided the 
benefits in two categories, 1) raising capital and 2) lowering the cost of capital. Although 
currency for M&A is a clear motivation to seek a cross-listing it is discussed later on as a 
standalone part due to its importance to the thesis. I also, when practical, elaborate on the 
development of the benefits, which I present in this section. However, a number of authors 
(see, e.g., Zingales, 2007) suggest that U.S. equity markets have lost some of their 
competitive edge not due to shrinking benefits of cross-listings, but due to towering costs. 
2.3.1 Capital raising 
The most common reason for equity issues in general is the need to raise funds for investment 
and cross-listings are no exception. Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002) document that out 
of their sample of 193 ADR issues in NYSE, 71% raised equity in the year following the 
issue. Pagano et al. (2002) suggest that the motive to cross-list for capital raising is highest 
when there are significant financial constraints in the home market of the cross-lister. The 
authors also note that cross-listing for capital raising is likely to be the case when the cross-
lister is a fast growing company, or a company that has already exhausted its debt capacity. It 
might also be the case that debt raising in U.S. becomes easier after cross-listing as cross-
listed companies have to commit to strict disclosure and corporate governance standards of 
U.S. GAAP. Sarbanes-Oxley has further increased this effect. On the other hand, the 
implementation of IFRS 3 and other stringent accounting systems outside the U.S. have 
decreased the gap between the strictness of U.S. and overseas accounting standards. 
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2.3.2 Decreased cost of capital 
On top of raising additional funds, firms are documented to cross-list in order to lower their 
cost of capital. For example, discussing cross-listing Chaplinsky and Ramchand (2000) note 
that “The search for new capital markets - and lower costs of capital - is an ongoing search for 
most firms.” Stapleton and Subrahmanyam (1977) and Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan 
(1987) provide a theoretical base on how the cross-listing of shares across segmented markets 
would lead to a higher intrinsic market price and lower cost of capital. A number of academic 
papers (Alexander, Eun, and Janakiramanan, 1988; Foester and Karolyi, 1993; Lau, Diltz, and 
Apilado, 1994; Miller, 1999; Errunza and Miller, 2000) have documented a return pattern 
consistent with this view. There are a number of potential factors that might decrease the cost 
of capital of a cross-listed firm, and in this subsection, I present each of them in turn. 
Increased investor base 
Cross-listing increases a firm‟s investor base, which enhances the firm‟s risk sharing and thus 
lowers its cost of capital (see, e.g., Lombardo and Pagano, 1999; Stulz, 1999; Bancel and 
Mittoo, 2001; Martin and Rey, 2000). More specifically, Karolyi (1998) documents that 
cross-listers seem to experience a reduction in their home market beta. This implies that 
riskier firms with higher cost of capital should reap greater benefits from cross-listing.  
According to JP Morgan (2005), investor base is likely to increase through a cross-listing, 
because many institutional investors are not allowed to hold foreign equity, but when a 
foreign company is cross-listed in a domestic exchange, it becomes possible to invest in these 
shares. Institutional investors are likely to welcome this possibility as it enables them to 
diversify more efficiently especially geographically, but possibly in some cases also across 
different industries. It is also important to note that trading costs of investing in domestically 
listed equity, be it depositary receipt or common stock, as opposed to foreign equity are likely 
to be substantially lower for both institutional and individual investors. Pagano et al. (2002), 
also note that reduction in the cost of converting dividends to domestic currency is likely to be 
an important benefit of investing in ADRs as opposed to foreign equity. 
Investing in foreign equity can also be disadvantageous due to limited amount of information 
available on foreign companies, as indicated by Gehrig (1993), Kang and Stulz (1994), and 
Brennan and Cao (1997). Merton (1987) takes this idea somewhat further in his „awareness 
hypothesis‟, which basically entails total ignorance of foreign investment opportunities by 
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investors. Pagano et al. (2002) conclude that cross-listing alleviates information asymmetries 
by making more abundant, timely and transparent information available for local investors. 
Furthermore, Pagano et al. believe that the benefits of increased amount of information do not 
concern only equity investors, but the company might also be able to gain access to cheaper 
debt financing after cross-listing. It is important to note, however, that although information 
asymmetries between developed European companies and U.S. investors still exist, they have 
decreased dramatically during the last two decades due to enhanced flow of information. The 
rise of internet and the enactment of more stringent corporate governance and disclosure 
requirements in Europe have greatly contributed to this development. 
Empirical evidence on the relation between cost of capital and increased shareholder base is 
provided by Foerster and Karolyi (1999), who show that the share price of a cross-lister rises 
more at the time of a cross-listing when it is accompanied by a greater expansion of the 
shareholder base. Also Miller (1999) finds evidence indicating that the price reaction to a 
cross-listing is positively correlated with the increase in the shareholder base. Furthermore, 
Miller notes that the price reaction is also positively linked to barriers of capital flows, a view 
which is supported by Foerster and Karolyi (2000). 
Enhanced liquidity 
Another potential source of value creation in cross-listing is enhanced liquidity of the 
company‟s equity, as overseas exchanges may be able to provide superior liquidity when 
compared to the home market. It actually seems that enhanced liquidity is one of the key 
motives of cross-listing as a market survey by Mittoo (1992) shows that 28% of the managers 
surveyed cite increased liquidity as the primary reason for cross-listing in the U.S.. The effect 
on liquidity is likely to be largest when the domestic capital market of the cross-lister is 
underdeveloped and, thus, better microstructure for liquidity production is available overseas. 
The empirical evidence on the effect of cross-listing to liquidity seems to be mixed at best. 
Some studies (see, e.g., Kadlec and McConnell, 1994; Noronha, Sarin, Saudagaran, 1996; 
Foerster and Karolyi, 1998) indicate that the competitive pressure from another exchange as 
well as the greater turnover related to a wider shareholder base may enhance liquidity in the 
home market by decreasing bid-ask spread and increasing trading volume. However, Pagano 
(1989) and Madhavan (1995) suggest that liquidity might also suffer in cases of high market 
fragmentation. Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998) find evidence consistent with this 
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view by using a sample of Mexican companies issuing ADRs. Domowitz et al. show that 
liquidity actually suffers both domestically and in the foreign market, if intermarket linkages 
are poor. Surveying the broad amount of literature on the effect of cross-listing to liquidity, 
Karolyi (1998), on the other hand, concludes that cross-listers typically experience narrowing 
of the bid-ask spread and increase of trading volume on their home market. However, the 
author also notes that the extent to which liquidity is improved depends on the proportion of 
the total trading volume the new market captures, as well as on the possible trading 
restrictions imposed on foreigners in the stocks of the cross-listers before cross-listing. 
The „time zone‟ hypothesis by Pulatkonak and Sofianos (1999) seeks to clarify when cross-
listing is likely to increase trading volume the most. Pulatkonak and Sofianos suggest that the 
closer the exchange of cross-listing, the more the trading volume in that exchange eats into 
the domestic turnover of the cross-lister. The empirical findings of Pagano et al. (2002) 
support the time zone hypothesis, showing that cross-listing by a European company on 
another European exchange decreases domestic turnover on average by 8%, where as no 
significant change in domestic turnover is found when the cross-listing is in a U.S. exchange. 
The most probable explanation for the time zone hypothesis is the fact that when the distance 
to the cross-lister exchange is large, the company extends its trading hours substantially, thus 
providing investors the possibility to trade almost around the clock. 
Halling, Pagano, Randl, and Zechner (2006) provide evidence indicating that the enhancing 
effect which cross-listing has on liquidity might be a think of the past. The authors note that 
the allocation of trading on a cross-listers stock has shifted dramatically from the foreign 
stock exchange to the domestic market since the 1980s. Zingales‟ (2007) view on cross-
listings as a liquidity provider can be summarized as “Electronic and globalized trading might 
have eroded the unique advantage of trading in New York.” 
Improved disclosure and corporate governance 
Cross-listing in a foreign exchange entails that the cross-lister must commit itself to a new set 
of disclosure and corporate governance requirements. These new requirements can be a 
significant burden, as will be discussed in section 2.4, but they can also be a source of value 
creation. When a company voluntarily chooses to subject itself to more stringent 
requirements, its disclosure and corporate governance are likely to improve, thus, benefiting 
the shareholder of the company as agency costs of external finance are decreased. Consistent 
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with this view, Stulz (1999) shows that companies from countries of low legal standards can 
attain a lower cost of capital by subjecting themselves to more stringent requirements. 
Consequently, it seems that companies seek to signal their quality by listing in tightly 
regulated capital markets (Cantale,1996; Fuerst, 1998). 
Exchanges seem to engage in a „race to the top‟ regarding disclosure requirements as they 
compete for new listings by adopting more stringent disclosure and corporate governance 
standards (Huddart, Hughes, and Brunnermeier, 1999). If this is the case, it would seem 
justified to assume that the effect of tighter regulation to the cross-listing decision would have 
diminished over time. Supporting this view Fanto and Karmel (1997) state that the 
improvements in European regulatory standards, most notably the adoption of IRFS, seem to 
have attracted U.S. based institutional investors to stocks listed exclusively in Europe. 
Increased analyst coverage  
Cross-listing to foreign exchanges has also been shown to increase analyst coverage and 
media attention (see, e.g., Baker et al., 2002; Lang, Lins, and Miller, 2003). Increased analyst 
coverage decreases information asymmetries and the increased visibility is likely to be 
welcomed especially by institutional investors. However, quite recently Dobbs and Goedhart 
(2008) argue that after correcting for the impact of size, cross-listed European companies are 
covered by only roughly two more analysts than those that are not cross-listed, while the 
average number of analyst covering the 300 largest European companies is 20. Also analyst 
activity in the U.S. in general has dropped notable in recent years (Kolasinski, 2006), perhaps 
partly due to the Global Research Settlement enforcement agreement reached in 2003. 
On the other hand, Blass and Yafeh (2001) provide evidence that the decision on the 
exchange of cross-listing might be affected by the location of analysts with superior 
knowledge of the industry. Consequently, cross-listers often tend to be high-tech oriented 
high-risk companies. This notion is consistent with the view that large stock markets are more 
suitable than banks to value innovative and fast growing high-tech companies (Allen, 1993). 
Product market reputation – a reason or a product of cross-listing? 
Product market reputation in the foreign market has been hypothesized to effect the cross-
listing decision. According to one view, a company which has a high product market 
reputation in some market might be able to capitalize on this reputation by offering equity in 
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this market, as local investors as consumers already trust the firm (see, Pagano et al., 2002). 
However, it might also be that the causality is other way around, i.e. companies might seek to 
cross-list their shares to increase their visibility in the market with the intent of increasing 
their sales. Evidence on the link between product market reputation and cross-listing is 
presented by Saudagaran (1988), but the author fails to show the direction of the causality.  
2.4 Costs of cross-listing 
The literature on the benefits of cross-listing is extensive, however, substantial costs are also 
associated with cross-listing. Direct costs of cross-listing include for example legal, 
accounting and other advisory fees as well as the listing charges of the exchange. For 
example, in NYSE the initial listing fee is $150,000 - 250,000, depending on the number of 
ADRs issued. All and all, initial registration with SEC is likely to pose costs in the ballpark of 
$1 million in accounting, legal, printing and registration fees (Baker et al., 2002). In addition 
to the initial fee, there is also an annual fee, whose amount also depends on the number of 
ADRs issued, the minimum fee in NYSE being $38,000. For example, a foreign firm issuing 
100 million ADRs in NYSE would face a $240,000 initial fee and $46,500 annual fee.  
Although direct costs of cross-listing may be very substantial especially to small companies, 
the indirect costs of cross-listing are likely to be far greater than the direct costs. For example, 
Fanto and Karmel‟s (1997) survey on potential cross-listers to the U.S. markets indicates that 
the cost of complying with U.S. GAAP and the risk of litigation are the main costs of cross-
listing. Also Mittoo‟s (1992) survey indicates that approximately 60% of the managers of 
cross-listing companies identified SEC reporting and compliance requirements to be the 
largest cost item. In a series of related studies, Saudagaran and Biddle (1992, 1995) show that 
the costs related to disclosure are the most significant variable affecting the choice of 
exchange to cross-list in. Furthermore, Saudagaran and Biddle (1995) show that the higher the 
disclosure requirements on a particular market, the less likely a company is to list there. 
Zingales (2007) notes that the increased threat of litigation in the U.S. is a substantial cost for 
cross-listers, as directors can be held personally responsible for a number of issues, but these 
directors reap only a very tiny fraction of the benefits of cross-listing. This might create a 
serious agency problem, as cross-listing is likely to be the right course of action for a number 
of companies, but their directors choose to pass the chance in the fear of lawsuits.  
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2.5 Cross-listing and M&A 
A number of authors, such as Pagano et al. (2002) and Eiteman et al. (1998), suggest that 
cross-listing might be motivated by the cross-lister‟s desire to obtain a currency for M&A 
transactions. Also JP Morgan (2005) concludes that “Mergers & acquisitions increasingly 
require the cross-border transfer of funds in today‟s global economy. Depositary receipts are 
the perfect structure to facilitate these transfers – .“ Despite these predictions, there seems to 
be only a very limited amount of empirical studies on acquisitions carried out by cross-listed 
companies in the market of cross-listing. In this section, I present the few preceding studies. 
First to study cross-listings and M&A activity was Tolmunen (2001). Later, his Master‟s 
thesis evolved into a co-written journal article (Tolmunen and Torstila, 2005), in which 
Tolmunen and Torstila study the effect of cross-listing on the acquisition behavior of a 
company. Their sample includes 547 European companies, of which 221 are cross-listed in 
U.S. exchanges and 326 are listed solely in their home markets. Studying acquisition 
performance by these firms in the time period 1996 - 2000, Tolmunen and Torstila show that 
cross-listed firms are significantly more active in acquiring U.S. companies than their 
domestically listed peers. This result holds even after controlling for a number of other 
variables commonly viewed as affecting acquisition likelihood. Furthermore, as companies 
choose to cross-list and, hence, are not random draws from the population, Tolmunen and 
Torstila also take into account self-selection in the sample and the results still remains robust. 
Tolmunen and Torstila (2005) also examine the payment method used in transatlantic M&As. 
They find evidence supporting the view that cross-listed firms are more likely to use equity 
payment for larger transactions than their domestically listed peers, but this result seems to be 
caused by self-selection. Tolmunen and Torstila also study the effect of cross-listing to 
premiums paid in acquisitions, but they do not find any significant relation. Furthermore, 
Tolmunen and Torstila examine the acquisition behavior of cross-listed companies before and 
after cross-listing. Their results indicate that cross-listed firms are active acquirers in the U.S. 
before and after cross-listing and, hence, there is no support on the view that the likelihood of 
acquisition increases after cross-listing. However, it seems that after cross-listing companies 
start to make large acquisitions and pay higher portion of their M&A volume with equity. The 
total M&A volume financed with equity leaps from 23% before cross-listing to 43% in the 
first five years after cross-listing and to further 58% in years 6 or more. Also the mean 
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transaction size increases from $427 million to $1,118 million. The authors‟ results, therefore, 
imply that cross-listing enables firms to engage in large equity-financed M&A. 
Burns (2004) examines the role of cross-listed stocks as an acquisition currency concentrating 
on the effect of cross-listing on premiums. The author studies the acquisitions behavior of 
1,412 U.S., 94 cross-listed, and 144 foreign non-cross-listed acquirers in the time period  
1984 - 2000, and finds that cross-listed firms often use equity to finance their M&A 
transactions with U.S. targets, whereas non-cross-listed acquirers primarily use cash. 
Furthermore, cross-listed firms using equity pay on average 10% less premium than non-
cross-listed firms that pay with cash. However, Burns also finds that cross-listed acquirers use 
equity less frequently than U.S. acquirers. In addition, the author finds evidence that legal 
protection in the home country of the acquirer plays a role in the choice of payment method: 
cross-listed companies domiciled in countries with poor legal protection are less likely to use 
equity and they pay higher premiums than bidders from countries with better legal protection. 
Burns et al. (2007) build on the paper by Burns (2004) with a broader sample of 149 cross-
listed and 438 non-cross-listed bidders, and provide support for all Burns‟ earlier findings 
presented above. In addition, the authors suggest that while cross-listing reduces barriers to 
investment, it cannot completely subsume both the legal environment and the importance of 
financial intermediaries‟ monitoring. Hence, the authors argue that the extent of actual legal 
and regulatory bonding by cross-listers is perhaps not as comprehensive as is often assumed. 
The papers by Tolmunen (2001), Tolmunen and Torstila (2005), Burns (2004) and Burns et 
al. (2007) are the sole empirical studies on the relation between cross-listing and M&A 
activity. None of these papers, however, examine the wealth effects of these deals, although 
Tolmunen and Torstila provide evidence that cross-listers often engage in large and equity-
financed transactions, thus, having potentially dubious consequences for their shareholders. 
Furthermore, although Tolmunen and Torstila study the acquisition behavior of cross-listers 
also before cross-listing, there is not yet a single paper on the acquisition behavior of 
companies after they have cross-delisted. In the light of these two obvious shortcomings in 
the prior literature, there is a clear need for an empirical research paper on these matters.  
In this chapter, I surveyed the prior literature on cross-listing to foreign exchanges. Having 
now covered the most important aspects of cross-listing, I can move on to discuss the theories 
and wealth effects of M&A transactions. 
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3 Motives and wealth effects of mergers and acquisitions 
In this section, I present an overview of the most important earlier studies on M&A 
transactions. First, I introduce the studies related to motives for M&A in general, and then to 
cross-border transactions specifically. Then, I go on providing a summary of what various 
finance researchers have found out about wealth gains in domestic and cross-border M&A, as 
well as to what variables they attribute these gains and losses. I conclude the chapter by 
discussing the special characteristics of transatlantic M&A. 
3.1 Motives explaining mergers and acquisitions 
Previous research has presented several theories explaining why takeovers occur. The 
understanding of key theories is imperative also for the understanding of the specific topic of 
this thesis, i.e. transatlantic M&A. This section begins by addressing general motives for 
M&A and goes on discussing the specific motives for cross-border M&A. It is important to 
discuss separately the motives for cross-border M&A as these motives indicate why it might 
be the case that cross-border M&A is more value creative than domestic M&A. 
3.1.1 General motives 
Theories explaining M&A are usually categorized as 1) synergy and efficiency theories, 2) 
agency theories, and 3) hubris theories. In this section, I briefly go through extant literature on 
each of these theories. It should be noted here that various other theories, such as those related 
to wealth redistribution, merger waves and optimal size of the company, have been 
hypothesized to motivate M&A transactions. However, in this section, I concentrate on the 
three most important and most well documented theories.  
Synergy and efficiency theories 
Synergy and efficiency theories predict that M&A transactions are value creative as firms 
engage in M&A only when the value of the combined entity is more than the value of the two 
individual companies. This will be the case if the two companies have synergies, which can 
be mainly categorized as financial or operational. Synergies are likely to be the most 
frequently suggested reason for M&A by both academic research and top management of the 
acquiring companies. Empirical evidence shows that while cost synergies are mostly achieved 
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as planned, the vast majority of revenue synergies will not be realized (Christofferson, 
McNish, and Sias, 2004), which then decreases the estimated profitability of the transaction. 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1983) find evidence supporting the view that tender offers occur as 
the bidding firm attempts to gain control of the target, and create value by implementing a 
higher-valued operating strategy. Higher value can be achieved as bidders utilize some 
specialized resource, such as more efficient management, economies of scale, improved 
production techniques, or the combination of complementary resources.  
Agency theories 
While efficiency and synergy theories predict gains from acquisitions, agency theories 
propose that M&A transactions are value destroying events, as managers pursue their own 
interest instead of trying to maximize shareholder wealth (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This 
is made possible in public companies, where ownership and management are usually 
separated, and the shareholders have little or no possibility to efficiently monitor the 
management. In his seminal paper, „Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and 
takeovers‟, Jensen (1986) presents a theory, according to which managers choose to spend 
free cash flow to value destroying acquisitions instead of distributing the excess cash to the 
shareholders of the company. This happens because managers are often prone to so called 
„empire building‟, as they are likely to feel more powerful, and get a higher remuneration, if 
they are able to expand the size of their company. Pike and Neale (2003) label such 
managerial takeover motives as the three Ps: power, prestige and pay. Empirical evidence on 
agency theory is presented by for example Morck and Schleifer (1990), who show that if 
private benefits to the management are particularly large, the managers might pursue 
shareholder value destroying acquisitions. 
Although agency theory states that takeovers are caused by agency issues, takeovers can also 
be a cure to agency conflicts. Manne (1965) suggest that when managers are running a 
company sub-optimally, there is a large incentive for an outside acquirer to take over the 
company, and improve its operations. Manne states that a majority of mergers are likely to be 
caused by this „market for corporate control‟. Grossman and Hart (1980) share Manne‟s view 
in that takeovers can be seen as a managerial disciplinary device, but due to minority 
shareholders possibility to free ride the deal, Grossman and Hart suggest that we observe less 
M&A transactions than would be socially optimal. 
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Hubris 
Whereas synergy and efficiency theory expects positive wealth effects from M&A and agency 
theory negative returns, hubris-theory, presented by Roll (1986) in his seminal paper, suggests 
that M&A transactions are a zero-sum game: target shareholders‟ gain is the bidder 
shareholders‟ loss. Roll suggests that there are in practice nonexistent synergies between most 
corporate combinations, and that the prevailing market price should reflect the full value of 
the firm under strong form market efficiency. The author states that the higher valuation of 
the target by the bidder might be caused by hubris as well as excessive self-confidence by the 
decision makers. Roll suggests that managers are likely to overpay as they are overly 
confident in their valuations and, thus, in bidding contests the most overly optimistic bidder is 
likely to win and suffer from winner‟s curse. Roll concludes that in the absence of synergies 
takeover premiums represent valuation errors and are, in effect, a direct redistribution of 
wealth from the bidder shareholders to the target shareholders. 
In hubris hypothesis, Roll (1986) has perfect capital markets, where irrational managers make 
bad decisions. Schleifer and Vishny (2003), on the other hand, base their model on imperfect 
capital markets and rational managers. Schleifer and Vishny believe that transactions are 
driven by stock market valuations of the merging companies as managers take advantage of 
missvaluations in the market place. According to Schleifer and Vishny, both acquirer and 
target shareholders can benefit from the transaction in the short run, but in the long-run M&A 
transactions are a zero-sum game as they are driven purely by the valuations of the acquiring 
and target companies, and no real wealth creation factors are present. 
3.1.2 Motives for cross-border M&A 
Having now covered the most important motives for M&A transaction in general, I now go on 
to discuss the motives related to cross-border M&A specifically. Various motives have been 
presented in the earlier literature, and I present here the most documented ones, i.e. theories 
relating to entry into new markets, learning and acquisition of resources and acquirer specific 
capabilities. 
Entry into new markets 
In some cases a company might wish to enter into a new market, but finds it very hard to 
establish a new entity as a greenfield investment to cater for that market. It might be for 
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example that the legislation in that specific country makes it troublesome to establish a new 
entity, or that the existing market players have very solid positions in the market, and market 
penetration would be costly and time consuming. Under these circumstances, the company 
might choose to acquire one of the existing market players to facilitate its entry into the 
markets. Using this approach, the company can swiftly gain access to local suppliers, clients 
and marketing channels (Wang and Boateng, 2007), whereas it would have had to use 
substantial amount of resources and time to establish this position from scratch. Weston, 
Mitchell, and Mulherin (2004) argue that entry into new markets is likely to be a very 
important motive for M&A when the company‟s domestic markets are saturated or too small. 
It can also be that entry into new markets is sought not only for its growth prospects, but also 
for risk reduction through international diversification. For example Fatemi (1984) and Seth 
(1990) show that geographical market diversification indeed reduces the riskiness of a 
company. However, as markets have become more correlated, this effect has grown smaller 
during recent years, but as Hargis and Mei (2006) point out, country diversification is still a 
key risk reduction factor and should not be neglected in favor of industrial diversification. 
Learning and acquisition of resources 
A number of studies have hypothesized that that learning and acquisition of key resources are 
important drivers of cross-border M&A (see, e.g., Vermeulen and Barkema, 2001). According 
to this theory, there are limits to how far it is practical for a company to develop intangible 
assets, such as technical and managerial capabilities, in house. Consequently, a company 
might find it more practical to make up for its intangible deficiencies by acquiring overseas 
companies that already hold these capabilities. The evidence regarding this theory is 
somewhat ambiguous as some studies (e.g. Eun, Kolodny, and Scheraga, 1996) suggest that 
cross-border acquisitions of R&D-intensive companies generate larger bidder returns and are, 
hence, more likely to be targets of international M&A, while other studies (e.g. Cakici et al., 
1996) find no such relation. 
Internalization of acquirer’s intangible assets 
Internalization hypothesis poses that in order to create value in cross-border M&A, the 
acquirer must have intangible assets that can be internalized (see Caves, 1971; Morck and 
Yeung, 1992). The theory suggests that firms having a lot of intangible assets are more likely 
to engage in cross-border M&A by acquiring targets that are lacking the capabilities which 
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the acquirer possess. This allows the acquirer to leverage on its capabilities on a large scale 
and, thus, create additional shareholder value through the acquisition. 
3.2 Wealth effects of M&A announcements 
Wealth effects around M&A announcements have been studied since 1980s, and the topic has 
spawned an exhaustive academic literature. This is because according to finance theory, at the 
announcement date of an M&A transaction, the market value of the corporation making the 
transaction should instantly change to reflect the value of the announced deal. Hence, in order 
to grasp the value created through M&A, one should look at the CARs around the 
announcement date. It is common to look at the value creation in a window of time around the 
announcement date, due to the fact that private information of the deal might be leaking and 
causes run-up on the share price before the announcement date, and also markets might be 
slow in reacting to the announcement. In this section, I present the key empirical studies on 
wealth effect of M&A announcements starting with domestic M&A transactions and finishing 
with cross-border deals. The focus is on the wealth effect to the acquirers‟ shareholders, but in 
the first subsection, I also comment on the value creation to the targets‟ shareholders in order 
to obtain a picture on the distribution of the total gains. It should be noted that by returns, 
gains, or losses, I constantly refer to CARs, except when I specifically mention otherwise. 
Table 2 summarizes the findings of the studies, which I present in this section. 
3.2.1 Wealth effects of domestic M&A announcements 
Most of the studies on wealth effects of domestic M&A announcements have concentrated on 
the U.S. markets due to extensive availability of observations that tend to make the results 
more reliable. Hence, this subsection will focus on studies conducted on the U.S. markets. 
Bradley, Desai, and Kim, (1988) were the first to study combined abnormal returns around 
M&A announcements. In their seminal paper, ‟Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions 
and their division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms‟, Bradley et al. show 
that M&A deals seem to truly be value creative transactions as a whole. Using a sample of 
236 U.S. acquisitions during 1963 - 1984, the authors show that the announcement of a 
subsequently completed M&A deal resulted in a highly significant combined CAR of 7.4%. 
Furthermore, the authors show that targets seem to reap lion‟s share of value created
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Table 2: Summary of studies on wealth effects of domestic and cross-border M&A transactions 
The table summarizes the findings of a number of key studies on wealth effects of domestic (Panel A) and cross-border (Panel B) M&A announcements. The column return 
weighting distinguishes between the possible ways of recording returns, namely percentage or value weighted, but also a special approach employed by Dos Santos et al. 
(2008) is possible. All the returns, except those of Dos Santos et al., refer to cumulative abnormal returns. The method used by Dos Santos et al. examines changes in industry 
adjusted excess value pre and post acquisition. The excess value is defined as a firm‟s market value (the market value of common equity plus the book value of total debt plus 
the liquidating value of preferred stock) to the imputed value of the company based on a multiple of industry matched peers. Bradley et al. (1988), Cakici et al. (1996), and 
Andrade et al. (2001) report their results in three different time periods and they are presented here separately. 
Panel A: Domestic transactions         
Author(s) Year of 
publication 
N Region of 
acquirer 
Region of 
target 
Time period Return 
weighting 
Acquirer 
returns 
Target 
returns 
Combined 
returns 
Bradley et al. 1988 51 USA USA 1963 - 1968 Percentage 4.1% 18.9% 7.8% 
Bradley et al. 1988 133 USA USA 1969 - 1980 Percentage 1.3% 35.3% 7.1% 
Bradley et al. 1988 52 USA USA 1981 - 1984 Percentage -2.9% 35.3% 8.0% 
          
Andrade et al. 2001 598 USA USA 1973 - 1979 Percentage -0.3% 16.0% 1.5% 
Andrade et al. 2001 1,226 USA USA 1980 - 1989 Percentage -0.4% 16.0% 2.6% 
Andrade et al. 2001 1,864 USA USA 1990 - 1998 Percentage -1.0% 15.9% 1.4% 
          
Moeller et al. 2004 12,023 USA USA 1980 - 2001 Percentage 1.1% n/a n/a 
Moeller et al. 2004 12,023 USA USA 1980 - 2001 Value -1.2% n/a n/a 
          
Hazelkorn et al. 2004 1,547 USA USA 1990 - 2002 Percentage -0.4% n/a n/a 
          
Panel B: Cross-border transactions         
Author(s) Year of 
publication 
N Region of 
acquirer 
Region of 
target 
Time period Return 
weighting 
Acquirer 
returns 
Target 
returns 
Combined 
returns 
Doukas and Travlos 1988 301 USA Rest of world 1975 - 1983 Percentage 0.5% n/a n/a 
          
Kang 1993 119 Japan USA 1975 - 1988 Percentage 0.5% 9.4% n/a 
          
Datta and Puia 1995 112 USA Rest of world 1978 - 1990 Percentage -0.7% n/a n/a 
          
Cakici et al. 1996 195 Rest of world USA 1983 - 1992 Percentage 2.0% n/a n/a 
Cakici et al. 1996 112 USA Rest of world 1983 - 1992 Percentage -0.3% n/a n/a 
          
Seth et al. 2002 100 Rest of world USA 1981 - 1990 Percentage 0.1% n/a 7.6% 
          
Dos Santos et al. 2008 136 USA Rest of world 1990 - 2000 Special -6.6% n/a n/a 
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in M&A as in their overall sample the targets average return was a notable 28.1%, whereas 
acquirer‟s CAR was a modest 1.0%. The authors also analyze the phenomenon in different 
time periods and show that while overall gains seems to have remained fairly stable, the 
targets share of the gains has increased, and during 1981 – 1984, bidders are actually making 
losses. The authors relate this development to the passage of the Williams act, which requires 
that at the time of a tender offer, the bidder must present a large amount of information, such 
as terms of the offer and sources of the funds, to both the target firm and the SEC. The Act 
also stipulated a certain time frame that the tender offer must be open. (Weston et al., 2004) 
More recent evidence is provided by Andrade, Mitchell, and Stafford (2001), who study a 
sample of 3,688 completed U.S. acquisitions announced during 1973 - 1998. The authors 
report a 1.8% combined return, 16.0% target return, and a loss of -0.7% for the acquirer, thus, 
providing further support for the view, according to which targets win in takeovers, while as 
bidders lose on average. The results also implicate that the overall returns from M&A seem to 
have decreased over time and the average bidder‟s losses have become steeper (see Table 2 
for complete details on the sub-samples).  
Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004), were one of the first researchers to study bidder 
wealth effects in M&A transactions by calculating both percentage and dollar weighted 
returns. Studying a sample of 12,023 U.S. acquisitions during 1980 - 2001, the authors show 
that while the percentage weighted return for the bidder is 1.1%, dollar weighted return is  
-1.2%. This phenomenon is driven by the fact that large transactions seem to be a lot worse 
than small transactions (see section 3.3.1 for a thorough discussion). In addition to providing 
further and more recent evidence supporting the view that acquirers lose on average in M&A, 
the paper also highlights the importance of looking at both percentage and value weighted 
returns. This is the approach that will be employed also in the empirical part of my study. 
Another quite recent paper by Hazelkorn, Zenner, and Shivdasani (2004) provided additional 
insights into the returns patterns of acquirers in M&A deals. Studying a sample of 1,547 U.S. 
acquisitions announced during 1990 - 2002, the authors document an acquirer CAR of -0.4%. 
However, the authors argue that although on average a small portion of acquirer‟s shareholder 
value is destroyed in M&A, this is by far not common. Hazelkorn et al. note that in 78% of 
their sample transactions, bidders lost or gained more than 2.0% of their market value at the 
time of the announcement of a deal. Hazelkorn et al. argue that this evidence supports a view, 
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according to which takeovers generally lead to large wealth effects to the bidder and, hence, 
decisions made in choosing the targets and valuing them properly are critical for success. 
In sum, the evidence seems to indicate that M&A deals create value on average. However, the 
evidence also shows that the value is most often entirely captured by the target, whereas the 
acquirer is seen as making losses in some studies and roughly breaking even in others. Having 
now covered domestic M&A transactions, I move on to my specific topic, cross-border M&A. 
3.2.2 Wealth effects of cross-border M&A announcements 
Also the wealth effects of cross-border M&A transactions have been widely studied since the 
late 1980s. In most of the studies on wealth effects of cross-border M&A announcements the 
sample includes U.S. companies either as bidders or targets, and as transatlantic M&A is also 
the topic of my thesis, I will concentrate in this section on the studies conducted with U.S. 
companies as one counterpart.  
Doukas and Travlos (1988) were one of the first to study cross-border acquisitions. Using a 
sample of 301 foreign acquisitions by U.S. bidders during 1975 - 1983, the authors show that 
the shareholders earn a significant 0.5% abnormal return around the announcement of the 
acquisition. Also Kang (1993) reports a CAR of 0.5% for his sample of 119 acquisitions of 
U.S. targets by Japanese firms in the period 1975 - 1988. Doukas and Travlos also provide 
evidence indicating that entry into a new market is a determinant of value creation, as the 
authors show that the average CAR for acquisitions in countries where the acquirer already 
has operations is an insignificant 0.3%, whereas acquisitions that result in entries into new 
markets earn on average a significant return of 0.7%. Doukas and Travlos also show that 
higher acquirer CARs are experienced when the target is from a less developed country, or 
when the acquirer diversifies both geographically and industrially at the same time. 
By using a sample of 112 cross-border acquisitions by U.S. acquirers between 1978 and 1990, 
Datta and Puia (1995) show that the average value creation to the bidder is -0.7%, indicating 
that bidders are actually making losses in the deals they carry out. Datta and Puia argue that 
these losses are consistent with Roll‟s hubris theory, but they also note that asymmetric 
information might make it hard to value foreign targets and, hence, the acquirers end up 
overpaying. An interesting reference is also made to earlier literature, as Datta and Puia note 
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that the average value creation through international M&A might have come down due to 
increased global competition, which results in fewer opportunities for good deals. 
In an interesting study, Cakici et al. (1996), study the value creation of cross-border M&A 
transactions by comparing two samples, in which U.S. companies are either bidder or target. 
They report that the average value creation by U.S. firms is -0.3%, while the acquisitions of 
U.S. targets by foreign companies seem to generate a return of 2.0%. Disappointingly, Cakici 
et al. fail to give any proper explanation on the source of this difference, but they conclude, 
however, that the value creation is not driven by relative size of the target or bidder, target 
R&D –intensity, first market entry, currency value, or industry factors.  
Seth, Song, and Richardson (2002) study cross-border acquisitions of U.S. targets carried out 
between 1981 and 1990 and report a bidder CAR of 0.1% and their results are, thus, in line 
with previous research. However, the study is quite interesting in the respect that it tries to 
determine the underlying motive for the transactions, i.e. synergy-seeking, managerialism, or 
hubris, and only then tries to determine the sources of the value creation or destruction. Seth 
et al. show that the value creation in synergy seeking acquisitions is driven by asset sharing, 
reverse internalization of valuable intangible assets, and financial diversification. However, 
the authors show that target shareholders gain most of the value created as gains accrue to 
bidder firm shareholders only for reverse internalization of the intangible assets. For value 
destroying acquisitions that Seth et al. expect to be driven by managerialism, the authors can 
only conclude that wealth destruction seems to be driven by risk reduction. It should be noted 
here, however, that as the division between the three alternative motives is based solely on 
target and acquirer returns, the results can be misleading. Nevertheless, the paper provides a 
lot of valuable qualitative insights into value creation in cross-border M&A transactions. 
One of the most recent papers on cross-border acquisitions is by Dos Santos, Errunza, and 
Miller (2008). The authors measure wealth effects of M&A deals as changes in industry 
adjusted excess value pre and post acquisition. The excess value is defined as firm‟s market 
value to the imputed value of the company based on a multiple of industry matched peers. 
Using this definition and a sample of 136 cross-border acquisitions by U.S. companies, the 
authors report an acquirer return of -6.6%. All and all, it seems that also cross-border M&A 
transactions between developed market companies seem to be roughly break-even deals for 
the bidder, most of the studies reporting either small positive or small negative gains. 
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3.3 Factors related to acquirer returns in M&A 
Prior research lists a large number of potential sources of acquirer gains and losses, of which 
many relate to M&A transactions in general, but there are also a number of potential sources 
of value creation that concern cross-border M&As specifically. In this section, I first discuss 
the literature on general sources of acquirer returns, and then present the literature on sources 
of acquirer returns in cross-border M&A. It is important to understand what drives the value 
creation in M&A, before it is possible to hypothesize on additional variables. In addition, 
proper understanding of the current theories allows me to credibly control my results. 
3.3.1 General sources of acquirer returns 
In this subsection, I review the most important literature on the sources of acquirer returns in 
M&A transactions. I cover method of payment, firm size, bidding contests, free cash flow and 
excess cash reserves, as well as company status of the target firm. 
Method of payment 
It is quite commonly held that acquisitions by cash generate superior abnormal stock returns 
(see, e.g., Myers and Majluf, 1984). The logic behind this theory is that the managers of the 
bidding firm have private information on the true value of their firm, and as they are seeking 
to maximize shareholder value, they choose to use equity as a payment method only when 
they think that their firm is overvalued in the market place. Thus, the method of payment in 
acquisitions conveys a powerful message on the true value of the firm to the investors. 
By studying 167 M&As, Travlos (1987) shows that bidders offering cash seem to roughly 
break even, while stock-financed deals generate significant abnormal losses. Similar patterns 
are also reported by e.g. You, Caves, Smith, and Henry (1986), Amihud, Lev, and Travlos 
(1990), and Andrade et al. (2001). Travlos also shows that stock offers generate negative 
returns regardless of the success of the bid, suggesting that by launching an equity-financed 
bid, the firm signals its overvaluation. These studies highlight the fact that shareholders of a 
company that makes a lot of equity-financed deals, one example being European firms cross-
listed in the U.S. (see Tolmunen and Torstila, 2005), might be at a very unfavorable position.  
A number of more recent studies present additional arguments for the superiority of cash 
deals. Hazelkorn et al. (2004) associate the favorable market reaction of cash-financed deals 
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to decreased agency costs, as cash deals are likely to be financed by increasing the leverage of 
the company. Cools, Gell, Kengelbach, and Roos (2007), on the other hand, argue that by 
paying with cash, the management of the bidder shows true commitment by putting actual 
money at stake. For the managers to be willing to do this, they are likely to be confident that 
the M&A deal will more than compensate its required rate of return. 
Firm size 
Relative size of the acquirer and bidder has been hypothesized to affect returns from M&A, 
and the matter has been studied by a number of researchers with somewhat inconclusive 
results. Being one of the first researchers to study the issue, Asquith, Bruner, and Mullins 
(1983) show that bidder abnormal returns are positively correlated with the ratio of the market 
value of the target to the bidder, providing evidence that relatively larger deals are better. 
They argue that this is due to an inherent measurement error in the event study methodology 
as percentage CARs are often examined instead of dollar CARs. If the bidder is a lot larger 
than the target, as is frequently the case, percentage returns are likely to be small, even if the 
deal is extremely good.  
In a more recent paper, Moeller et al. (2004) study a sample of 12,023 acquisitions during the 
time period 1980-2001 and find that equally weighted abnormal returns to bidder shareholders 
are positive 1.1%, but money wise, the acquirers seem to lose on average $25.2 million per 
acquisition. This is due to the fact that in their sample, larger deals were a lot worse than 
small deals. More specifically, it seems that small firms are making small and value creating 
acquisitions, whereas large firms are making large and value destroying acquisitions. Moeller 
et al. suggest that the managers of large firms might be more prone to hubris and, hence, end 
up overpaying. The authors also find some additional support for this view, as they show that 
larger firms are paying larger premiums for their targets. The authors also suggest that larger 
firms are usually mature companies with poor internal growth prospects and, hence, they are 
likely to have a large free cash flow, which the managers of the company might use to make 
acquisitions, even in the absence of suitable targets. As with the extant literature on the 
method of payment, also the literature on firm size and acquisitions seems to support the fact 
that the shareholders of cross-listed companies are in a disadvantageous position when their 
company makes an acquisition, as Tolmunen and Torstila (2005) show that these acquisitions 
are substantially larger than the ones carried out by the firms prior to cross-listing. 
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Winner’s curse in bidding contests 
Bradley et al. (1988) show that in bidding contests, the eventual winner suffers from so called 
„winner‟s curse‟ as the bidding contest drives up the deal price, and the winner quite often 
ends up overpaying. In Bradley et al., the average CAR for the bidder is 2.8% if there is a 
single bidder, but a -0.7% if there are multiple bidders. The authors also show that the 
winner‟s curse is most severe for late entrants to the bidding process. More recently, Cakici et 
al. (1996) document the existence of winner‟s curse issue in a sample of cross-border M&As. 
Free cash flow and excess cash reserves 
Supporting Jensen‟s (1986) free cash flow problem hypothesis, Harford (1999) shows that 
companies with large cash reserves seem to be more likely to attempt acquisitions. Studying a 
sample of attempted acquisitions between 1977 and 1993, Harford also shows that the 
acquisitions carried out by the cash rich firms seem to be more wealth destroying than deals in 
the overall sample and, furthermore, on average bids by the cash rich firms seem to destroy 
some 7% of the cash reserves in terms of market value. Harford also notes that the 
acquisitions made by the cash rich firms are diversifying, and lead to a decrease in the 
operating performance of the bidder. Also interestingly, bids by cash rich firms are very 
seldom challenged, possible indicating bids for targets that nobody else is interested in. 
Public vs. private target 
A number of authors (Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller, 2002; Hazelkorn et al., 2004; Moeller 
et al., 2004) have shown that companies experience larger gains when they acquire private 
targets or subsidiaries of public companies than entire public companies. Fuller et al. and 
Hazelkorn et al. attribute this effect to the lack of public market price, which may enable 
bargain deals, and to a broader selection of possible public targets, which might lead to overly 
complex post-merger integration and, hence, decrease acquirer returns. The motivation behind 
the possibility of bargain deals in non-public targets is, according to Fuller et al., the fact that 
the market for those targets is often very illiquid leading to discounts in their valuation. 
3.3.2 Sources of acquirer returns in cross-border M&A 
Having now covered the general sources of acquirer gains or losses, in this subsection I 
present the most important earlier literature on sources of acquirer returns in cross-border 
35 
M&A transactions. I go over cultural fit, relative exchange rates, market premier, and industry 
diversification. 
Cultural fit 
A number of scholars have hypothesized that acquisition performance might be related to the 
cultural fit between acquirer and target. For example Madura, Vasconcellos, and Kish (1991) 
develop a model to value international acquisitions. Their model suggest, that one has to take 
into consideration the cultural and linguistic ties between the acquirer and the target, as these 
aspects are argued to have a clear impact on the profitability of the acquisition. Madura et al. 
claim that the better the cultural fit between the merging parties, the better the returns. 
To evaluate the relation between cultural fit and gains from M&A, Datta and Puia (1995) 
study a sample of 112 large cross-border acquisitions undertaken by U.S. firms between 1978 
and 1990. The authors report statistically significantly higher bidder returns for M&A 
transactions in which the cultural distance is low between the home countries of the acquirer 
and the target, compared to those transactions with large cultural distance. Datta and Puia 
associate the higher returns with the ease of post-merger integration of two firms which share 
similar cultural systems. In addition, the authors note that the poor acquisition performance 
prevalent in M&As with large cultural distance might also be attributable to poor knowledge 
of the target firm by the bidder, which might cause the company to overpay for the target. 
Relative exchange rate changes 
Froot and Stein (1991) argue that when financing an M&A transaction, it is likely that only 
part of the cash needed will be raised by issue of debt and, hence, a part of the acquisition will 
be paid by the internal assets of the acquirer. Thus, acquirer returns are likely to be higher 
when the acquirer‟s currency is strong in relation to the target. This view is supported by 
Kang (1993), who shows that the appreciation of yen relative to the dollar increases the 
acquirer returns in cross-border M&As where U.S. targets are acquired by Japanese bidders. 
Market premier 
Consistent with the theory, according to which entry into new markets is a key motive behind 
international M&A, Doukas and Travlos (1988) show that U.S. companies bidding for non-
U.S. targets earn highest returns, when the bidder does not have operations in the target 
country. On a related note, however, Dos Santos et al. (2008) show that going abroad for the 
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first time through M&A is associated with greater value loss than cross-border acquisitions by 
acquirers, who have already established their position abroad. It would seem, therefore, that 
entry into new markets is valuable only to companies that are already international. 
Industry diversification 
A number of academic researchers have shown that domestic M&As that lead to a more 
diversified entity are value destroying (Bradley et al., 1988; Hazelkorn et al., 2004). However, 
some studies have shown that the opposite holds for cross-border M&As, as diversifying 
acquisitions seem to be more value creative than focused deals (Doukas and Travlos, 1988; 
Eun et al., 1996). However, Dos Santos et al. (2008) report that unrelated cross-border M&As 
result in substantial negative effects on the market valuation of the bidder. Thus, the evidence 
on the effect of industry diversification in cross-border acquisitions is mixed at best. 
3.4 Special characteristics of transatlantic M&A 
Transatlantic M&A has a number of special aspects, whose understanding is imperative, if 
one is to study these transactions. In this section, I first discuss ADRs as an acquisitions 
currency in transatlantic M&A, and then I briefly go over the implication of differing legal 
and regulatory framework, emphasizing the role of tax implications. 
ADRs are generally viewed as a more viable takeover currency in the U.S. than foreign equity 
(see, e.g., Eiteman et al., 1998; Pagano et al., 2002). Behavioral issues, such as home bias, are 
likely to be key contributors to this notion. U.S. investors just simply seem to prefer domestic 
equity over foreign equity and, hence, will be more willing to accept ADRs as a method of 
payment in takeovers than foreign equity. However, there are also a number of factual issues 
that make it rational for U.S. investors to prefer ADRs over foreign equity. For example 
certain U.S. institutions have constraints on the amount of foreign equity which they can hold. 
When these institutions are faced with a takeover suggestion, they are more likely to favor 
deals that give payment in U.S. equity. If these institutions are paid in foreign equity, they 
might be forced to sell their holdings and unfavorable tax consequences might incur. 
Also JP Morgan (2005) notes that U.S. investors are likely to favor trading ADRs over 
foreign shares, as the executions will be dollar denominated, transfer costs will be smaller, 
and investors can avoid transfer taxes. To same vein, JP Morgan also notes that certain 
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country specific factors, such as the difficulties in reclamation of local taxes in Italy, are likely 
to further strengthen U.S. investor‟s preference towards ADRs. JP Morgan (2005) and 
Bendaniel and Rosenbloom (1998) come to the conclusion that ADR programs heavily 
contribute to the success of U.S. acquisitions by foreign bidders. 
Transatlantic M&A transactions are governed by three distinct legislations: U.S. legislation, 
legislation of the country of origin of the acquirer, as well as nowadays also increasingly EU 
legislation. Transatlantic M&As, however, are quite frequent endeavors and legislation quite 
seldom prohibits them from taking place. According to Bendaniel and Rosenbloom (1998), 
however, there are certain cases when an acquisition might be suspended. First, regulatory 
approval is required in acquisitions of assets that are viewed as contributing to the U.S. 
national security, namely industries associated with defense, financing, transportation, and 
broadcasting. However, getting a regulatory approval is deemed easier for countries from 
developed Europe than say from Russia. Second, U.S. antitrust laws require a pre-merger 
notification to authorities for deals above certain size. Furthermore, also the EU commission 
might block deals that they see as accumulating too much monopoly power to one company. 
Taxes are an important consideration in all M&A activity and, hence, they must be considered 
also in transatlantic transactions. In order to avoid taxes to the shareholders of the target, the 
acquisitions must be organized as a tax-free reorganization as opposed to a taxable purchase. 
The deal is classified as a tax-free reorganization, when majority of the consideration is in 
stock, being most often ADRs (Weston et al., 2004). In this case, there are no immediate tax 
consequences for the target‟s shareholders, but they carry over the tax basis in the acquiring 
company stock, and taxes are imputed at the time of the sale of these stocks. According to 
Bendaniel and Rosenbloom (1998), U.S. acquisitions by non-US targets are most often 
carried out as forward triangular mergers. In this transaction, the U.S. target is acquired by a 
newly formed shell subsidiary of the foreign parent company. The purchase medium is often 
the parent company stock, and in this case the deal is considered as a tax-free reorganization. 
In this chapter, I have covered the extant literature on motives, wealth effects and sources of 
wealth effects of M&A activity. Also special characteristics of transatlantic M&A 
transactions were very briefly discussed. Having now developed a comprehensive 
understanding of M&A as well as cross-listing, it is time to move on to hypothesize on the 
relation between cross-listing and returns from M&A. 
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4 Hypotheses and variables 
The main contribution of my study is the evaluation of nine hypotheses, most of which are 
based on extant literature on finance and international business studies. However, none of the 
hypotheses have so far been tested on a cross-listing setting. I formulate my hypotheses 
around the following research question: 
Research problem: Are U.S. acquisitions by European companies cross-listed 
in the U.S. value creative? 
In this chapter, I first present my hypotheses related to the above research question. After 
presenting the hypotheses, I explain the theories behind my controlling determinants of value 
creation. In addition to reliably controlling my results, these additional variables allow me to 
provide insights to some common theories on M&A returns in a transatlantic setting. 
4.1 Hypotheses of the study 
In this section, I present the hypotheses, which I seek to confirm in the empirical part of my 
paper. I first discuss hypotheses related to Sample 1 – acquisitions by cross-listers and the 
control group and then to Sample 2 – acquisitions by cross-listers before cross-listing, during 
cross-listing, and after cross-delisting. 
4.1.1 Hypotheses related to Sample 1 
As discussed in the literature review, managers are often prone to irrational empire building. 
It might be that the management of a company which chooses to cross-list its shares on a 
foreign exchange and uses those shares to make acquisitions, is embarking on an ultimate 
empire building journey: they want to conquer there world, so to speak. This is driven by 
personal self interest of the management of the acquiring company; by growing the size of the 
company, the managers are able to get more power, prestige and pay (Pike and Neale, 2003). 
This effect is likely to be even more dramatic in a cross-listing setting as the managers of 
European companies are sure to get more air and press time in the U.S. by making more and 
larger acquisitions in the U.S., which is made possible by the existence of their cross-listed 
stock as a medium of exchange in M&A. This suggestion is in line with Morck and Schleifer 
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(1990), who report that when private benefits to the management are especially large, the 
managers might carry out shareholder wealth destroying acquisitions. 
A straight forward test of managerial hubris is to check how visible a company is in 
prestigious business publications. As I argue that managers of cross-listed companies are 
more prone to irrational empire building and hubris, then it is likely that a cross-listed 
company is more visible in prestigious publications surrounding the announcement of the 
acquisitions than a non-cross-listed company. Hence, my first hypothesis: 
: Cross-listed companies are more visible in prestigious business publications 
than their non-cross-listed peers around takeover announcements 
A large number of publication hits entails that the company‟s management is likely to have 
deliberately tried to increase the company‟s, as well as their own, visibility in these 
publications in order to increase their prestige. One way to do this is to engage in flashy 
corporate transactions, which are sure to get publicity to the company, although they would 
not be beneficial to the shareholders. Thus, I form my second hypothesis as follows: 
: The higher the visibility of the acquirer in prestigious business publications, 
the lower the returns from M&A 
As the development of a viable M&A currency is one of the key motivators for cross-listing 
in the first place (Eiteman et al. 1998; Pagano et al. 2002; JP Morgan, 2005; Citigroup, 2005), 
it is likely that managers of companies, which have cross-listed at least partially for this 
reason, are eager to use the currency to make acquisitions, irrespective of any good takeover 
opportunities being present. This is somewhat analogous to the classical free cash flow 
problem (Jensen, 1986), as cross-listed companies in effect have large amounts of viable 
takeover currency in their possession. One might even say that they can in effect print 
acquisition money. This kind of an incentive is not present for non-cross-listed companies, 
indicating that non-cross-listed companies are able to use more judgment and common sense 
in their M&A, and are therefore less prone to hubris than cross-listed companies. 
When one considers the fact that management of cross-listed companies are more prone to 
empire building, and the fact that cross-listed companies have large amounts of viable 
takeover currency in their possession, this raises the questions on the rationale behind these 
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acquisitions. Tolmunen and Torstila (2005) provided first evidence on the dubious nature of 
the acquisitions made by cross-listed companies as they showed these acquisitions to be larger 
and more stock-financed than acquisitions by non-cross-listed companies. The possibility to 
use cross-listed stock as acquisition currency also makes it easier for cross-listed companies 
to bid for public targets and, hence, cross-listed companies are more likely to acquire public 
companies than their non-cross-listed peers, indicating worse acquisition performance. 
Furthermore, as cross-listed companies have been shown to be more active acquirers than 
their non-cross-listed peers (Tolmunen and Torstila, 2005), they are likely to use less scrutiny 
in selecting their targets and, thus, end up bidding also for companies that are outside their 
industry and have a poor strategic fit. This implies potentially adverse outcomes for the 
shareholders of cross-listed companies as diversifying acquisitions have been shown to lead to 
shareholder value destruction (Graham, Lemmon, and Wolf, 2002).  
The above hypothesized tendency of cross-listed companies to engage in stock financed 
M&A, where the target is a large public company having a poor strategic fit is likely to be 
only symptom of a larger problem: irrational managerial empire building. As the egos of the 
management grow to huge proportions, the acquisitions made by them are likely to be 
suboptimal from the viewpoint of the shareholders of the company. I argue that as the 
shareholders are likely to acknowledge these tendencies, they should react unfavourably to 
the takeover announcements. Hence, I form my third hypothesis as follows: 
: Cross-border acquisitions by cross-listed acquirers are less value creative 
than cross-border acquisitions by non-cross-listed bidders 
It has to be noted, however, that not all prior studies provide evidence that the deals made by 
cross-listed bidders are worse than those of their domestically listed peers. Burns et al. (2007) 
argue that the home bias of U.S. investors might be alleviated by a U.S. cross-listings as 
bonding occurs, enabling cross-listed companies to pay lower premiums. However, Burns et 
al. more specifically note that cross-listers pay on average 10% less premium on their equity-
financed deals than non-cross-listed bidders pay on cash deals. Cash and stock deals cannot, 
however, be directly compared, and it is impossible to say which of the above deals would be 
better for the bidder‟s shareholders. 
It is generally acknowledged that agency costs tend to be more substantial for larger 
companies (see Jensen, 1986; Schin and Kim, 2002), which are likely to have a larger amount 
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of atomistic shareholders, who have very limited possibilities for controlling the actions of the 
management. Furthermore, Jensen notes that increased size of the firm increases the resources 
under the management‟s control. These resources tend to, more often or not, be used to 
shareholder value destroying activities such as wealth destroying acquisitions. The increase in 
the size of the company is also sometimes associated with the fact that the company might be 
overvalued, creating additional incentives for companies to engage in equity-financed M&A.  
Theory and empirical evidence seems to suggest that agency costs increase as the size of the 
company increases. However, this effect is likely to be even larger for cross-listed companies 
than for those companies that are only domestically listed, due to the fact that foreign equity 
is regarded as inferior to domestic equity in the U.S..  This results in a situation, where only 
cross-listed companies are able to fully utilize their size and other resources, as well as in 
some cases overvaluation of their stock, in making transatlantic acquisitions. Hence, I state 
my fourth hypothesis as: 
: The difference in acquirer gains between cross-listed and non-cross-listed 
companies is higher for larger companies 
As discussed in section 3.2, bidder returns in M&A have been shown to be negative in some 
studies, while other studies indicate that the acquirers roughly break even. However, very few 
researchers suggest that M&A transactions create wealth for the acquirer on average, at least 
when studying the question with recent data concerning M&A transactions between 
developed world targets and developed world bidders. 
It seems that the earlier evidence would indicate that also the U.S. acquisitions of European 
companies cross-listed in the U.S. would be at most break-even endeavors for the acquiring 
company, if there is no additional evidence or theory suggesting that these companies would 
be likely to make exceptionally good acquisitions. However, as discussed earlier, the 
acquisitions made by foreign companies cross-listed in the U.S. are likely to be even worse 
than those acquisitions made by their domestically listed peers, due to the high number of 
potential agency and hubris costs, which the decision to cross-list seems to indicate. Hence, I 
state my fifth hypothesis as:  
: Acquisitions by cross-listed acquirers are wealth destroying 
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4.1.2 Hypotheses related to Sample 2 
Cross-listing in itself is likely to change the acquisition behavior of a company. As cross-
listing provides the company with a viable M&A currency, the firm is likely to want to use it, 
as discussed in the previous subsection. This M&A currency allows the firm to engage in 
equity-financed transactions in the U.S. more efficiently, which in effect would make it easier 
for the company to make larger acquisitions, as the company has to raise less debt to finance 
the transaction. Supporting this view, Tolmunen and Torstila (2005) show that the cross-
listing of a company seems to lead to significant increases in large equity-financed 
transactions, implying dubious consequences for the shareholders of a cross-listing company. 
It might be that the decision to cross-list acts as a proxy for a larger change in the company. 
Although cross-listing companies are likely to have been acquisitive in the U.S. already 
before the cross-listing, cross-listing might have been pursued at a time when a firm chooses 
to accelerate its internalization process. For example Buckley and Casson (1998) suggest that 
the internalization of a company proceeds in stages. Hence, if the decision to cross-list is 
made at an early stage of the internalization process of the company, more acquisitions are 
likely to follow soon after the cross-listing. As I have hypothesized above, this change in the 
internalization process of a company is not always made on rational accounts, but rather as a 
result of self interest of the management, which causes the firm to embark on an irrational 
journey of empire building through world conquering. Thus, my sixth hypothesis: 
: Gains from acquisitions decrease after company cross-lists 
To the best of my knowledge, there exists no earlier studies on the relation between cross-
delisting and M&A, and as cross-delistings have become increasingly common, as discussed 
in section 2.1, this is a clear avenue for research. Although literature suggests that the 
introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley and change in deregistering requirements (see, e.g., Doidge et 
al., 2008) have been the key drivers of cross-delistings, only a fraction of firms cross-listed in 
the U.S. have chosen to cross-delists. This implies that the decision to cross-delist is not an 
automatic response to changes in the regulative environment, but rather a strategic choice, 
potentially indicating some change in the company. As the decision to cross-list is viewed as 
evidence of an empire building journey, which is likely to decrease returns from M&A, it 
might also very well be the case that the decision of a firm to choose to end its cross-listing 
and delist from a foreign exchange marks the end of this irrational wealth destroying journey. 
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It could be that discouraged by bad acquisitions made while being cross-listed, the company 
decides that it is not anymore necessary for it to have a viable M&A currency and, hence, it 
can choose to cross-delist. After cross-delisting, the company does not anymore need to make 
acquisitions just because they have the takeover currency available and, thus, companies are 
likely to make better choices in their acquisitions. Also the management of a company is 
likely to be very cautious and trying to avoid making bad acquisitions, if they have already 
carried out a number of wealth destroying deals while being cross-listed. The shareholders are 
likely to tolerate value destroying behavior for some time, but management who continuously 
make bad choices in M&A are likely to find themselves unemployed. I argue that cross-
delisting is likely to change the acquisition behavior of a company to a better direction, likely 
to be witnessed in for example smaller deals, larger amount of cash deals, and more deals 
where the target is a private company. Thus, I form my seventh hypothesis as follows: 
: Gains from acquisitions increase after company cross-delists 
Cross-delisting is also likely to affect the prominence of a company in prestigious business 
publications. As I hypothesize that cross-delisting implies a change in a company to a more 
shareholder value oriented direction, which entails that the company does not strive to make 
high-profile acquisitions for the sake of managerial hubris, cross-delisting is likely to decrease 
the visibility of the sample companies in the above mentioned publications. Therefore, I state 
my eighth hypothesis as:  
: Visibility in prestigious publications is smaller for cross-delisted companies 
than for cross-listed companies 
Hypothesis 4 highlighted the fact that cross-listing is likely to be even worse for the acquirer 
returns of larger companies due to more severe agency issues in these diversely held 
companies. As a result, it is likely that large cross-listed companies make particularly bad 
acquisitions and, hence, the decision to cross-delist has a particularly favorable effect for large 
companies, as cross-delistings removes the acquisition currency from the management‟s 
disposal. Hence, quite analogously to Hypothesis 4, I form my ninth and final hypothesis as: 
: The effect of cross-delisting to acquirer returns is more intense for larger 
companies 
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4.2 Other determinants of acquirer value creation in M&A 
In this part, I briefly present the theories behind the use of my various control variables in the 
empirical part of my paper. Most of the theories are already discussed to some extent in 
section 3.3, so I provide here only a quick summary.  
Method of payment in M&A has a substantial effect on the value creation of the transaction. 
Cash deals are generally viewed as more favorable than equity-financed deals for a number of 
reasons, such as management sending a signal of the company being overvalued when they 
launch an equity-financed bid, or the fact that cash deals have a favorable effect on the 
leverage of the acquiring company. It should be noted, however, that if the bidding company 
is more overvalued than the target, stock financing is actually a good choice (Schleifer and 
Vishny, 2003). Nevertheless, in general equity-financed transactions seem to be less wealth 
creative and, hence, I control for method of payment and expect the relation to be: 
: Gains from acquisitions decrease as the equity component of the deal 
increases 
Although industrial diversification might be in the interest of the managers of a company as it 
decreases the risk of the manager‟s employment (Amihud and Lev, 1981), diversifying 
acquisitions have been shown to be shareholder value destructive (see, e.g., Berger and Ofek, 
1996; Graham et al., 2002). Thus, I allow for the effect of diversifying deals: 
: Gains from acquisitions are lower when the bidder and target are from 
different major industries 
A large number of academics such as Grosman and Hart (1980), Hirshleifer and Titman 
(1990), Chowdhry and Jegadeesh (1994), Bagnoli and Lipman (1996), and Bulow, Huang, 
and Klemperer (1999) hypothesize that there is a positive relation between bidder returns and 
pre-bid ownership of the target by the bidder, known as the toehold. These authors suggest 
that toehold increases acquirer returns by increasing the probability of takeover success, 
decreasing the required premium, and by reducing the costs incurred during the takeover 
process. Consistent with this view, a negative relation between bid premia and toehold is 
widely documented (Bris, 1998; Asquith and Kieschnick 1999; Betton and Eckbo, 2000), and 
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Betton and Eckbo also provide evidence supporting the view that toehold enhances the 
probability of bid success. Hence, also the effect of toehold must be controlled: 
: Gains from acquisitions are higher when the bidder has a toehold in the 
target prior to the transaction 
The size of the transaction has been shown to have a negative relation with bidder returns 
(see, e.g., Moeller et al., 2004). Acknowledging this, I control for the effect of deal size: 
: Gains from small acquisitions are higher than gains from large acquisitions 
The acquisitions of non-public targets, i.e. private targets or subsidiaries of public targets, 
seem to be more value creative than the acquisitions of public targets. This effect has been 
explained by the lack of market price for non-public targets, and by the problems in post-
merger integration for public targets. Considering these views, I control for the company 
status of the target firm: 
: Gains from acquisitions of private targets and subsidiaries of public targets 
are higher than from the acquisition of public targets 
Jensen (1986) hypothesizes that companies with large free cash flows end up destroying 
shareholder value by making bad acquisitions instead of distributing the extra cash to 
shareholders. Furthermore, Harford (1999) empirically shows that the acquisitions of cash 
rich companies are less value creative being often single bidder, diversifying deals that lead to 
decreases in subsequent operating performance. Hence, I control for the size of cash reserves: 
: Gains from acquisitions are smaller for more cash rich companies 
Motivations for cross-border M&A might differ with the profitability of the acquiring 
company. A company struggling with its profitability might choose to engage in cross-border 
M&A transactions just to remain independent, whereas highly profitable companies are more 
likely to engage in cross-border M&A for reasons given in section 3.1.2, such as learning and 
new market entry. Thus, I control for the profitability of the acquiring company: 
: Gains from acquisitions are higher for more profitable companies 
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Moeller et al. (2004) showed also that there is a negative relation between acquirer returns 
and acquirer size. This could be caused by more severe agency issues in larger companies, or 
by the fact that larger companies are usually mature companies with less growth 
opportunities. Following this, I control for acquirer size: 
: Large acquirers experience smaller gains from acquisitions than their 
smaller peers 
Maloney, McCormick, and Mitchel (1993) document a positive relation between acquirer 
leverage and its gains from acquisitions. The authors argue that this relation is due to the fact 
that agency costs are smaller with highly leveraged companies and, hence, acquisitions made 
by these companies tend to be driven with solid industrial and financial logic, instead of 
hubris or managerialism. Although some studies have found no such relation (e.g. Moeller et 
al., 2004), I allow for the existence of this association: 
: Highly leveraged acquirers gain more from acquisitions than their less 
leveraged peers 
As discussed in section 3.3.2, cultural fit can have a substantial impact on the ease of post-
merger integration. Geringer, Beamish, and DaCosta (1989) suggest that cultural problems are 
likely to affect a number of phases in the integration, for example the transferring of 
acquirer‟s culture specific capabilities, such as marketing or labor policies. Also empirical 
evidence suggests that acquirer gains are greater in transactions where the cultural distance is 
small (see, e.g., Datta and Puia, 1995). Hence, I control for cultural distance: 
: Gains from acquisitions are higher when the target has a close cultural fit 
to the acquirer 
In section 3.3.2, I introduced the view according to which acquirer‟s whose domestic currency 
is strong relative to the home currency of the target are likely to experience higher abnormal 
returns in M&A transactions. As there is also prior empirical evidence that this is truly the 
case (see. Kang, 1993), I allow for the effect of relative exchange rates: 
: Acquirers having a better relative exchange rate gain more from 
acquisitions 
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5 Data and methodology 
In this chapter, I first introduce the data used in my study, after which I describe the 
methodology which I employ to study my hypotheses laid out in the previous chapter. 
5.1 Data 
In this section, I describe the data used starting with an explanation of the identification of the 
sample for the cross-listers. Then I introduce my control sample, after which I describe the 
sample identification process for the M&A sample. I also discuss other data used in the study. 
I conclude the section by presenting descriptive statistics for my various samples. 
5.1.1 Sample identification for the cross-lister sample 
The sample identification procedure, which I describe here, follows quite closely the 
guidelines laid down by Tolmunen (2001) and Tolmunen and Torstila (2005). I define Europe 
in this thesis as the developed Europe, i.e. as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and 
Switzerland. The reason for this definition is that I want to exclude European companies, 
whose country of origin is considered as having an underdeveloped equity market, which 
might disrupt my analysis. Also cross-listings by companies from Europe‟s less developed 
countries are extremely rare. Extant literature (see Pagano et al., 2002; Tolmunen and 
Torstila, 2005) define cross-listing as a listing that takes place before or simultaneously to a 
home market listing. I follow this same approach in identifying my sample. Tolmunen and 
Torstila also introduce a view, according to which companies who have cross-listed their 
shares prior to year 1980 are truly global in nature and cross-listing is likely to have very little 
effect on their acquisition behavior. I build on this idea and require that the cross-listing in my 
sample has to have taken place between 1.1.1980 and 31.12.2008. 
I start the identification of the cross-lister sample from the web pages of the major U.S. stock 
exchanges, i.e. New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the former American Stock Exchange 
nowadays called NYSE Alternext U.S. (AMEX) and National Association of Securities 
Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ). I search for companies domiciled in Europe, 
collecting the name of the company, time of the listing as well as the type of listing. This 
yields me a total of 160 European companies currently listed in the U.S.. 
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As delistings from the U.S. have become increasingly common due to a number of reasons, 
the most important being the relaxation of SEC deregistering requirements, I also need to add 
companies that have been, but are not anymore listed in the U.S. to overcome survivorship 
bias. I do this by using the Thomson Financial SDC New Issues (SDC) database. I search the 
database for U.S. equity listings by European companies between 1.1.1980 and 31.12.2008. 
This yields me a total of 265 potential cross-listers, of which 105 turn out to be duplicates of 
the companies, which I already identified through the exchanges. 
Combining my samples from the two sources and eliminating doubles, I have 320 
observations. Prior literature on cross-delistings (see, e.g., Doidge et al., 2008) has laid down 
a practice to use a number of different databases to make sure to be able to include all cross-
delistings. To follow this, I further check for cross-listings from the Citigroup‟s ADR service. 
Employing the same date range as previously, this yields me 435 observations, of which 86 
are new observations that were not found from the other two sources.  
All and all, I identify a sample of 406 potential cross-listers. However, it still needs to be 
verified, whether these are actual cross-listings, or direct orphan listings to the U.S.. I use 
various sources to confirm this: 1) If the issue synopsis in SDC mentions a simultaneous 
offering in Europe, the issue is deemed as a cross-listing. 2) Also if, according to Thomson 
Financial Datastream (Datastream), there is a stock market quote in Europe for the potential 
cross-lister prior to the listing in the U.S., the company is categorized as a cross-lister. 3) 
Finally, I use the web page of the company in question, or alternatively LexisNexis key word 
search, to verify the existence of a prior listing in Europe. By employing this method, I am 
able to confirm most of my sample companies as cross-listers due to the fact that direct 
listings in the U.S. by other than North American firms are extremely rare.  
For the observations that I have identified solely from SDC, I also have to verify the date of 
cross-delisting. I again use web pages of the companies as well as LexisNexis for this task. 
While I add the delisting date to these observations, I also simultaneously cross-check the 
listing dates found in SDC to verify the correctness of my data. It also turns out that in some 
cases the date of listing differs between the exchanges, SDC and / or Citigroup‟s ADR 
service. If the difference is minor, i.e. less than five days, I use first the date from the 
exchanges, then SDC, and finally that of Citigroups ADR service, if data from the two other 
sources is  not available.  However,  if the  difference  is  more than five days,  I further study  
49 
Table 3: Sample sources and filtering of the cross-lister sample 
This table shows the derivation of my sample of European companies that have been cross-listed in the U.S. 
between 1.1.1980 and 31.12.2008. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and 
Switzerland. N is number of firms in each stage. I show the initial sample sources and document the process of 
removing some of the observations to arrive at my final cross-lister sample. Data on potential cross-listings is 
first gathered from three partially overlapping sources, i.e. directly from the exchanges, Thomson Financial SDC 
New Issues database (SDC), and Citigroup‟s ADR service. Some observations have to be eliminated due to 1) 
being a duplicate among the three samples, 2) being a direct listing to U.S. instead of a cross-listing, 3) being a 
financial company (four digit SIC code beginning with 6) due to differences in their financial reporting, 4) 
ambiguous listing date, and 5) no data available in the Thomson Financial Worldscope database. 
Source / rationale for removing N 
Directly from the exchanges 160 
SDC 265 
Citigroup‟s ADR 435 
Duplicates -454 
Direct listers -49 
Total cross-listers 357 
  
Financial companies -52 
Ambiguous listing date -2 
Data unavailable -22 
Total sample 281 
 
the issue from the web site of the company in question as well as by using LexisNexis. I have 
to exclude two companies due to being unable to confirm the listing date. Once I employ my 
final restrictions, i.e. the removal of financial companies due to differences in their financial 
reporting, and the removal of listings of companies which had no data available in the 
Thomson Financial Worldscope (Worldscope) database, I arrive with a final cross-lister 
sample of 281 companies (see Table 3 for summary of the sample identification process).  
In this thesis, listing is defined as a quotation on a major U.S. stock exchange, meaning that 
Level I ADRs as well as SEC Rule 144A private placements are not qualified in the sample, 
unless they eventually lead to a full quotation. I obtain information on private placements and 
Level 1 ADR programs from the Bank of New York web page. This allows me to define the 
original IPO date as the OTC listing date, as identified also in SDC and by the exchanges, for 
a number of companies. The same definition is used by Tolmunen and Torstila (2005). 
5.1.2 Control sample 
I base my control sample on the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe, which 
covers countries Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, 
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Ireland, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, 
and the UK. With a variable number of components, this index covers approximately 95% of 
the free float market capitalization across these 18 countries. It should be noted, however, that 
no companies from Iceland qualified to the index at the time of retrieval of its composition 
(December 2008 version). This index excludes stocks of companies that have had over ten 
non trading days during the prior three months. It is also worth noting that although the time 
period in my sample is 1996 - 2008, this single version of the index is used throughout the 
thesis as a control group. During my sample period, however, some companies have been part 
of the index, but have been subsequently removed from its composition. It might be that some 
of these companies have went out of business and, hence, it is in theory possible that by using 
the index from December 2008, I introduce a survivorship bias in the acquisitions performed 
by my sample companies. The effect, however, is likely to be negotiable, and no further 
actions are taken to correct it. 
5.1.3 Sample identification for the M&A sample 
Table 4 on the next page summarizes the results of the identification procedure for the M&A 
sample. To identify my sample, I search the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and 
Acquisitions database for acquisitions, where the target is a U.S. based company and the 
acquirer‟s country of origin is from the EU-15 or Norway or Switzerland. As European 
companies quite often use a U.S. subsidiary in making the acquisition in the U.S., I attribute 
these acquisitions to the ultimate parent company as identified by SDC. I include transactions 
between 1.1.1996 and 31.12.2008. The logic for this restriction is that financial data on 
European companies in the Worldscope database prior to 1996 is quite limited. 
I only include transactions which are completed, i.e. I exclude withdrawn, pending and 
rumored transactions. I further require that the acquisition has to result in majority ownership 
of the target, and I also require that the value of the acquisition must be over $1 million to 
alleviate the problem of small acquisitions having a negligible effect on the market value of 
the bidder. 
I match the M&A transactions to my sample companies by searching with names and parts of 
the name of the acquirer, as well as with the company‟s ticker. I verify manually the accuracy 
of each data point. This yields my  Sample 1, with 451  acquisitions by cross-listed companies 
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Table 4: Filtering of the M&A sample 
The table shows the sample of acquisitions of U.S. companies by European companies between 1.1.1996 and 
31.12.2008 as reported in the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database (SDC). Europe is 
defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK. Panel A shows the eliminations done on the 
sample, i.e. the removal of acquisitions that did not result in a majority ownership of the target by the acquirer, 
removal of transactions which are not completed, and removal of transactions where the deal value is less than 
$1 million or is unavailable. Panel B shows the number of these acquisitions that are included in the analysis as 
they are matched to either a sample of 281 European companies that were cross-listed in the U.S. at the time of 
the acquisition, excluding those companies that cross-listed prior to 1.1.1980, or to the control sample, which 
includes the companies from the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe (December 2008 version). 
However, when a STOXX company is also cross-listed at the time of an acquisition, the transaction is classified 
as a cross-lister acquisition. Both the cross-lister sample and the control sample exclude financial companies 
(first digit of SIC code 6) due to differences in their financial reporting. In addition, panel B reports the number 
of acquisitions, in which the method of payment is known. Panel C shows the other sample, which consists of 
transactions by the cross-listers before cross-listing (Before c-listing), while being cross-listed (During c-listing) 
and after cross-delisting (After c-listing). In addition, panel C reports the number of acquisitions, in which the 
method of payment is known.  
Panel A: Sample filtering   
  N  
SDC 9463  
Minority stake after acquisition -307  
Acquisition not completed -1436  
Value of deal less than $1 million or unavailable -4210  
Total transactions 3510  
 
Panel B: Sample 1 - Cross-listers and control sample         
 Cross-listed acquirer Non-cross-listed acquirer Total  
  N Percent N Percent N 
Transactions in the overall analysis 
with control sample 
451 32.2% 951 67.8% 1402 
Of which method of payment known 290 32.8% 595 67.2% 885 
 
Panel C: Sample 2 - Cross-listers before, during, and after cross-listing  
 Before c-listing During c-listing After c-listing Total 
  N Percent N Percent N Percent N 
Transactions in the analysis before, 
during, and after cross-listing 
105 16.7% 451 71.8% 72 11.5% 628 
Of which method of payment known 64 15.7% 290 71.3% 53 13.0% 407 
 
and 951 acquisitions by the control companies, and Sample 2, with 105 transactions before 
cross-listing, 451 transactions during cross-listing, and 72 transactions after cross-delisting. 
5.1.4 Publication hits 
In order to investigate the visibility of the sample companies in prestigious business 
publications, I hand collect a unique database of publication hits from LexisNexis. I check 
52 
how many times the sample companies have appeared in the headline of Wall Street Journal, 
Financial Times, or Business Week during a one-year period ending ten days after the 
announcement of an M&A transaction. The logic behind this time period is that managerial 
hubris should be visible already prior to an M&A transaction and also in connection with the 
deal. In the analysis of differences in various subsamples, outlier companies that capture 5% 
or above of the total hit volume of that subsample are removed from the analysis. 
5.1.5 Other data 
In order to calculate cumulative abnormal returns, I need time series data for my sample 
acquirers before and after the announcement date. This data is retrieved through Datastream, 
from which I also retrieve time series data for the relevant market indices for each acquirer 
country in my sample, relevant exchange rate data, and money market rates. It is worth noting 
that all the time series data for the individual companies, market indices, and money market 
funds are retrieved in local currencies and, hence, percentage CARs are based entirely on 
local currencies and, consequently, are free from the effect of changes in exchange rates. 
Acquirer financials are retrieved through Worldscope, and are U.S. dollar denominated. The 
data available from the Worldscope needs adjustments for various reasons. For example P/E-
ratio is meaningless when earnings are below zero. In order to keep my sample unbiased, I 
only make adjustments to the data in cases when the data from Worldscope has questionable 
economic sense or is a clear outlier. I make the following adjustments. Unavailable values are 
left untouched. Return on assets is required to be at least -200%, and interest coverage ratio is 
limited to a range between -100 and 100. P/B-ratio is limited to max 50, and all companies 
that have a negative P/B-ratio are given a ratio of 50. P/E-ratio is adjusted to 0.1 if negative 
and to 100 if over 100. In the analysis of cross-listing and cross-delisting likelihood as the 
first step of the Heckman (1979) process, I calculate a number of variables as three-year 
averages to remove yearly fluctuations. For some observations, the three year figures are not 
available. In these cases, I use the longest available time period for averaging the figures. 
5.1.6 Descriptive statistics of the cross-lister and control sample 
Figure 3 shows quite clearly the trend of cross-listings and cross-delistings that was described 
earlier in section 2.1. Cross-listings in the U.S. by European companies were still relatively 
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rare in the beginning of the 1980s, but they gradually became more common towards the 
beginning of the 1990s peaking around 1995 with 27 annual cross-listings. Cross-listings 
remained quite popular until the passage of Sarbanes Oxley in 2002, which collapsed the 
number of cross-listings to only few per year. Cross-delistings, on the other hand, were very 
rare until 1995, from where they started to climb gradually, amounting to 17 annual cross-
delistings by 2002. Cross-delistings remained near at these relatively high levels until 2007, 
when it become possible to deregister one‟s share with the SEC if only 5% of the global 
trading volume in the stock came from the U.S.. This exploded the number of cross-delistings 
as 49 European companies cross-delisted their shares from the U.S. during 2007. In the year 
2008, cross-delistings settled back to a low level of eight annual cross-delistings. This was 
due to the very high number of companies, who instantly reacted to the change in the 
deregistering requirements, and already delisted during 2007 and, hence, there were very few 
prospective delisters left. 
 
Figure 3: Annual cross-listings and cross-delistings This figure shows the distribution of 281 European cross-
listings to the U.S. stock exchanges between 1980 and 2008. Also shown is the number of these cross-listings 
that subsequently cross-delisted during the sample period.  
Panel A in Table 5 shows the distribution of the cross-listing sample by country of origin for 
cross-listers, control sample, and whole sample. As can be seen, United Kingdom dominates 
the total sample with 278 (29.3%) observations. Also France and Germany are very well 
represented with 112 (11.8%) and 95 (10.0%) observations, respectfully. UK, unsurprisingly, 
also dominates the cross-lister sample with 98 (34.9%) observations. However, it seems that 
companies from the UK tend to be cross-listed more often than their frequency in the overall 
sample would imply. This is likely to be associated with the fact that the cultural fit between 
UK and U.S. is quite high due to legislative, linguistic, and political proximity. (see, e.g., 
Sarkissian  and Schill,  2004).  Also  Netherlands  seems  to be even more  overrepresented  in  
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Table 5: The cross-lister and control sample by country of origin and by industry 
This table shows the distribution a sample of 281 European companies that have been cross-listed in the U.S. 
between 1.1.1980 and 31.12.2008, and the distribution of the control sample, which includes those companies 
from the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe (December 2008 version) that have not been cross-
listed. Both the cross-lister sample and the control sample exclude financial companies (first digit of SIC code 6) 
due to differences in their financial reporting.. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and 
UK. Panel A shows the distribution of the cross-listers by country of origin as in the Thomson Financial 
Worldscope database (Worldscope), and Panel B shows the distribution by industry, determined by the SIC code 
as in the Worldscope database.  
Panel A: Distribution by country of origin             
  Cross-listed Only domestically listed Total 
Country of origin N Percent  N Percent  N Percent 
Austria 1 0.4%  14 2.1%  15 1.6% 
Belgium 3 1.1%  20 3.0%  23 2.4% 
Denmark 4 1.4%  19 2.8%  23 2.4% 
Finland 7 2.5%  29 4.3%  36 3.8% 
France 38 13.5%  74 11.1%  112 11.8% 
Germany 18 6.4%  77 11.5%  95 10.0% 
Greece 7 2.5%  16 2.4%  23 2.4% 
Italy 12 4.3%  41 6.1%  53 5.6% 
Ireland 15 5.3%  11 1.6%  26 2.7% 
Luxembourg 8 2.8%  4 0.6%  12 1.3% 
Netherlands 29 10.3%  27 4.0%  56 5.9% 
Norway 10 3.6%  17 2.5%  27 2.8% 
Portugal 2 0.7%  7 1.0%  9 0.9% 
Spain 5 1.8%  40 6.0%  45 4.7% 
Sweden 13 4.6%  39 5.8%  52 5.5% 
Switzerland 11 3.9%  53 7.9%  64 6.7% 
United Kingdom 98 34.9%  180 26.9%  278 29.3% 
Total 281 100.0%  668 100.0%  949 100.0% 
          
Panel B: Distribution by industry         
 Cross-listed 
Only domestically 
listed 
Total 
Industry N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Mining and construction (SIC 1) 21 7.5% 72 10.7% 93 9.8% 
Manufacturing: foods, textiles etc. (SIC 2) 60 21.4% 142 21.1% 202 21.3% 
Manufacturing: plastics, metals etc. (SIC 3) 62 22.1% 172 25.7% 234 24.7% 
Transportation and communications (SIC 4) 71 25.3% 110 16.5% 181 19.1% 
Wholesale and retail trade (SIC 5) 14 5.0% 70 10.5% 84 8.9% 
Finance, insurance, and real estate (SIC 6) - - - - - - 
Personal and business services (SIC 7) 42 14.9% 72 10.8% 114 12.0% 
Health, legal, educational services (SIC 8) 10 3.6% 29 4.3% 39 4.1% 
Public administration (SIC 9) 1 0.4% 1 0.1% 2 0.2% 
Total 281 100.0% 668 100.0% 949 100% 
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the cross-lister sample than the UK as its overall percentage in the whole sample is only 5.9%, 
but it holds a share of 10.3% in the cross-lister sample. Also Ireland has a substantially higher 
proportion in the cross-lister than in the overall sample (5.3% vs. 2.7%).  
Panel B of Table 5 describes the distribution of the cross-lister sample, control sample and 
combined sample by industry determined by the SIC code. The industry classes SIC 4, 
Transportation and communication, as well as SIC 7, Personal and business services, seem to 
be somewhat overrepresented in the cross-lister sample when compared to the whole sample 
(25.3% vs. 19.1% and 14.9% vs. 12.0%, respectfully). This might be explained by a number 
of factors such as the reliance on foreign expertise, i.e. companies choose to cross-list to 
locations where the most talented and experienced analysis of a given sector is present (see, 
e.g., Blass and Yafeh, 2001). It is quite straightforward to see that this might partly explain 
the large number of high-tech companies, usually having a SIC code beginning with 4 or 7, 
listing to the Nasdaq at the beginning of this millennium. 
Table 6 shows the financial performance of cross-listers prior to cross-listings, as well as the 
financial performance of the control sample for the year 2007. These figures are interesting as 
they might shed light on the decision of some companies to cross-list in the first place. 
However, disappointingly there are quite small differences between the two groups. They 
seem to be of roughly equal size when looking at the average figures, however, median 
figures indicate that the companies in the control sample are substantially larger, no matter if 
we look at market based size measures, i.e. market capitalization and enterprise value (EV), or 
total assets. It should be noted here, however, that as all the figures are nominal values, cross-
listers are at a size disadvantage, as their cross-listing has in the vast majority of the cases 
occurred prior to 2008. There does not seem to be large differences in the relative 
indebtedness or the sales growth of the cross-listers and control group companies in contrast 
to the findings of Pagano et al. (2002), who concluded that companies seem to cross-list after 
a high growth period, which left them highly leveraged. 
What is notable, however, is that the return on assets (ROA) is substantially worse for the 
cross-lister group, indicating that one motivation for cross-listing could be to strengthen the 
company‟s ROA. Theory suggests that by cross-listing, the company can lower also the cost 
of its debt capital, hence, improving ROA. The most striking difference between the groups 
is, however,  the one in  research  and development costs. Whereas  the median value of R&D  
56 
Table 6: Financial performance of the cross-listers and control sample 
Panel A of this table shows the financial performance of a sample of 281 European companies that have been 
cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1980-31.12.2008. Financial performance is shown prior to the cross-listing, 
i.e. according to the last financial year before the year of cross-listing. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 
countries and Norway and UK. The table shows the number of observations (N), average, median and standard 
deviation (Std.) of a number of financial variables. Panel B reports the same characteristics at end of year 2007 
for the control sample, which includes those companies from the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for 
Europe (December 2008 version) that are not cross-listed. Both the cross-lister sample and the control sample 
exclude financial companies (first digit of SIC code 6) due to the differences in their financial reporting. All 
financials are from Thomson Financial Worldscope database. Market cap is the value of the company‟s common 
stock. Net debt is defined as short-term debt and long-term debt less cash and cash equivalents. Enterprise value 
(EV) is defined as market capitalization + net debt. Sales growth is annualized three-year growth rate. Return on 
assets (ROA) is net income / total assets. Interest coverage ratio is defined as interest expenses on  
debt / EBITDA. Quick ratio is current assets less inventories / current liabilities. Price-to-book (P/B) is market 
cap / book value of equity and price-to-earnings (P/E) is price per share / earnings per share. 
Panel A:Cross-lister sample   
Financial N Median Average Std. 
Market capitalization ($m) 123 1,976 7,897 20,181 
EV ($m) 106 3,403 10,885 23,873 
Total assets ($m) 215 1,720 10,052 28,677 
Net debt-to-EV 106 13.1% 18.8% 31.1% 
3-year sales growth 101 11.2% 16.1% 34.3% 
ROA 214 4.2% 0.1% 23.3% 
R&D expenses/ sales 116 3.6% 22.4% 99.4% 
Quick ratio 212 97.0% 140.3% 180.8% 
Cash ratio 179 12.2% 37.3% 102.4% 
Interest coverage ratio 205 6.53 7.52 31.82 
P/B 122 2.56 6.27 10.54 
P/E 122 14.36 21.05 24.46 
     
Panel B: Control sample   
Financial N Median Average Std. 
Market capitalization ($m) 586 3,161 6,976 14,756 
EV ($m) 576 4,145 9,372 19,197 
Total assets ($m) 668 3,401 10,898 27,633 
Net debt-to-EV 576 14.1% 17.6% 22.4% 
3-year sales growth 653 10.0% 18.8% 80.0% 
ROA 667 6.0% 7.1% 11.5% 
R&D expenses/ sales 325 1.5% 4.5% 16.1% 
Quick ratio 660 93.4% 113.3% 88.7% 
Cash ratio 656 15.6% 28.0% 47.0% 
Interest coverage ratio 663 9.90 19.22 26.99 
P/B 586 2.77 4.58 7.56 
P/E 585 16.04 19.64 17.74 
 
costs to sales was 3.6% for the cross-listers, the control group invested less than half of this to 
research. Looking at the averages, the difference is even greater (22.4% vs. 4.5%). This is in 
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line with the view that more technology oriented firms choose to cross-list to the U.S. 
possible due to the proximity of most skillful analysts to cover them (Blass and Yafeh, 2001). 
5.1.7 Descriptive statistics of Sample 1 – M&A deals by cross-listers and control group 
Table 7 below shows the distribution of number of deals and value of the deals in Sample 1. It 
can be clearly seen that there is indeed a time trend in acquisitions: they tend to occur in so 
called merger waves. The first merger wave in my sample occurred during the 2000 - 2001 
dot-com bubble, and the second wave during 2006 - 2007. As is evident, the first merger 
wave was associated with higher M&A deal volume than the latter one. This supports the 
common view according to which the wave at the turn of the millennium peaked higher than 
the most recent boom. 
Table 7: Number of deals and value of deals by year 
The table shows the annual number of deals and value of deals in $millions carried out by a sample of 281 
European companies while being cross-listed in the U.S. between 1.1.1996 and 31.12.2008, excluding those 
companies that cross-listed prior to 1980. The table also shows the acquisitions carried out by the control 
sample, which includes those companies from the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe 
(December 2008 version) that are not cross-listed at the time of the acquisition. Both the cross-lister sample and 
the control sample exclude financial companies (first digit of SIC code 6) due to differences in their financial 
reporting. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK. Shown is also the annual 
distribution of number of deals, percentage of deals, value of deals, and percentage of the value of deals for the 
total sample including both cross-listed and non-cross-listed acquirers. 
 Cross-listed acquirer Non-cross-listed acquirer Total sample 
Year  N $m  N $m  N Percent $m Percent 
1996 13 7,729  56 12,676  69 4.9% 20,405 2.7% 
1997 23 6,231  63 12,615  86 6.1% 18,846 2.5% 
1998 43 37,719  74 18,936  117 8.3% 56,654 7.6% 
1999 55 28,166  85 96,746  140 10.0% 124,912 16.8% 
2000 70 79,258  110 71,014  180 12.8% 150,272 20.2% 
2001 32 19,858  66 32,094  98 7.0% 51,953 7.0% 
2002 29 5,065  58 13,027  87 6.2% 18,091 2.4% 
2003 23 4,020  55 8,290  78 5.6% 12,311 1.7% 
2004 28 9,478  61 7,348  89 6.3% 16,825 2.3% 
2005 32 18,243  64 23,910  96 6.8% 42,153 5.7% 
2006 37 51,227  91 22,929  128 9.1% 74,156 10.0% 
2007 46 64,250  95 68,786  141 10.1% 133,037 17.9% 
2008 20 4,811  73 19,567  93 6.6% 24,377 3.3% 
Total 451 336,056  951 407,937  1402 100.0% 743,992 100.0% 
 
As Table 8 shows, UK, France and Germany are, unsurprisingly, most well represented in the 
acquirer sample. However, what is more important, is that although companies from UK hold 
only 29.3% of the cross-lister and control firm samples, these companies account for 44.5% 
of the  acquisitions  carried out. This is likely  to be  due to  the cultural  proximity of  UK and  
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Table 8: The cross-lister and control sample transactions by bidder country of origin and by target 
industry 
This table shows the distribution of acquisitions by a sample of 281 European companies that were cross-listed 
in the U.S. at the time of the acquisition, i.e. between 1.1.1996 and 31.12.2008, excluding those companies that 
cross-listed prior to 1980. The table also shows the distribution of acquisitions by the control sample during the 
same time period. The control sample includes those companies from the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market 
Index for Europe (December 2008 version) that are not cross-listed at the time of the acquisition. Both the cross-
lister sample and the control sample exclude financial companies (first digit of SIC code 6) due to the differences 
in their financial reporting. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK. Panel A 
shows the distribution of the transactions by bidder country of origin as in the Thomson Financial Worldscope 
database (Worldscope), and Panel B shows the distribution by target industry, determined by the SIC code as in 
the SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. 
Panel A: Transactions by bidder country of origin 
  Cross-listed acquirer  Non-cross-listed acquirer  Total sample 
Country of origin  N Percent  N Percent  N Percent 
Austria  0 0.0%  7 0.7%  7 0.5% 
Belgium  11 2.4%  17 1.8%  28 2.0% 
Denmark  1 0.2%  16 1.7%  17 1.2% 
Finland  17 3.8%  23 2.4%  40 2.9% 
France  93 20.6%  72 7.6%  165 11.8% 
Germany  53 11.8%  82 8.6%  135 9.6% 
Greece  0 0.0%  4 0.4%  4 0.3% 
Italy  5 1.1%  13 1.4%  18 1.3% 
Ireland  41 9.1%  33 3.5%  74 5.3% 
Luxembourg  0 0.0%  3 0.3%  3 0.2% 
Netherlands  54 12.0%  39 4.1%  93 6.6% 
Norway  7 1.6%  11 1.2%  18 1.3% 
Portugal  1 0.2%  0 0.0%  1 0.1% 
Spain  2 0.4%  18 1.9%  20 1.4% 
Sweden  13 2.9%  56 5.9%  69 4.9% 
Switzerland  25 5.5%  61 6.4%  86 6.1% 
United Kingdom  128 28.4%  496 52.2%  624 44.5% 
Total  451 100.0%  951 100.0%  1402 100.0% 
 
Panel B: Transactions by target industry     
  Cross-listed 
acquirer 
Non-cross-listed 
acquirer 
Total sample 
Industry N Percent N Percent N Percent 
Mining and construction (SIC 1) 22 4.9% 52 5.5% 74 5.3% 
Manufacturing: foods, textiles etc. (SIC 2) 99 22.0% 166 17.5% 265 18.9% 
Manufacturing: plastics, metals etc. (SIC 3) 118 26.2% 334 35.1% 452 32.2% 
Transportation and communications (SIC 4) 36 8.0% 80 8.4% 116 8.3% 
Wholesale and retail trade (SIC 5) 30 6.7% 80 8.4% 110 7.8% 
Finance, insurance, and real estate (SIC 6) 27 6.0% 64 6.7% 91 6.5% 
Personal and business services (SIC 7) 88 19.5% 115 12.1% 203 14.5% 
Health, legal, educational services (SIC 8) 29 6.4% 59 6.2% 88 6.3% 
Public administration (SIC 9) 2 0.4% 1 0.1% 3 0.2% 
Total 451 100.0% 951 100.0% 1402 100.0% 
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U.S.. Besides UK, the acquisitions are geographically dispersed quite similarly than the 
companies in the underlying company samples. Panel B of Table 8 shows the distribution of 
the sample acquisitions by the industry of the target. The data provides no real surprises as 
there are no large differences between the target industries of cross-listed and non-cross-listed 
acquirers, except that cross-listed acquirers seem to be acquiring substantially more personal 
and business services companies and substantially less plastic and metals manufacturing 
companies than the control group. As companies tend to bid for firms that are from the same 
industry than themselves, this result is explained by the fact that cross-listers themselves tend 
to come more from SIC 7 and less from SIC 3, as they are more often or not technology 
oriented companies. 
Table 9 reports a number of key characteristics of the M&A transactions in Sample 1. It can 
be clearly seen that the cross-listers have made larger acquisitions in absolute dollar terms 
than the non-cross-listed acquirers during the sample period. The median value of a 
transaction where cross-lister is the acquirer is $115.0m, 119% above the median value of a 
transaction by the control group. The size effect is also robust to the usage of simple average 
($745.1m vs. $429.0m). This is somewhat different to that shown by Tolmunen and Torstila 
(2005), who in fact document that the acquirer‟s in their control sample seem to be making 
slightly larger transaction than the acquirer‟s in the cross-lister group. Actually, a similar 
pattern is also visible in my data, if one looks at the relative size of the acquisitions, i.e. deal 
value to market capitalization of the acquirer. Utilizing this more informative approach to size 
measurement, it seems that the control group has made relatively somewhat larger 
transactions than the cross-lister group.  
What is more striking than this small difference in relative deal size is, however, the large 
differences in payment methods between the cross-listers and the control group, as the 
average equity-financing in the acquisitions by the cross-listers is 16.4% compared to meager 
4.9% for the control group. This finding is well in line with the hypothesis that cross-listing 
enables the usage of equity as an acquisitions currency and, hence, cross-listers engage in 
larger and more equity-financed transaction than their domestically listed peers. This can be 
even more clearly seen in the percentage of transactions completely equity-financed: 12.1% 
for cross-listers and 2.5% for the control group. Also the total volume of transaction financed 
with equity is 26.6% for the cross-listers, compared to 23.0% for the control group. 
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Table 9: Descriptive statistics of the transactions of the cross-lister and control sample 
Panel A of this table shows a number of deal characteristics for 451 M&A transaction carried out by a sample of 
281 European companies while being cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1996-31.12.2008, excluding those 
companies that cross-listed prior to 1980. Panel B of the table shows the same deal characteristics for a sample 
of 915 acquisitions carried out by the control sample, which includes those companies from the Dow Jones 
STOXX Total Market Index for Europe (December 2008 version) that are not cross-listed at the time of the 
acquisition. Both the cross-lister sample and the control sample exclude financial companies (first digit of SIC 
code 6) due to differences in their financial reporting. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and 
Norway and UK. N refers to the number of M&A transactions, where the characteristics in question can be 
determined. Transaction value is the deal value from the Thomson Financial SDC database (SDC), % of shares 
acquired and resulting ownership % is from SDC, Market capitalization (Mcap) of the acquirer is from 
Worldscope database 21 trading days prior to deal announcement, % of equity financing, percent of volume 
equity financed and percent 100% equity financed is from SDC. A target is defined as a non-public target if SDC 
categorizes it as either a private target of subsidiary of a public target. 
Panel A: Cross-listed acquirers   
  
N Median Average 
Std. 
deviation 
Percent 
Transaction value ($m) 451 115.0 745.1 2,146.9  
% of shares acquired 451 100.0% 95.7% 14.9%  
Resulting ownership % 451 100.0% 98.8% 7.0%  
Transaction value / Mcap of the acquirer 451 1.3% 7.3% 21.5%  
% of equity financing 290 0.0% 16.4% 34.9%  
Percent of volume equity-financed 290    26.6% 
Percent 100% equity-financed 290    12.1% 
Percent non-public target 451    75.6% 
      
Panel B: Non-cross-listed acquirers 
  
N Median Average 
Std. 
deviation 
Percent 
Transaction value 951 52.4 429.0 2,325.0  
% of shares acquired 951 100.0% 97.0% 13.3%  
Resulting ownership % 951 100.0% 99.0% 6.2%  
Transaction value / Mcap of the acquirer 951 1.6% 8.2% 35.3%  
% of equity financing 595 0.0% 4.9% 19.5%  
Percent of volume equity-financed     23.0% 
Percent 100% equity-financed 595    2.5% 
Percent non-public target 951    81.4% 
 
The smaller difference in this measure indicates that cross-listers tend to use equity as a 
payment method for smaller transactions than the control group, who seems to use equity only 
for the largest acquisitions. This is likely to be associated with the fact that foreign equity is 
regarded as an inferior acquisition currency in the U.S. and, thus, the control group chooses to 
use it only in the most sizable transactions. It also seems that the cross-listers acquire 
somewhat more public entities than the non-cross-listed acquirers. This is how one would 
expect, as the higher amount of deals financed with equity is likely to be at least partly a 
results of more acquisitions of public targets. 
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5.1.8 Descriptive statistics of Sample 2 – M&A deals by cross-listers before cross-listing, 
during cross-listing, and after cross-delisting 
In addition to comparing the acquisition performance of the cross-listers and the control 
group, my Hypotheses 6, 7, and 9 relate to the acquisition behavior of cross-listers at different 
times of the cross-listing cycle, i.e. before cross-listing, during cross-listing, and after cross-
delisting. Having looked at the descriptive statistics of Sample 1, I now move on to discuss 
the properties of Sample 2. 
Table 10 on the next page, shows various characteristics of the transactions in Sample 2. 
When one compares Panel A, showing the characteristics of acquisitions before cross-listing, 
and Panel B, showing acquisitions during cross-listing, there does not seem to be any 
dramatic differences. It, however, seems that the transactions made by the cross-listers prior 
to cross-listing are somewhat larger than those made while being cross-listed. It also seems 
that the sample companies used equity more frequently as a payment method, and more often 
purchased public companies before their cross-listing. The results are somewhat puzzling as 
Tolmunen and Torstila (2005) found the opposite to hold for cross-listers, as their results 
indicated that mean transaction size and percentage of equity financing increase dramatically 
after a company cross-lists. It might be that the behavior of cross-listing companies has 
changed somewhat during this decade, and the companies that eventually choose to cross-list, 
have been making large equity-financed transaction in the U.S. already before cross-listing. 
Supporting this notion, Tolmunen and Torstila show that the companies that eventually 
choose to cross-list in the U.S. have been quite acquisitive in the U.S. already before the 
cross-listing. It might be the case that as obstacles of holding and trading foreign equity have 
grown smaller during this decade, the role of cross-listed stock as an acquisition currency is 
perhaps not as important as it used to be. 
Most interesting aspect in Table 10, however, is the comparison of acquisitions during cross-
listing, in Panel B, to acquisitions after cross-delisting, in Panel C. What can be instantly seen, 
is the fact that after a company cross-delists, the median deals size nearly halves ($115.0m vs. 
$53.0m), the average percentage of equity-financing plummets from 16.4% to 2.5%, the 
volume of deals financed with equity drops from 26.6% to 0.2%, and the amount of entirely 
equity-financed deals drops from 12.1% to zero. It seems that, as Hypothesis 7 suggest, cross-
delisting marks the end of a U.S. acquisition spree, as evidenced by smaller and cash-financed 
deals  being the  new norm. As  there are no extant studies  on the  effect of  cross-delisting to  
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Table 10: Descriptive statistics of the transactions of the cross-lister sample 
This table shows a number of deal characteristics for 628 M&A transaction carried out during 1.1.1996-
31.12.2008 by a sample of 281 European companies that have been cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1980-
31.12.2008. Financial companies are excluded (first digit of SIC code 6). Europe is defined as the original EU-15 
countries and Norway and UK. Panel A shows the deal characteristics for the 105 acquisitions by sample 
companies prior to cross-listing. Panel B shows the same characteristics for 451 acquisitions carried out by the 
sample companies while being cross-listed in the U.S.. Panel C shows the same characteristics for 72 
acquisitions performed by the sample companies after they have cross-delisted their shares from the U.S. stock 
exchanges. N refers to the number of M&A transactions, where the characteristics in question can be determined. 
Transaction value is the deal value from the Thomson Financial SDC database (SDC), % of shares acquired and 
resulting ownership % is from SDC, Market capitalization (Mcap) of the acquirer is from Worldscope database 
21 trading days prior to deal announcement, % of equity financing, percent of volume equity financed and 
percent 100% equity financed is from SDC. A target is defined as a non-public target if SDC categorizes it as 
either a private target of subsidiary of a public target. 
Panel A: Before cross-listing 
  
N Median Average 
Std. 
deviation 
Percent 
Transaction value 105 130.0 1,190.0 5,959.9  
% of shares acquired 105 100.0% 96.7% 13.8%  
Resulting ownership % 105 100.0% 98.8% 6.9%  
Transaction value / Mcap of the acquirer 105 1.6% 15.8% 39.3%  
% of equity financing 64 0.0% 19.8% 38.0%  
Percent of volume equity-financed 64    57.0% 
Percent 100% equity-financed 64    9.5% 
Percent non-public target 105    67.6% 
      
Panel B: During cross-listing 
  
N Median Average 
Std. 
deviation 
Percent 
Transaction value 451 115.0 745.1 2,146.9  
% of shares acquired 451 100.0% 95.7% 14.9%  
Resulting ownership % 451 100.0% 98.8% 7.0%  
Transaction value / Mcap of the acquirer 451 1.3% 7.3% 21.5%  
% of equity financing 290 0.0% 16.4% 34.9%  
Percent of volume equity-financed 290    26.6% 
Percent 100% equity-financed 290    12.1% 
Percent non-public target 451    75.6% 
      
Panel C: After cross-delisting 
  
N Median Average 
Std. 
deviation 
Percent 
Transaction value 72 53.0 374.2 797.0  
% of shares acquired 72 100.0% 96.7% 13.3%  
Resulting ownership % 72 100.0% 98.0% 8.8%  
Transaction value / Mcap of the acquirer 72 0.9% 2.9% 5.5%  
% of equity financing 53 0.0% 2.5% 12.9%  
Percent of volume equity-financed 53    0.2% 
Percent 100% equity-financed 53    0.0% 
Percent non-public target 72    73.6% 
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M&A activity, it will be interesting to see, whether these smaller and less equity-financed 
deals in fact translate into better acquisition performance after cross-delisting, as one would 
easily assume given the prior literature on the superiority of small and cash financed deals in 
acquirer value creation. 
5.2 Methodology 
In this section, I briefly present the methodology which I use in the empirical section of this 
thesis to test the nine hypotheses laid down in the previous chapter. First, I introduce event 
study methodology, then regressions, and conclude by presenting my regression variables. 
5.2.1 Event study methodology 
This paper uses an event study approach in measuring the shareholder wealth effects of 
transatlantic M&A transactions. Both percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) as well 
as dollar cumulative abnormal returns ($CARs) are calculated over three short-term event 
windows, i.e. [-1;+1], [-3;+3], and [-5;+5]. The reason for calculating both percentage and 
dollar CARs is that, as discussed in section 3.2.1, percentage abnormal returns do not always 
effectively capture the change in the wealth of bidder‟s shareholders due to differences in the 
market values of the sample companies (see, e.g., Malatesta, 1983). For example Moeller et 
al. (2004) showed that although percentage cumulative abnormal returns for bidders would be 
positive, dollar cumulative abnormal returns might very well be heavily negative due to the 
fact that larger deals seem to be worse. Hence, it is important to study both percentage and 
dollar cumulative abnormal returns to better understand the underlying phenomenon. 
Event study methodology has its roots in the studies of Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), 
and the methodology is quite thoroughly covered in for example Brown and Warner (1985). 
To calculate CARs, I first estimate a market model for each acquirer in the sample 
transactions. I do this by regressing the daily excess returns of the acquirer on the daily excess 
returns of the local stock market over a clean 200 day period starting 220 days prior to the 
announcement date. It should be noted here that the used market indices are the Morgan 
Stanley Capital Investment (MSCI) country price indices for each country, and country 
specific money market rates are used as the risk-free rate. Performing the above mentioned 
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regressions allows me to determine the market model parameters alfa ( ) and beta ( ) for 
each of the acquirers. Equation 1 below shows the market model in question. 
 , (1) 
where  
 Logarithmic rate of return for firm  on day  
 
 Logarithmic rate of return for the relevant market index  on 
day  
 
 Logarithmic daily money market rate for the relevant money 
market  on day  
 
Having obtained estimates for alfa and beta from the market model (Equation 1), the next step 
is to calculate the expected daily returns, , around the announcement date for each 
acquirer  using Equation 2: 
 (2) 
  
Then, abnormal returns ( ) for each firm  are calculated (Equation 3), and further 
averaged over the sample acquirers (Equation 4), sample size being denoted by . 
 (3) 
  
 
 
(4) 
  
The abnormal return is, hence, the actual return less that predicted by the model in the case 
that no event would have taken place (Equation 2). This allows me to isolate the wealth effect 
of the announcement of the acquisition from general market movement. In order to correct for 
the effect of leaking investor information as well as for slow price adjustment, it is common 
practice in event studies to cumulate the abnormal return over a window of time around the 
event date. Thus, I calculate average CARs over a time window  as: 
  
65 
 
 
 
(5) 
  
In addition to merely calculating the CARs, I also test for their significance in order to 
determine whether the observed CARs are more likely to be a result of chance or of actual 
tendency found in the population. In order to do this, I need the standard deviation of the 
CARs. Hence, I first calculate the average abnormal return over the relevant event window 
(Equation 6), then using this, the standard deviation ( ) of the abnormal returns 
(Equation 7), and finally, I am able to calculate the standard deviation of the CARs over a the 
relevant time window, the length of which is L days (Equation 8). 
 
 
(6) 
  
 
 
(7) 
  
 
 
(8) 
  
Having obtained  from Equation 5 and  from Equation 8, I can now calculate the 
t-statistic in order to test a null hypothesis stating zero CARs over the event window. By 
observing the t-statistics, I can make conclusions on the statistical significance of the acquirer 
CARs. The test statistic is calculated as follows: 
 
 
(9) 
  
The above derivation concerns the calculation of percentage cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs). Consequently, I also need to use a specific method to calculate the dollar cumulative 
abnormal returns ($CARs). Fortunately, there is a straightforward formula, which relates 
percentage abnormal returns to dollar abnormal returns, namely: 
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 (10) 
where  
 Market value of the common stock of company one 
day prior to the start of the event period 
 
5.2.2 Regressions 
The effect of cross-listing and cross-delisting to CARs will be studied with ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression models. The regression variables of the models will be explained in 
detail in the next section, 5.2.3. However, before OLS can be run, self-selection of the cross-
listers in Sample 1 and self-selection of the cross-delisters in Sample 2 has to be taken into 
account. This is due to the fact that companies that choose to cross-list or cross-delist are not 
random draws from the population, but they rather choose to list or delist. This complicates 
the analysis so that one cannot directly estimate an OLS model for CARs with cross-listing or 
cross-delisting dummies, as the listing and delisting decisions might be related to CARs and, 
hence, the dummies and error terms would be correlated, possible leading to biased results. 
In order to take into account the self selection in Sample 1, I use the Heckman (1979) two-
step estimation method, i.e. I first estimate a self selection model, whose results I then use in 
the final OLS regressions to control for the bias. I follow Torstila and Tolmunen (2005) and 
employ a probit
4
 model of cross-listing likelihood as a self selection model. I present here a 
short summary of the probit model, for a more thorough overview see, e.g., Green (1993). In 
the probit model there is an unobserved latent variable  and observed variable 
. In studying the company‟s decision to cross-list, the observed dependent variable, 
 receives a value of 0 if the company is not cross-listed at the time of the acquisition, 
and a value of 1 if the company is cross-listed at the time of the acquisition. The regression 
relation is defined in terms of the latent variable as: 
 , (11) 
where  
if  
if  
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 Set of variables affecting the likelihood of company  to cross-
list 
 error term 
 
 
 
 
This relation gives the probability function: 
 (12) 
  
  
where F is the cumulative distribution function for the error term,  Hence, the functional 
form of F depends on the assumptions made by the . In probit, it is assumed that the  is 
normally distributed. The likelihood function to be estimated is then: 
 
 
(13) 
As the first stage of Heckman (1979), I estimate the model in Equation 11 and obtain an 
estimate for . Next, I calculate for each firm  the inverse Mills ratio,  defined as: 
 
 
(14) 
where  refers to the standard normal density distribution and  to cumulative distribution 
function. Then at the second stage of Heckman, I estimate an OLS model employing  as an 
additional explanatory variable for the CARs. 
The variables , which I use to estimate the probability of cross-listing are derived from 
extant literature on cross-listings. The variables, which I employ, relate to both individual 
firms specific variables and to variables specific for the country of origin of the firm, as 
suggested by e.g. Doidge, Karolyi, and Stultz (2004).  
The probit model of cross-listing likelihood follows the specification in Tolmunen and 
Torstila (2005). The firm level variables used are logarithm of assets at the last full year 
balance sheet date prior to an acquisition by a sample company, three-year average sales 
growth, three-year average P/E ratio, three-year average P/B ratio, and industry dummies 
based on the major industry class of the SIC code. The country level variables in my model 
are dummy variables for legal origin, accounting standards, and judicial efficiency as defined 
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in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Schleifer, and Vishny (1998). Following Doidge et al. (2004) 
as well as Tolmunen and Torstila (2005), I further include two additional variables, i.e. 
market liquidity, measured as the dollar value of shares traded in a given market divided by 
the average market capitalization of the market in the year 1997, and the logarithm of the 
country's per capita GNP in dollars for the same year. 
Also cross-delisting is a conscious choice made by the sample companies and, hence, there 
might be same kind of self-selection issues in Sample 2 as in Sample 1. Thus, I also run OLS 
regressions separately for a subsample of Sample 2, containing only the acquisitions by 
companies during cross-listing and after cross-delisting. This allows me to employ the 
Heckman two-stage procedure to control for the effect of self-selection. I use as the first stage 
of Heckman a probit model of cross-delisting likelihood. This allows me to also enhance the 
knowledge on cross-delistings, as the matter has been previously studied by only two authors: 
Witmer (2005) and more recently after the change in SEC deregistering requirements Doidge 
et al. (2008). 
The used probit model for cross-delisting is quite similar to the model for cross-listing, but the 
explanatory variables and the independent variable are different. Namely, in the probit model 
there is an unobserved latent variable  and observed variable . While 
studying the company‟s decision to cross-delist, the observed dependent variable,  
receives a value of 0 if the company is still cross-listed at the time of the acquisition, and a 
value of 1 if the company has cross-delisted at the time of the acquisition. The regression 
relation is defined in terms of the latent variable in the same fashion as shown above for 
cross-listing. 
The variables, which I use to estimate the probability of cross-delisting relate to both 
individual firms specific variables and to variables specific for the country of origin of the 
firm, as suggested by e.g. Doidge et al. (2008). The firm specific variables in my model are 
the leverage of the company defined as total debt divided by total assets, logarithm of assets, 
and three-year average sales growth. In addition to the sales growth, I also use global industry 
median Tobin‟s q for the year prior to the acquisitions to proxy for the growth opportunities 
of the company. Tobin‟s q is defined in the usual manner as book value of total assets less 
book value of equity plus market value of equity, all divided by the book value of total assets. 
The industry is defined according to the first two digits of the SIC code. I also include in the 
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model a measure of the company‟s shares held by insiders of the company. I proxy for this 
variable by the Worldscope data item closely held shares, which includes, but is not limited 
to, shares held by officers, directors, and their immediate families, shares held in trust, shares 
held by other corporations, by pension plans, and by individuals who hold 5% or more of the 
company‟s outstanding shares. In addition, I also add a dummy variable, which takes a value 
of 1 if the acquisition is made after the relaxation of deregistering requirements, i.e. post 
March 21, 2007, when SEC adopted Exchange Act Rule 12h-6, and zero otherwise. 
Following Doidge et al. (2008), I obtain my country level variables from La Porta et al. 
(1998) and from Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Schleifer (2008). I include a legal 
index, which is obtained by multiplying the anti-director rights variable from Djankov et al. 
by the rule of law index from La Porta et al.. Furthermore, I include stock market 
capitalization divided by GDP and the logarithm of GDP per capita in $. These two variables 
are calculated for the year prior to the deal, with the exception that year 2007 figures are used 
for 2008 as figures for this year were not yet available from the World Bank WDI database. 
5.2.3 Regressions variables of the CAR models 
The independent variables in the OLS models, where CAR is the dependent variable, include 
certain key acquirer financial ratios at the beginning of the year of the transaction, logarithm 
of the market capitalization of the acquirer 21 days prior to the acquisitions, and dummy 
variables reflecting quantitative and qualitative deal, target, and bidder characteristics. None 
of these variables should adversely affect the variance of the error term, and, hence, it can be 
assumed to be constant. This would imply that my regression is free from heteroscedasticity. 
However, the regressions could still be affected by multicollinearity, if there is a high 
correlation between some of the explanatory variables. To check this, I calculate the 
correlation between the regressors in my models (see Appendix A). As is evident, none of the 
regressors, excluding the inverse Mills ratios, are severely correlated with each other and, 
thus, the regressions should be free from multicollinearity. Next, I present each of variables 
used to explain wealth creation. 
CROSS: A dummy variable to account for the effect of cross-listing. Takes a value of one if 
the acquirer is cross-listed in the U.S. at the time of the acquisition, and zero otherwise.  
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BEFORE: A dummy variable to take into account the effect of cross-listing. Receives a value 
of one if the acquirer has not yet been cross-listed in the U.S. at the time of the acquisition, 
and zero otherwise. 
AFTER: A dummy variable to take into account the effect of cross-delisting. Receives a value 
of one if the acquirer has cross-delisted from the U.S. at the time of the acquisition, and zero 
otherwise. Dummies BEFORE and AFTER together categorize the acquisitions of Sample 2 
in three classes: acquisitions made before, during, and after cross-listing.  
% EQUITY: Percentage of the purchase price paid with equity. 
TOEHOLD: A dummy variable to account for the effect of toehold. Receives a value of one if 
the bidder had ownership in the target prior to announcement of the deal according to SDC, 
zero otherwise. 
DIVERSIFY: A dummy variable to take into account the effect of diversifying deals. Receives 
a value of one if the bidder and target are from different major industries as defined by the 
first two digits of the SIC code as in Worldscope, zero otherwise. 
LANGUAGE: A dummy variable to account for cultural proximity of the target and the 
bidder. Takes a value of one if the official language of the acquirer‟s home country is English, 
and zero otherwise. 
RER: A variable reflecting the differences in relative exchange rates between the target and 
the bidder home currencies. Following Harris and Ravenscraft (1991), I define RER as  
 
 
 
, (15) 
where  is the average exchange rate between the currencies of the target and the bidder 
during 1996 - 2008 and  is the exchange rate at the beginning of the acquisition year. I 
express exchange rates as US$1 equals of the number of foreign currency units, i.e. positive 
 reflects a strong currency relative to the U.S. dollar. 
LOG MCAP: Proxy variable for the size of the acquiring company. Defined as the logarithm 
of the market cap of the acquirer 21 days prior to the announcement of the deal in log $m. 
EBIT MARGIN: A financial ratio reflecting the profitability of the acquirer prior to the 
transaction. Defined as the ratio of the acquirer‟s operating income to sales. 
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CASH RATIO: A financial ratio reflecting the size of the acquirer‟s cash reserves prior to the 
deal. Defined as the ratio of the acquirer‟s cash and short-term investments to its total assets. 
LEVERAGE: A financial ratio reflecting the leverage of the acquiring company before the 
transaction. Defined as the ratio of total debt to market capitalization of the acquirer 21 days 
prior to the announcement of the deal.  
NON-PUBLIC: A dummy variable to account for the effect of target being a non-public 
entity. Takes a value of one if the target is defined as a private company or a subsidiary of a 
public company in SDC, zero otherwise. 
DEAL SIZE: The logarithm of the value of the transaction as shown in SDC in $m. 
PUBLICATION Gives the number of times the name of the company was mentioned in the 
headline of Business Week, Financial Times, or Wall Street Journal during a one-year period 
ending 10 days after the announcement on an M&A transaction by the sample company as in 
LexisNexis database. 
: The inverse Mills ratio, estimated as the first stage of the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
model for Sample 1. Included in the model to overcome self-selection bias as cross-listed 
companies are not random draws from a population, but self-select.  
: The inverse Mills ratio, estimated as the first stage of the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
model for Sample 2. Included in the model to overcome self-selection bias as cross-delisted 
companies are not random draws from a population, but self-select. 
INDUSTRY: Dummy variables to account for industry disturbance. There are seven industry 
dummies defined by the first digit of the SIC code. SIC 6, Finance, insurance, and real estate, 
is omitted and SIC 1, Mining and construction, acts as the base group. 
YEAR: Dummy variables to account for merger waves. There are 12 year dummies for years 
1997 - 2008 and year 1996 is the base case.  
COUNTRY: Dummy variables to account for the effect of the home country of the acquirer. 
There are 16 dummy variables and Germany acts as the base group. 
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6 Empirical results 
In this chapter, I present the empirical findings of my thesis. First, I discuss the visibility of 
the sample companies in prestigious publications to illustrate managerial hubris. Second, I go 
over the results on acquirer wealth effects to shed light on the absolute and relative value 
creation. Finally, I conclude the chapter by presenting the results of my regression analysis. 
6.1 Visibility of the sample companies in prestigious publications 
In this section, I elaborate on the visibility of my sample companies in three prestigious 
business publications, namely Business Week, Financial Times, and Wall Street Journal. It is 
interesting to see how prevalent the sample companies have been during a one-year period 
leading to an M&A transaction, as more publication hits act as a proxy for managerial hubris. 
Table 11 shows the number of times the sample companies have appeared in the above 
mentioned publications on a one-year period ending ten days after the announcement of an 
M&A transaction by the sample company. As is evident, the cross-listed companies seem to 
be substantially more prevalent in these publications than their non-cross-listed peers, the 
average number of hits being 30.6 for the cross-listers and 12.8 for the control-group. 
However, it seems that the distribution of hits is somewhat more skewed for the non-cross-
listed companies. Consequently, the difference in median is even relatively larger: median for 
cross-listed companies is 16, while it is a meager 5 for the control group. The differences in 
both average and median are highly significant, indicating that cross-listers tend to appear 
substantially more in these publications. Hence, there is strong support for Hypothesis 1. 
As shown earlier by e.g. Pagano et al. (2002), cross-listed companies tend to be larger than 
non-cross-listed firms, and quite intuitively, the size of a company also increases its 
prominence in prestigious business publications. Hence, the results obtained above might be 
driven by the fact that the cross-listers are simply larger than the non-cross-listers. This can be 
checked with a robustness check where the publication hits are regressed over the size of the 
company as well as over a cross-listing dummy. Appendix B reports the results of this 
regression. The regression shows that cross-listing does indeed increase publication hits by an 
average of 11.4, even after we control for the effect of company size. The coefficient for the 
cross-listing dummy is statistically significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 11: Publication hits during a one-year period leading to an M&A transaction 
The table shows the number of times when the companies in the sample have appeared in the headline of Wall 
Street Journal, Financial Times or Business week on a period of one year ending 10 days after the announcement 
of an M&A transaction by the sample company. The table also reports the t-statistic for the differences in the 
averages of the subsamples and z-statistic of the Wilcoxon rank sum test for the differences in the medians. 
Companies that hold 5% or more of the total hit volume of a subsample are removed from the analysis. The 
publication hits are obtained through LexisNexis keyword searches. Sample 1 includes 1,382 M&A transaction 
carried out by a sample of 281 European companies while being cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1996-
31.12.2008, excluding those companies that cross-listed prior to 1980, or by the control sample, which includes 
those companies from the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe (December 2008 version) that are 
not cross-listed at the time of the acquisition. The subsamples are labeled C-listed and Control group, 
respectively. Sample 2 includes 608 acquisitions by the sample of 281 cross-listers at different stages of the 
cross-listing cycle, i.e. before cross-listing, during cross-listing, and after cross-delisting. During cross-listing is 
the same subsample as C-listed, before cross-listing is labeled as Before c-listing and after cross-delisting is 
labeled as After c-listing. Both samples exclude financial companies (first digit of SIC code 6) due to differences 
in their financial reporting. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK. Both 
acquisition samples are retrieved from the Thomson Financial SDC database, and include only completed 
acquisitions that result in majority ownership of the target by the bidder, and deal size is at minimum $1m. 
 
Sample 1  Sample 2 
 
C-listed 
 
Control 
croup 
C-listed – 
control 
Before  
c-listing 
C-listed – 
before 
After  
c-listing 
After – 
during 
Average 30.6 12.8 17.8***  33.0 -2.3 6.8 -23.9*** 
T-statistic 
  
[11.08]  
 
[-0.62] 
 
[-4.38] 
Median 16.0 5.0 11.0***  18.0 -2.0 4.0 -10.0 
Z-statistics 
  
[-9.88]  
 
[-1.64] 
 
[-0.93] 
N 405 951 
 
 105 
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***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Let‟s consider a naïve example based on the regression analysis. A hypothetical European 
company with a market cap of $100 million appears in the headline of Business Week, 
Financial Times, and Wall Street Journal on average 11 times in the one year-period leading 
to an M&A transaction by the company. However, if the company cross-listed its shares to 
the U.S., it would appear on average 22 times. The same result could also by achieved by 
merely increasing the size of the company. However, to achieve the same number of hits than 
with cross-listing would require the company‟s market cap to grow to $40 billion! 
However, the figures for Sample 2 on Table 11 do not support the view according to which 
cross-listing increases the visibility of a company in prestigious business publications. There 
is quite little difference in the publication hits before and during cross-listing, although both 
average and median number of hits are somewhat higher before cross-listing. This would 
indicate that the companies that choose to eventually cross-list are already prominent in the 
media prior to the cross-listing. This result supports a view, according to which the behavior 
of a company is quite similar prior and during cross-listing. This would entail that cross-
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listing is likely to be only a symptom of larger managerial and hubris issues within the 
company, which are visible in the extensive publicity gotten by them. 
It seems that companies get substantially less publicity around their M&A transactions after 
they have cross-delisted, as the average number of hits drops to 6.8 and median number of 
hits is only 4. The difference in the average number of hits during cross-listing and after 
cross-delisting is highly significant with a t-value of 4.38, supporting Hypothesis 8, i.e. 
indicating that the publicity gotten after cross-delisting is indeed much lower than during 
cross-listing. Hence, it also seems that cross-delisting is an indicator of a change in the 
company, witnessed by better acquisition performance and less search for publicity. It should 
be noted, however, that the difference in median number of hits is statistically insignificant. 
6.2 Wealth effects to acquirer shareholders 
This section presents the results of tests on wealth creation to acquirer shareholders. This 
section is divided into four subsections, two for both of my samples. I assess absolute value 
creation and, in addition, I test for the difference in value creation between my various 
subsamples. 
6.2.1 Cumulative abnormal returns Sample 1 – M&A transactions by cross-listers and 
control group 
Table 12 presents the cumulative abnormal returns for the cross-listers and the control group. 
As can be seen, it seems that the acquisitions by the cross-listers are roughly break-even 
transactions to the shareholders of the acquiring company as the average CAR for the clean  
3-day period is 0.19%. The average CAR for the cross-listers is not statistically significantly 
different from zero in any of the event periods, further indicating value neutral transactions. 
Looking at the mid-point of the range of CARs, it seems that the cross-listers are doing even 
somewhat worse than the average suggests, as the median CAR for the 3-day event window is 
-0.10%. Hence, the distribution of wealth effects seems to be somewhat skewed. 
When one looks at the dollar weighted abnormal returns, it actually appears that M&A 
activity by cross-listed companies is shareholder value destroying. It seems that the cross-
listers are destroying on average $93.8m of wealth per transaction, and also the median value 
destruction  is $1.5m. This is in line with the idea presented by Moeller et al. (2004):  deals by  
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Table 12: Cumulative abnormal returns to cross-lister and control group acquirers 
This table presents the average and median acquirer percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and dollar 
cumulative abnormal returns ($CAR) for a sample of 451 M&A transaction carried out by 281 European 
companies while being cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1996-31.12.2008, excluding those companies that 
cross-listed prior to 1980. The table also shows the CARs and $CARs for a sample of 951 acquisitions carried 
out by the control sample, which includes those companies from the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for 
Europe (December 2008 version) that are not cross-listed at the time of the acquisition. Acquirers in the cross-
lister sample and the control sample exclude financial companies (first digit of SIC code 6) due to differences in 
their financial reporting. Europe is defined here as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK. The 
samples are retrieved from Thomson Financial SDC database, and include only completed acquisitions that 
result in majority ownership of the target by the bidder, and deal size is at minimum $1m. The $CARs are 
reported in $millions. The returns are reported over three short-term event windows and the t-statistic is reported 
in parenthesis below the average CARs. Positive refers to percentage of the sample acquisitions, which are value 
creative to the acquirer in the respective event period. The table also reports the difference in CARs and $CARs 
between cross-listed and control group acquirers. For the difference in median CARs and $CARs, the table also 
reports the z-statistic of the Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
 Cross-listed acquirers Control group acquirers Difference 
Percentage returns    
[-5;+5]    
Average CAR -0.27% 0.56%*** -0.83%* 
T-statistic [-0.72] [2.59] [-1.90] 
Median CAR 0.13% 0.55% -0.41% 
Z-statistic   [-1.44] 
Positive 51.00% 55.63% 55.52% 
[-3;+3]    
Average CAR 0.03% 0.65%*** -0.63%* 
T-statistic [0.09] [3.78] [-1.80] 
Median CAR 0.20% 0.50% -0.30%** 
Z-statistic   [-1.99] 
Positive 51.00% 54.36% 54.26% 
[-1;+1]    
Average CAR 0.19% 0.55%*** -0.36% 
T-statistic [0.96] [4.87] [-1.58] 
Median CAR -0.10% 0.32% -0.42%** 
Z-statistic   [-1.98] 
Positive 48.56% 55.63% 55.52% 
    
Dollar returns ($m)    
[-5;+5]    
Average $CAR -264.46 -33.64 -230.83** 
T-statistic   [-2.26] 
Median $CAR 3.11 12.06 -8.96 
Z-statistic   [-0.70] 
[-3;+3]    
Average $CAR -215.56 -3.05 -212.50** 
T-statistic   [-2.59] 
Median $CAR 2.65 9.83 -7.18 
Z-statistic   [-0.72] 
[-1;+1]    
Average $CAR -93.79 0.88 -94.67 
T-statistic   [-1.44] 
Median $CAR -1.51 8.23 -9.74 
Z-statistic   [-1.60] 
***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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large firms seem to be worse. The results on $CARs give some support to Hypothesis 5, 
which states that M&A transactions by cross-listed companies are wealth destroying. 
However, when one looks at the percentage CARs, it must be concluded that acquisitions 
seems to be roughly break-even corporate events for cross-listed companies. 
It is of interest to compare the acquisition performance of the cross-listers to the control group 
to see how cross-listers fare relatively in their M&A activity. Contrary to the cross-listers, it 
actually seems that the control group is reaping significant returns from their M&A activity, 
as the average CAR for the 3-day event period is 0.55%, which is statistically significantly 
different from zero at the 1% level. Furthermore, the difference in the average returns 
between the cross-listers and the control group is statistically significant for the 11-day and  
7-day time periods and almost statistically significant in the 3-day event window (t-value  
of -1.58). Also the difference in median values seems to indicate that cross-listers make worse 
M&A transactions than the control group, and the difference is statistically significant at the 
5% level for the 7-day and 3-day event windows. 
When one looks at the $CARs, the difference is even somewhat more obvious than in the case 
of CARs. Whereas cross-listers average $CAR was a loss of $93.8m for the 3-day event 
window, the control group roughly broke even with a $CAR of $0.9m. However, the 
difference is only statistically significant for the somewhat more noisy 7-day and 11-day 
event periods. Also median $CAR figures suggests that the control group creates more value 
in its acquisitions than the cross-listers, as control group‟s median $CAR is $8.2m, which is 
$9.7m more than for the cross-lister group. However, the difference in medians is not 
statistically significant in any of the used event periods. 
Figure 4 on the next page shows the development of the 7-day CAR for both cross-listers and 
the control group. The curve for the control group shows the usual shape of the CAR curve, 
i.e. there is small evidence of insider information leaking prior to the event date, but most of 
the CAR is attributable to the event date, while also the first and second day after the event 
provide some abnormal returns, indicating slow adjustment to information. The figure for the 
cross-listers is somewhat more peculiar. It seems that there is substantial leakage of insider 
information as days -1 and -2 contribute -0.171% and -0.036% to the CAR, respectively, 
while the abnormal return on the event date is -0.049%. What is even more peculiar, is the 
fact that after the initial negative return, days +1 and +2 provide substantial positive returns 
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and, hence, the whole event is deemed as slightly value creative. It might be that as the deals 
by the cross-lister group are substantially larger than those of the control sample, they are 
likely to be more complex and, hence, harder to value and keep secret until the event date. 
Furthermore, as the M&A transactions by the cross-listers are more frequently paid for with 
equity, this further complicates their valuation. Hence, the complicated nature of the cross-
lister deals is likely to contribute to the short-term undervaluation, which is then reversed. 
 
Figure 4: The average 7-day CAR for cross-lister and control group acquirers This figure shows the 
development of the average cumulative abnormal return to acquirer shareholders over a 7-day event window,  
[-3;+3], for a sample 451 takeovers carried out during 1996-2008 by 281 European companies cross-listed in the 
U.S. at the time of the acquisition, and for 951 acquisitions performed during the same time period by the control 
group, which includes companies from Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe excluding the cross-
listers. The stock price, index, and risk-free rate data are from Thomson Financial Datastream database. 
Figure 5 shows the distribution of the 3-day CAR for the cross-lister acquisitions. As is 
evident, the distribution is quite far from normal with really fat tails. What is quite interesting, 
is the fact that roughly 20% of the transactions lead to value creation or destruction in excess 
of 5%, indicating that there is both substantial value created and destroyed within the sample 
companies. In fact, only some 30% of the acquisitions have an event return between -1% and 
1%, although the average return in the sample is 0.19%. The implication is straight forward: 
the transactions of the cross-listers in general seem to lead to large wealth changes, although 
on average the valuation effects seem to even out. This is in line with the findings of 
Hazelkorn et al. (2004), as in their sample 78% of the bidders lost or gained more than 2.0% 
of their market value at the event date, although the average CAR was -0.4%. 
As it seems in the light of pure CARs and $CARs that cross-lister acquisitions are somewhat 
less value creative than those of the control group, it is interesting to see what kind of results 
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does the regression analysis provide when we control for a number of deal characteristics 
related to wealth creation. It is also interesting to see how the self-selection model affects 
these results, as it might be that the cross-listing decision is driven by the intent to ease 
acquisitions and, hence, employment of the self-selection model might render the regression 
results insignificant. 
 
Figure 5: The distribution of 3-day CARs to the cross-listed acquirers The figure presents the distribution of 
average cumulative abnormal return to acquirer shareholders over a 3-day event window, [-1;+1], for a sample of 
451 takeovers carried out during 1996-2008 by 281 European companies cross-listed in the U.S. at the time of 
the acquisition. The stock price, index, and risk-free rate data are from Thomson Financial Datastream database. 
6.2.2 Cumulative abnormal returns Sample 2 – M&A transactions by cross-listers before 
cross-listing, during cross-listing, and after cross-delisting 
Table 13 compares the value creation of the cross-listers before cross-listing, during cross-
listing, and after cross-delisting. As can be seen from the table, it actually seems that, contrary 
to what Hypothesis 6 suggests, the acquisitions made before cross-listings seem to be worse 
than those made during cross-listing: the 3-day average CARs is 0.03% prior to cross-listing 
and 0.19% during cross-listing. Although the average CAR is smaller for the 3-day and 7-day 
event windows before cross-listing than during cross-listing, the contrary holds for median 
CARs; it seems that the midpoint transaction is better before cross-listing than during, 
suggesting a more skewed distribution for the CARs before cross-listing. It should be noted 
here, however, that the differences are quite small and not statistically significant in any of the 
used event windows. Hence, the results mildly imply that Hypothesis 6 is likely to be rejected, 
however, no  conclusions  should be made  based on the  descriptive statistics.  An  interesting 
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Table 13: Cumulative abnormal percentage returns to cross-listed acquirers before cross-listing, during 
cross-listing, and after cross-delisting 
The table reports the average and median acquirer percentage cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and dollar 
cumulative abnormal returns ($CAR) for a sample of M&A transaction carried out during 1.1.1996-31.12.2008 
by a sample of 281 European companies that have been cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1980-31.12.2008. 
Financial companies are excluded (first digit of SIC code 6). Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries 
and Norway and UK. The samples are retrieved from Thomson Financial SDC database, and include only 
completed acquisitions that result in majority ownership of the target by the bidder, and deal size is at minimum 
$1m. The column labeled before c-listing shows the characteristics for a sample of 105 acquisitions by sample 
companies prior to cross-listing. The column labeled during c-listing shows the same characteristics for 451 
acquisitions carried out by the sample companies while being cross-listed in the U.S., and the column labeled 
after c-listing shows the same characteristics for 72 acquisitions performed by the sample companies after they 
have cross-delisted their shares from the U.S. stock exchanges. The returns are reported over three short-term 
event windows and the t-statistic is reported in parenthesis below the average CAR. Positive refers to percentage 
of the sample acquisitions, which are value creative to the acquirer in the respective event period. The table also 
reports the difference of CARs and $CARs between acquisitions carried out by the sample companies before and 
during cross-listing (During –before), and those acquisitions carried out after cross-delisting and during cross-
listing (After-during). For the difference in median CARs and $CARs, the table also reports the z-statistic of the 
Wilcoxon rank sum test. 
 Before c-
listing 
During c-
listing 
During – 
before 
After c-listing After – during 
Percentage returns      
[-5;+5]      
Average CAR 0.16% -0.27% -0.43% 0.75% 1.02% 
T-statistic [0.01] <[0.01] [0.01] [0.01] [0.01] 
Median CAR -0.08% 0.13% 0.21% 0.77% 0.64% 
Z-statistic   [-0.44]  [-1.06] 
Positive 49.52% 51.00%  54.17%  
[-3;+3]      
Average CAR -0.09% 0.03% 0.12% 1.16%** 1.14%* 
T-statistic [-0.20] [0.09] [0.22] [2.14] [1.87] 
Median CAR 0.29% 0.20% -0.09% 1.06% 0.86%* 
Z-statistic   [-0.18]  [-1.65] 
Positive 52.38% 51.00%  59.72%  
[-1;+1]      
Average CAR 0.03% 0.19% 0.16% 0.72%** 0.53% 
T-statistic [0.10] [0.96] [0.46] [2.02] [1.33] 
Median CAR 0.31% -0.10% -0.41% 0.46% 0.56% 
Z-statistic   [-0.51]  [-1.16] 
Positive 57.14% 48.56%  58.33%  
      
Dollar returns ($m)      
[-5;+5]      
Average $CAR 29.87 -264.46 -294.33 -160.57 103.89 
T-statistic   [-0.97]  [0.47] 
Median $CAR -2.84 3.11 5.94 8.63 5.53 
Z-statistic   [-0.90]  [-0.34] 
[-3;+3]      
Average $CAR 70.89 -215.56 -286.44 -80.62 134.94 
T-statistic   [-1.18]  [0.83] 
Median $CAR 4.75 2.65 -2.10 22.50 19.84 
Z-statistic   [-0.83]  [-0.36] 
[-1;+1]      
Average $CAR -1.65 -93.79 -92.14 -49.27 50.53 
T-statistic   [-0.52]  [0.33] 
Median $CAR 14.20 -1.51 -15.71 26.53 28.04 
Z-statistic   [-1.07]  [-0.95] 
***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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observation is that percentage of value creative seems to be substantially higher before cross-
listing than during, being 57.1% before and 48.6% during in the 3-day event window, further 
indicating more skewed distribution for the transactions made before cross-listing. 
When one looks at the $CARs before cross-listing and during cross-listing, it seems that the 
average M&A transaction made during cross-listing is a lot worse than that carried out before 
cross-listing. For example, the average value destruction during the 3-day event period before 
cross-listing is $1.7, whereas during cross-listing a substantially larger amount of value, 
specifically $93.8m, is destroyed. However, the difference is not statistically significant in 
any of the event periods. Similar results are also reported for the median figures, but again, 
the difference is not statistically significant and is, in fact, the other way around for the 11-day 
event period. Although not statistically significant, the fact that the difference in $CARs 
anyway seems to somewhat favor transactions prior to cross-listing, whereas it was the other 
way around for CARs, suggest that large companies fare relatively worse in their M&A 
activity after having cross-listed. 
The statistics for the transactions made after cross-delisting provide very interesting 
information: it seems that the deals are significantly value creative (t-value 2.02) with a CAR 
of 0.72% for the 3-day event window. Furthermore, the results also indicate that the 
difference in the average value creation between transactions made during cross-listing and 
after cross-delisting is statistically different from zero during the 7-day event period, i.e. the 
transactions made after cross-delisting are better, supporting Hypothesis 7. The sign of the 
difference is also robust for the usage of median and different time windows, however, the 
difference is statistically significant only in the 7-day period. Hence, it must be concluded that 
only some weak support for Hypothesis 7 is found. Furthermore, the results must still be 
controlled in the usual manner for a number of other variables related to value creation, most 
notably deal size and method of payment. 
Same pattern of returns is also visible in the $CARs; the average 3-day $CAR after cross-
delisting is -$49.3, which is substantially more than that of the transactions made during 
cross-listing, i.e. -$93.8m. In fact, it seems that the median transaction made after cross-
delisting is somewhat value creative with a $CAR of $26.5m in the 3-day event window. 
Hence, the average acquirer seems to be creating value before cross-listing and after cross-
delisting, but shareholder value is destroyed during cross-listing. This is likely to be 
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associated with the fact that the managers of a company are on an irrational empire building 
journey while being cross-listed, and the market acknowledges this with negative returns. It 
should be noted, however, that the differences in the average or median $CARs during cross-
listing and after cross-delisting are not statistically significant in any of the event periods, 
suggesting that there are no real differences in the returns. 
In sum, it seems that Hypothesis 6 is unlikely to be verified in the multivariate analysis part of 
this thesis, as the descriptive statistics indicated that transactions made before cross-listing are 
actually worse than those made during cross-listing on average, although the difference is not 
statistically significant in any of the event periods. This result might be associated with the 
fact that companies that eventually choose to cross-list in the U.S. have already been quite 
acquisitive in the U.S. before the cross-listing (Tolmunen and Torstila, 2005) and to the fact 
that cross-listers actually make larger and more equity financed transactions prior to cross-
listing compared to during cross-listing, as shown in section 5.1.7. Although Hypothesis 6 is 
likely to be rejected, interesting results might be obtained with regards of Hypothesis 7, as it 
seems that the transactions made after cross-delisting are somewhat better than those made 
during cross-listing, however, the difference is not consistently statistically significant. 
6.2.3 Two-sampled paired t-tests – Sample 1 
In this subsection, I evaluate the difference in the CARs of the cross-listers and the control 
group based on a two-sampled paired t-tests. The matching used in these tests should alleviate 
the problem of comparing apples and oranges, i.e. they should make the transactions more 
comparable. A number of earlier studies have highlighted the importance of method of 
payment and acquirer size to the profitability of M&A transactions (see, e.g., Hazerkorn et al., 
2004; Moeller et al., 2004), hence, I match the transactions with these two characteristics. 
Furthermore, I also control for acquirer industry. 
As can be seen in table 14, the transactions of the cross-listers seem to be less value creative 
than those of the control group in all of the time periods. However, the difference is not 
statistically significant in any of the event windows. Hence, it seems that after we control for 
deal and acquirer characteristics, the transactions made by the cross-listers are not 
significantly worse than those made by the control group. 
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Table 14: Two-sampled paired t-tests for the difference between average acquirer percentage CAR’s of 
cross-listed and control sample acquirers 
The table shows the average cumulative abnormal percentage returns (CARs) to the acquirer‟s shareholders as 
measured by the market model in three event windows. The sample includes 224 paired M&A transaction by a 
sample of 281 European companies while being cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1996-31.12.2008, excluding 
those companies that cross-listed prior to 1980, paired with transactions of the control sample, which includes 
those companies from the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe (December 2008 version) that are 
not cross-listed at the time of the acquisition. Both acquirer samples exclude financial companies (first digit of 
SIC code 6) due to differences in their financial reporting. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and 
Norway and UK. The samples are retrieved from Thomson Financial SDC database, and include only completed 
acquisitions that result in majority ownership of the target by the bidder, and deal size is at minimum $1m. In 
addition, method of payment must be known. The companies are matched by method of payment (pure cash 
deal, hybrid deal, or pure stock deal), industry groups according to the first two digits of the SIC code, and 
acquirer size (as close as possible, but at minimum the control pair must be within 50-200% of the market cap of 
the cross-lister). T-statistic is reported in parenthesis below the difference in average CARs. 
 Cross-listed acquirers Control group acquirers Difference 
    
[-5;+5] -0.64% 0.31% -0.95% 
T-statistic   [-1.43] 
    
[-3;+3] 0.14% 0.49% -0.35% 
T-statistic   [-0.70] 
    
[-1;+1] 0.39% 0.44% -0.05% 
T-statistic   [-0.13] 
***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
Interestingly, when one compares the returns of the cross-listers and the control group in 
Table 14 to Table 12, one sees that the CARs in Table 14 are higher for the cross-listers and 
lower for the control group. This is exactly what one would expect to find after we make the 
transactions more comparable: the difference in the returns grows smaller. In the light of this 
evidence, it is quite interesting to see whether there are any significant results obtainable from 
the multivariate statistics. It might still be the case that results can be obtained, as only a quite 
small number of value creation variables are controlled here. 
6.2.4 Two-sampled paired t-tests before – Sample 2 
In this subsection, I study the difference in the CARs of the subsamples of Sample 2, i.e. I 
compare prior cross-listing to during cross-listing and during cross-listing to after cross-
delisting, using two-sampled paired t-tests. It should be noted here, however, that the 
sampling is subject to a number of caveats, most importantly the small number of 
observations before cross-listing and after cross-delisting. Hence, the results as such are only 
meant  to provide  another  reference  point  into the  matter,  and no  real conclusions  can  be 
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Table 15: Two-sampled paired t-tests for the difference between average percentage CARs of cross-listed 
acquirers before cross-listing, during cross-listing, and after cross-delisting 
The table reports the average cumulative abnormal percentage returns (CARs) to the acquirer‟s shareholders as 
measured by the market model in three event windows. The first sample includes 69 paired M&A transaction by 
European acquirers before and during cross-listing to the U.S. stock exchanges. The second sample includes 32 
paired takeovers of U.S. targets by European bidders during cross-listing and after cross-delisting from the U.S.. 
The matching is done by companies, i.e. the pairs are transactions performed by the same company at different 
stages of the cross-listing cycle. The acquisition are performed by 281 European companies that have been being 
cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1996-31.12.2008, excluding those companies that cross-listed prior to 1980, 
and excluding financial companies (first digit of SIC code 6) due to differences in their financial reporting. 
Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK.. The transaction samples are retrieved 
from Thomson Financial SDC database, and include only completed acquisitions that result in majority 
ownership of the target by the bidder, and deal size is at minimum $1m. T-statistic is reported in parenthesis 
below the difference in average CARs. 
 Pairs 1: Before c-listing and during c-listing  Pairs 2: During c-listing and after c-listing 
 Before  
c-listing 
During  
c-listing 
During – 
before 
 During  
c-listing 
After  
c-listing 
After – during 
        
[-5;+5] 0.51% 0.48% 0.03%  2.47% -0.89% -3.36%** 
T-statistic   [0.03]    [-2.29] 
        
[-3;+3] 0.25% 0.28% -0.03%  1.31% 0.56% -0.75% 
T-statistic   [-0.41]    [-0.63] 
        
[-1;+1] 0.32% -0.27% 0.58%  1.48% -0.25% -1.73%** 
T-statistic     [0.89]       [-2.48] 
***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
drawn. The transactions are matched so that transactions made by the same company at 
different stages in the cross-listing cycle form pairs. 
Table 15 provides interesting, yet somewhat disappointing results. It seems that the M&A 
transactions made before cross-listing are more value creative than those carried out during 
cross-listing in the 11 and 3-day event periods, whereas in the 7-day event period it is the 
opposite. However, none of the differences are statistically significant, indicating that the 
differences are negligible. 
As can be seen in Table 15, it seems that the transactions made during cross-listing are more 
value creative than those made after cross-delisting, and the difference is statistically 
significant for the 11 and 3-day even windows. This is contrary to Hypothesis 7, and very 
likely to be attributed to the extremely small number of transactions after cross-delisting, 
which makes the pairing somewhat handicapped. All and all, the results obtained in this 
subsection should be evaluated with skeptism, and the most intuitive conclusion drawn is that 
the matter needs further studying my employing multivariate models. 
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6.3 Determinants of acquirer gains 
In this section, I study the importance of cross-listing and cross-delisting to acquirer gains 
with multivariate regression analysis. Although my descriptive statistics provided some 
evidence indicating that cross-listers seem to be making worse acquisitions than the control 
group, and that cross-delisting improves acquisition performance, it might be that the 
differences are driven by other deal characteristics, such as the size of the deal, method of 
payment, and company status of the target. Hence, I must control for the effect of a number of 
variables to be able to determine if there is truly a relation between returns from M&A and 
cross-listing and cross-delisting. 
6.3.1 Regression analysis – Sample 1 
As suggested by Tolmunen and Torstila (2005) and Burns et al. (2007), cross-listing is a 
conscious choice made by the cross-listing company and, hence, this self-selection must be 
taken into account in interpreting the results of the CAR regressions. Therefore, in this 
section, I first introduce my cross-listing model, which acts as a self-selection model for 
Sample 1. Then, I show the general results of the regression analysis, where I seek to 
determine whether there is a relation between cross-listing and value creation. Finally, I report 
regression results for different time period to grasp an idea of the relative importance of 
different deal characteristics at different times, mainly prior and after the introduction of 
Sarbanes-Oxley. 
First stage of Heckman – cross-listing likelihood 
Table 16 show the results of the cross-listing likelihood model. One can easily see that the 
size of the acquirer as well as the average sales growth seem to contribute substantially to the 
decision to cross-list: bigger companies and companies that are growing more rapidly are 
more likely to cross-list their shares. This is in line with the idea that cross-listing is more 
attractive to larger companies as the costs of compliance with reporting requirements are 
relatively larger for smaller companies (see, e.g., Zingales, 2007) as well as with the idea that 
companies who have grown rapidly seek new markets by cross-listing (Pagano et al., 2002). 
The coefficients for Log assets and Sales growth are statistically significant at the 1% level in 
all the models. Similar coefficients are reported by for example and Tolmunen and Torstila 
(2005). 
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Table 16: Determinants of cross-listing likelihood 
The table shows the results of probit regressions, where the dependent variable takes a value of one if the 
company is cross-listed, zero otherwise, and the observations are deal years for 1,392 M&A transaction carried 
out by a sample of 281 European companies while being cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1996-31.12.2008, 
excluding those companies that cross-listed prior to 1980, or by the control sample, which includes those 
companies from the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe (December 2008 version) that are not 
cross-listed at the time of the acquisition. Financial companies are excluded (first digit of SIC code 6) due to 
differences in their financial reporting. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK. 
The sample is retrieved from Thomson Financial SDC database, and includes only completed acquisitions that 
result in majority ownership of the target by the bidder, and deal size is at minimum $1m. All accounting and 
market value variables are retrieved from Thomson Financial Worldscope database, and are from the last full 
year financial statement filed prior to the deal. Log assets is logarithm of assets in $m. Sales growth is three-year 
annualized sales growth. P/E is price per share / earnings per share, and P/B is market value of equity / book 
value of equity, both defined as three-year averages. Country-level variables in the model are from La Porta et al. 
(1998) and Doidge et al. (2004). Model 6 is used as the first stage of the Heckman process and, hence, only 
includes the transactions, of which all second stage variables are known. The models also includes industry 
dummies that are not shown here. Chi squared-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the coefficient. Third 
last row of the table shows the sample size, second last row gives the log likelihood, and last row reports the 
pseudo- goodness of fit measure. 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Intercept -2.50*** -3.63*** -3.59*** -2.80*** -7.16 -7.85 
 [-8.77] [-10.86] [-10.55] [-2.68] [-1.61] [-1.56] 
Log assets 0.46*** 0.68*** 0.62*** 0.61*** 0.62*** 0.47*** 
 [8.38] [10.79] [9.29] [9.22] [9.23] [6.37] 
Sales growth  0.62*** 0.56*** 0.55*** 0.54*** 0.46*** 
  [4.29] [3.80] [3.67] [3.62] [2.81] 
P/E  0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.01*** 
  [4.44] [3.86] [3.77] [3.68] [3.03] 
P/B  0.02 0.02** 0.02** 0.02** 0.03** 
  [1.61] [2.02] [2.28] [2.35] [2.50] 
French law   0.52*** 0.41** 0.19 0.19 
   [5.41] [2.28] [0.69] [0.59] 
German law   0.06 0.02 -0.37 -0.29 
   [0.45] [0.11] [-0.76] [-0.52] 
Scandinavian law   0.15 0.23 0.06 -0.05 
   [0.16] [1.54] [0.27] [-0.20] 
Accounting standards    <0.00 <0.00 <0.00 
    [0.02] [-0.36] [-0.05] 
Judicial efficiency    -0.08 -0.12 -0.16* 
    [-1.49] [-1.61] [-1.77] 
Liquidity     0.10 0.18 
     [0.33] [0.51] 
Log GNP     1.17 1.36 
     [1.07] [1.11] 
Industry dummies √ √ √ √ √ √ 
N 1392 1242 1242 1242 1242 833 
LogL -827.05 -706.62 -691.21 -690.10 -689.49 -541.98 
Pseudo-  0.056 0.102 0.122 0.123 0.124 0.105 
***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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In addition to the size of the company and its historical growth rate, also the valuation level of 
the firm seems to contribute somewhat to the decision to cross-list; the coefficients for P/E 
and P/B are statistically significant at the 5% or 1% level for all but one of the specifications 
shown in Table 16. The dummies for legal origin and accounting standards report relatively 
modest and insignificant coefficients, whereas the coefficient of Judicial efficiency is 
statistically significant in Model 6. The coefficients for Liquidity and Log GNP are 
insignificant. 
CAR regressions 
Table 17 shows the results of the OLS regressions, where the 3-day CAR of the cross-lister 
and control group acquirers is regressed on a number of quantitative and qualitative deal, 
acquirer, and target characteristics. The table shows 12 separate OLS models. Models are 
shown so that the next model always introduces one or several new explanatory variables to 
the model. Models 9 and 10 relate specifically to the studying of the effect of publication hits 
to acquirer gains, and Models 11 and 12 are the self-selection equivalents of Models 7 and 8. 
Model 1 includes only the intercept and the dummy Cross, which takes a value of one, if the 
company is cross-listed at the time of the acquisition. With this specification, the effect of 
cross-listing is quite small, -0.4%, and has an insignificant t-value of -1.46. When we add 
percentage of equity financing as an explanatory variable in the next model, the cross-listing 
dummy becomes substantially more influential with a coefficient of -0.7%, which is 
statistically significant at the 10% level. Hence, it seems that when we take into account 
method of payment, the acquisitions made by the cross-listed companies seem to be even 
worse. As the coefficient of % Equity is negative, although not statistically significant, in all 
of the specifications (Models 2-12) my results are in line with the general view that stock as a 
method of payment has a decreasing effect on the returns from M&A (see, e.g., Hazelkorn  
et al., 2004). 
Model 3 introduces the dummies Toehold and Diversify into the regression. Contrary to 
expectations, the sign of Toehold is positive and that of Diversify is negative throughout all 
the used specifications. However, the results are statistically insignificant and, hence, there is 
no evidence of a relation between returns from acquisitions and either toehold or the fact that 
the deal is a diversifying one. The magnitude and statistical significance of the Cross dummy 
is not materially affected by the introduction of the variables Toehold and Diversify. 
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Model 4 introduces a dummy variable Language to account for cultural proximity of the 
target and the bidder as well as variable Rer to account for the effect of fluctuation in 
exchange rates. The language dummy seems to actually take negative values in all the models, 
and the same holds for Rer. This is contrary to what expected, but it has to be noted that 
neither of the coefficients is significant in any of the models and, hence, no reliable 
conclusions can be drawn. The introduction of Language as well as Rer both decrease the 
significance of the Cross coefficient slightly, but the magnitude and sign remain intact. 
Introduction of the variables Log mcap, EBIT margin, Cash ratio and Leverage through 
Model 5, on the other hand, decreases the coefficient of Cross somewhat to -0.6% and makes 
it statistically insignificant with a t-value of -1.26. Hence, it seem that the size of the acquirer 
and its financial position explain some of the poor performance of the cross-listers. Most 
importantly, cross-listers seem to make worse acquisitions, because they are larger than the 
control group, which is in line with a view, according to which deals by larger companies tend 
to be worse (see Moeller et al., 2004). 
The coefficient of Log mcap is negative and statistically significant in all of the models, 
supporting the above mentioned proposition that large companies fare relatively worse in their 
acquisitions. EBIT margin has a negative, yet insignificant, coefficient in all of the models, 
perhaps hinting that well performing companies fare relatively worse in their acquisitions, 
which might reflect the fact that these companies have a free cash flow problem  
(Jensen ,1986). However, the size of the cash reserves seem to increase returns from M&A, 
which is in contrast to what was expected, but might relate to the fact that having large cash 
reserves, the company can more easily pay with cash as it does not have to raise debt in order 
for the transaction to go through. It is, nevertheless, important to note that the coefficient of 
Cash ratio is not statistically significant at the conventional levels. Leverage seems to be 
associated with negative returns, however, the variable has a very small coefficient, which is 
statistically insignificant in all of the specifications. 
Model 6 introduces in the analysis a dummy variable Non-public. The introduction of this 
variable increases the t-value of the Cross dummy to -1.36. This result lends support to the 
earlier findings regarding the company status of the target firm (Fuller et al., 2002; Hazelkorn 
et al., 2004; Moeller et al., 2004) as the coefficient of Non-public is positive and statistically 
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Table 17: Determinants of acquirer wealth creation for European cross-listers 
This table shows the results of twelve OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the three day, [-1;+1], cumulative abnormal percentage return to the acquirer 
shareholders as measured by the market model. The sample includes 1,402 M&A transaction carried out by a sample of 281 European companies while being cross-listed in 
the U.S. during 1.1.1996-31.12.2008, excluding those companies that cross-listed prior to 1980, or by the control sample, which includes those companies from the Dow 
Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe (December 2008 version) that are not cross-listed at the time of the acquisition. Financial companies are excluded (first digit of 
SIC code 6) due to differences in their financial reporting. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK. The sample acquisitions are retrieved from 
the Thomson Financial SDC database (SDC), and include only completed acquisitions that result in majority ownership of the target by the bidder, and deal size is at 
minimum $1m. Cross is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the acquirer is cross-listed in the U.S. at the time of the acquisition. % Equity is the percentage of the 
purchase price paid with equity as in SDC. Toehold is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one, if the acquirer has ownership in the target prior to the announcement of 
the deal according to SDC. Diversify is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the bidder and target are from different major industries as defined by the first two 
digits of the SIC code as in Thomson Financial Worldscope database (Worldscope). Language is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the official language of the 
acquirer‟s home country is English. Relative exchange rate, Rer, measures the deviation from the average exchange rate of local currency against U.S. dollar during the 
sample period. Log mcap is the logarithm of the market cap of the acquirer 21 trading day prior to announcement of the deal in $m as in Thomson Financial Datastream 
database. All accounting variables are retrieved from Worldscope and are from the last full year financial statement filed prior to the deal and refer to acquirer characteristics. 
EBIT margin is the ratio of operating income to sales. Cash ratio is the ratio of the cash and short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market 
cap. Non-public is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the target is defined as a private company or a subsidiary of a public company in SDC. Deal size is the 
logarithm of the value of the transaction as shown in SDC in $m. Log mcap*Cross is an interaction term. Publication is the number of times the name of the company was 
mentioned in the headline of Business Week, Financial Times or Wall Street Journal during a one-year period ending 10 days after the announcement on an M&A transaction 
by the sample company as in LexisNexis database. Publication*Cross is an interaction term.  is the inverse Mills ratio, estimated as the first stage of the Heckman (1979) 
two-stage model. The regressions also include year, industry, and country dummies, but they are not reported. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the coefficient. 
Second last row of the table shows the sample size and last row reports the goodness of fit measure. 
            Treatment effects 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10  Model 11 Model 12 
Intercept 0.008 0.011 0.009 0.010 0.040** 0.026 0.018 0.025 0.007 0.006  0.068 0.074 
 [0.81] [0.69] [0.59] [0.62] [1.98] [1.25] [0.87] [1.09] [0.31] [0.26]  [1.49] [1.61] 
Cross -0.004 -0.007* -0.007* -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 -0.006 -0.024 -0.004 -0.001  -0.006 -0.026 
 [-1.46] [-1.71] [-1.67] [-1.62] [-1.26] [-1.36] [-1.43] [-0.98] [-0.88] [-0.22]  [-1.17] [-0.95] 
% Equity  -0.006 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.007 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007  -0.009 -0.009 
  [-0.76] [-0.75] [-0.75] [-0.69] [-0.66] [-0.90] [-0.91] [-1.02] [-0.96]  [-1.08] [-1.10] 
Toehold   -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0004 -0.002 -0.003  -0.001 -0.001 
   [-0.12] [-0.14] [-0.29] [-0.13] [-0.10] [-0.05] [-0.31] [-0.35]  [-0.11] [-0.07] 
Diversify   0.003 0.004 0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.004 0.004  0.001 0.001 
   [0.92] [0.95] [0.81] [0.57] [0.87] [0.89] [0.96] [0.95]  [0.32] [0.32] 
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Table 17: Determinants of acquirer wealth creation for European cross-listers (continued) 
            Treatment effects 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10  Model 11 Model 12 
Language    -0.0004 -0.006 -0.008 -0.008 -0.006 -0.011 -0.012  -0.011 -0.008 
    [-0.04] [-0.51] [-0.72] [-0.74] [-0.54] [-1.01] [-1.06]  [-0.92] [-0.66] 
Rer    -0.046 -0.056 -0.055 -0.051 -0.050 -0.042 -0.040  -0.048 -0.048 
    [-0.98] [-1.17] [-1.16] [-1.07] [-1.05] [-0.87] [-0.83]  [-0.90] [-0.90] 
Log mcap     -0.009*** -0.007** -0.009*** -0.011** -0.006 -0.006  -0.015** -0.017** 
     [-2.61] [-2.06] [-2.63] [-2.54] [-1.55] [-1.62]  [-2.51] [-2.56] 
EBIT margin     -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009  -0.008 -0.009 
     [-0.58] [-0.59] [-0.69] [-0.76] [-0.73] [-0.66]  [-0.56] [-0.62] 
Cash ratio     0.016 0.017 0.019 0.020 0.022 0.022  0.018 0.019 
     [1.10] [1.14] [1.27] [1.32] [1.46] [1.43]  [1.13] [1.19] 
Leverage     -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.0002 -0.0001  -0.002 -0.002 
     [-0.30] [-0.18] [-0.20] [-0.27] [-0.07] [-0.04]  [-0.47] [-0.54] 
Non-public      0.011** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.017*** 0.018***  0.018*** 0.018*** 
      [2.55] [3.23] [3.21] [3.62] [3.69]  [3.55] [3.55] 
Deal size       0.006** 0.006** 0.007*** 0.007***  0.007** 0.007** 
       [2.21] [2.23] [2.60] [2.58]  [2.31] [2.35] 
Log mcap*Cross        0.005     0.005 
        [0.74]     [0.76] 
Publication         -0.0002* -0.0001    
         [-1.92] [-0.41]    
Publication*Cross          -0.0001    
          [-0.95]    
            -0.018 -0.018 
            [-1.34] [-1.33] 
Year dummies √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ 
Industry dummies √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ 
Country dummies √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ 
N 1402 885 885 885 869 869 869 869 849 849  833 833 
 0.030 0.035 0.036 0.038 0.054 0.061 0.066 0.067 0.075 0.076  0.065 0.065 
***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
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significant in all of the specifications. The results indicate that by purchasing a private target 
or a subsidiary of a public company, the bidder reaps 1.1 - 1.8% higher initial return than by 
acquiring a public company. 
In Model 7, I further control for the effect of deal size on the acquisition performance. Quite 
puzzlingly, it seems that the higher the value of the transaction, the higher the returns. This is 
in contrast to the findings of Moeller et al. (2004), but might be related to the view according 
to which it is not so much the absolute size of the deal, but the size relative to the acquiring 
company, which is key to the profitability of the transaction (see, e.g., Asquith et al., 1983; 
Scanlon, Trifts, and Pettway, 1989). Furthermore, Asquith et al. actually empirically show 
that the larger the target relative to the bidder, the higher the returns. As my sample 
companies are relatively large, this idea would explain the significantly positive coefficient of 
the Deal size variable. 
Model 8 introduces the interaction term Log mcap*Cross, which is used to determine whether 
the effect of cross-listing to acquirer returns is different for large and small companies. 
Contrary to Hypothesis 4, it actually seems that the effect of cross-listing is somewhat less 
negative to larger companies This result might be attributable to the fact that as larger 
companies seem to benefit more from cross-listing due to relatively smaller costs (see, e.g., 
Zingales, 2007), small companies that choose to cross-list do it for somewhat dubious 
reasons. The company might be just following a cross-listing fad, indicating that its 
management is overall more prone to hubris and, hence, could be expected to have poorer 
acquisition performance. However, the coefficient for the interaction term is far from being 
statistically significant. 
Interestingly, the introduction of Publication in Model 9 decreases the coefficient of Cross to  
-0.4% and makes it quite insignificant with a t-value of -0.88. The coefficient of Publication, 
on the other hand, is -0.02%, and statistically significant at the 10% level. This supports 
Hypothesis 2, according to which prominence in business publication is a sign of hubris and, 
hence, decreases returns from acquisitions. The coefficient for Publication seems rather small, 
but already 10 extra hits in the prestigious business publications will mean that the takeover 
creates on average 0.2% less value, which is already a rather sizeable decrease given the fact 
that acquisitions tend to be roughly break-even corporate transactions for the acquirers. 
Hence, a seemingly small increase in visibility of the company in the prestigious business 
91 
publications entails that the company is likely to make losses in its acquisitions. It, therefore, 
seems that prominence in these publications may be a rather strong proxy for managerial 
hubris. Model 10 introduces the interaction term Publication*Cross. Disappointingly, 
however, its coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
All and all, the regression models 1 - 10 seem to hint that there is indeed a negative relation 
between cross-listing and the returns from M&A. However, the relation is only weakly 
statistically significant in some of the models and not statistically significant even at the 10% 
level in most of the specifications. Hence, it should be concluded that there is only very weak 
evidence supporting Hypothesis 3. 
When we take into account the effect of self-selection in Model 11, the size of the coefficient 
of Cross does not materially change, but it becomes insignificant. Hence, it seems that 
although cross-listing has a somewhat negative effect to the bidder M&A returns, this effect 
might be caused by the self-selection in the sample, i.e. the companies that cross-listed in the 
first place tend to be those that make worse acquisitions than the companies that choose to 
remain only domestically listed. This is in line with the view that although cross-listing is 
driven partly by rational reasons, it is also a fad. A number of companies have cross-listed 
because they have seen others opting for this route and they do not want to be left behind. 
These are likely to be the companies with greater hubris issues and, consequently, poor M&A 
performance. It should be noted, however, that as the coefficient for the inverse Mills ratio is 
not statistically significant, there is no evidence of a self-selection issue. The introduction of 
the self-selection model‟s inverse Mills ratio to Model 8 produces Model 12. However, this 
introduction seems to have very little effect to any other coefficient than that of Cross as the 
size and significance of rest of the coefficients in Model 12 are very similar to Model 8. 
Having now covered the general results of the regression analysis, I present Model 7 and 
Model 11 for three distinctive time periods, namely 1996 - 06/2002, 07/2002 - 2004 and  
2005 - 2008 This allows me to investigate whether cross-listings effect to value creations has 
changed overtime, most importantly I compare the difference before and after the introduction 
of Sarbanes-Oxley. Furthermore, I separate the last M&A boom, 2005 - 2008, to see if this 
time period seems to be any different than prior time periods. 
Table 18 reports the coefficients of regression Models 7 and 11 for the three above mentioned 
time periods. The results provide some interesting insights. First of all, it seems that the effect 
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Table 18: Determinants of acquirer wealth creation during different time periods 
This table shows the results of two OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the three day, [-1;+1], 
cumulative abnormal percentage return to the acquirer shareholders as measured by the market model, in three 
time windows. Sample includes 869 M&A transaction carried out by a sample of 281 European companies while 
being cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1996-31.12.2008, excluding those companies that cross-listed prior to 
1980, or by the control sample, which includes those companies from the Dow Jones STOXX Total Market 
Index for Europe (December 2008 version) that are not cross-listed at the time of the acquisition. Financial 
companies (first digit of SIC code 6) are excluded due to differences in their financial reporting. Europe is 
defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK. The sample acquisitions are retrieved from the 
Thomson Financial SDC database (SDC), and include only completed acquisitions that result in majority 
ownership of the target by the bidder, and deal size is at minimum $1m. In addition, the method of payment must 
be known. Cross is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the acquirer is cross-listed in the U.S. at the 
time of the acquisition. % Equity is the percentage of the purchase price paid with equity as in SDC. Toehold is a 
dummy variable, which takes a value of one, if the acquirer has ownership in the target prior to the 
announcement of the deal according to SDC. Diversify is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the 
bidder and target are from different major industries as defined by the first two digits of the SIC code as in 
Thomson Financial Worldscope database (Worldscope). Language is a dummy variable, which takes a value of 
one if the official language of the acquirer‟s home country is English. Relative exchange rate, Rer, measures the 
deviation from the average exchange rate of local currency against U.S. dollar during the sample period. Log 
mcap is the logarithm of the market cap of the acquirer 21 trading day prior to announcement of the deal in $m 
as in Thomson Financial Datastream database. All accounting variables are retrieved from Worldscope and are 
from the last full year financial statement filed prior to the deal and refer to acquirer characteristics. EBIT margin 
is the ratio of operating income to sales. Cash ratio is the ratio of the cash and short-term investments to total 
assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market cap. Non-public is a dummy variable, which takes a value of 
one if the target is defined as a private company or a subsidiary of a public company in SDC. Deal size is the 
logarithm of the value of the transaction as shown in SDC in $m.  is the inverse Mills ratio, estimated as the 
first stage of the Heckman (1979) two-stage model. The regressions also include year, industry, and country 
dummies, but they are not reported. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the coefficient. Second last row 
of the table gives the sample size and the last row reports the goodness of fit measure. 
 1996-06/2002  07/2002-2004  2005-2008 
Variable Model 7 Model 11  Model 7 Model 11  Model 7 Model 11 
Intercept 0.006 0.000  -0.005 0.144  0.060 0.138 
 [0.18] [0.00]  [-0.09] [1.58]  [1.59] [1.64] 
Cross 
 
-0.013* -0.011  0.003 0.001  -0.007 -0.011 
 [-1.87] [-1.52]  [0.28] [0.10]  [-1.17] [-1.50] 
% equity -0.003 -0.004  -0.028* -0.028  -0.003 -0.002 
 [-0.30] [-0.37]  [-1.66] [-1.62]  [-0.18] [-0.12] 
Toehold 0.013 0.011  -0.013 -0.014  -0.017 -0.020 
 [0.96] [0.80]  [-0.88] [-0.96]  [-1.49] [-1.58] 
Diversify 0.005 0.003  0.001 0.000  -0.001 -0.003 
 [0.77] [0.46]  [0.16] [0.04]  [-0.09] [-0.42] 
Language -0.002 -0.007  0.016 0.024  -0.005 -0.004 
 [-0.20] [-0.47]  [0.78] [1.07]  [-0.51] [-0.33] 
Rer -0.031 -0.040  0.060 0.065  -0.024 0.092 
 [-0.49] [-0.58]  [0.38] [0.41]  [-0.19] [0.59] 
Log mcap -0.010* -0.009  -0.004 -0.019*  -0.015*** -0.020** 
 [-1.88] [-1.01]  [-0.47] [-1.73]  [-2.84] [-2.22] 
EBIT margin -0.009 -0.008  -0.070 -0.076  -0.022 -0.015 
 [-0.43] [-0.38]  [-1.39] [-1.52]  [-0.73] [-0.48] 
Cash ratio 0.020 0.023  -0.113*** -0.115***  0.050** 0.050** 
 [0.73] [0.79]  [-3.55] [-3.59]  [2.36] [2.17] 
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Table 18: Determinants of acquirer wealth creation during different time periods (continued) 
 1996-06/2002  07/2002-2004  2005-2008 
Variable Model 7 Model 11  Model 7 Model 11  Model 7 Model 11 
Leverage -0.0001 -0.0003  -0.009 -0.014  -0.007 -0.006 
 [-0.02] [-0.05]  [-0.48] [-0.77]  [-1.08] [-0.80] 
Non-public 0.022*** 0.025***  0.020* 0.023*  0.002 0.002 
 [3.04] [3.14]  [1.70] [1.90]  [0.29] [0.26] 
Deal size 0.010** 0.011**  0.001 0.001  0.005 0.003 
 [2.34] [2.33]  [0.09] [0.19]  [1.18] [0.72] 
  0.003   -0.057**   -0.025 
  [0.18]   [-2.05]   [-1.12] 
Year dummies √ √  √ √  √ √  √ √ √ √ 
Industry dummies √ √  √ √  √ √  √ √ √ √ 
Country dummies √ √  √ √  √ √  √ √ √ √ 
N 455 438  124 120  290 275 
 0.080 0.078  0.149 0.391   0.140 0.141 
***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
of cross-listing to returns from M&A has been the highest during the period 1996-06/2002, 
i.e. prior to the introduction of Sarbanes Oxley. During this time period, cross-listing seems to 
have decreased returns from M&A by a substantial 1.1% even after controlling for the effect 
of self-selection. During the period 07/2002 - 2004, which was characterised by stagnant 
stock price performance in general, the effect of cross-listing to returns from M&A seems to 
be actually slightly positive, yet, statistically very insignificant, perhaps reflecting the fact that 
cross-listed companies were more reluctant to strike deals when the market had gone sour.  
When the markets started recovering in the last time period, it actually seems that the negative 
effect of cross-listing resurfaced, although being somewhat smaller and less statistically 
significant than prior to the introduction of Sarbanes Oxley. This decreasing time trend in 
cross-listing‟s effect to returns from M&A is likely to be attributable to the fact that more 
companies suffering from hubris cross-listed in the U.S. prior to the introduction of Sarbanes-
Oxley and subsequently made poor acquisitions. After the introduction of Sarbanes-Oxley, 
cross-listing is likely to be sought for more rational reasons and, hence, also the acquisition 
performance of these companies is not materially affected by the cross-listing status. 
Also the other deal characteristics seem to be somewhat different during different time 
periods. For example, the effect of toehold seems to have been positive prior to the 
introduction on Sarbanes-Oxley, and has only since turned negative. One explanation for this 
might be that, as Ravid and Spiegel (1999) suggest, toeholds are most useful when there are 
rival bidders, and as those deals where there is competition tend to be worse for the bidder, 
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the negative coefficient of toehold might be attributable to the fact that toehold indicates that 
there is likely to be more than one bidder in the deal. Consequently, if it is the case that there 
were more competition in takeovers during the latter periods of my sample, it would make 
sense that toehold would have a negative coefficient in those time periods. However, the 
coefficient of toehold is not statistically significant in any of the reported time periods. 
It is also worth noting that the coefficient and significance of the variable Non-public has 
decreased dramatically during the sample period, being only an insignificant 0.2% in the last 
time period. This is likely to be caused by the fact that the sophistication of sellers and the 
utilization of advisors, such as investment banks, have grown and there is less bargain deals 
available, as also non-public companies are sold for a price, which is close to their intrinsic 
value. It also seems that the effect of industrial diversification has turned negative in the last 
time period, supporting the common view, according to which industrial diversification has 
continued to lose its attractiveness. It is worth noting, however, that the coefficient for 
Diversify is statistically very insignificant in all the time periods reported in Table 18. 
6.3.2 Regression analysis – Sample 2 
In this section, I present my regression results for Sample 2. Similar to Sample 1, also Sample 
2 is affected by self-selection and, hence, I first show the results of my self-selection model, 
which is a probit model for cross-delisting likelihood. Then, I go on presenting the results of 
my CAR regressions, where I seek to establish whether there is a relation between gains from 
acquisitions and the cross-listing status of the company. 
First stage of Heckman – cross-delisting likelihood 
The results of the first stage of Heckman (1979) process for Sample 2 are quite interesting not 
only because they allow me to control for the issue of self-selection, but because the general 
knowledge of cross-delisting is quite limited. As the topic of cross-delisting has been 
empirically studied by only Witmer (2005) and Doidge et al. (2008), I am able to deepen the 
knowledge on cross-delistings and, hence, I present the results of the cross-delisting 
likelihood model more thoroughly than those of the cross-listing model presented earlier. 
Table 19 shows the results of the cross-delisting probit regressions. Model 1 includes only 
intercept  and a dummy  variable  Post SEC act,  which  takes a value  of one if the M&A deal 
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Table 19: Determinants of cross-delisting likelihood 
The table shows the results of probit regressions, where the dependent variable takes a value of one if the 
company has cross-delisted, zero otherwise, and the observations are deal years for 523 M&A transaction carried 
out by a sample of 281 European companies while being cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1996-31.12.2008 or 
after cross-delisting. Those companies that have cross-listed prior to 1980 are excluded. Also financial 
companies are excluded (first digit of SIC code 6) due to differences in their financial reporting. Europe is 
defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK.. The sample is retrieved from Thomson Financial 
SDC database, and includes only completed acquisitions that result in majority ownership of the target by the 
bidder, and deal size is at minimum $1m. All accounting and market value variables are retrieved from Thomson 
Financial Worldscope database (Worldscope), and are from the last full year financial statement filed prior to the 
deal. Post SEC act is a dummy variable, which takes a value of 1, if the acquisition was announced post March 
21, 2007. Log assets is logarithm of assets in $m. Leverage is total debt divided by total assets. Sales growth is 
three-year annualized sales growth. Global industry q is the median Tobin‟s q of the industry of the acquirer as 
defined by the first two digits of the SIC code.Tobin‟s q is defined as the book value of total assets less book 
value of equity plus market value of equity, all divided by the book value of total assets. Ownership is the 
Worldscope data item closely held shares. Country-level variables in the model are from La Porta et al. (1998) 
and Djankov et al. (2008). Model 7 is used as the first stage of the Heckman process and, hence, only includes 
the transactions, of which all second stage variables are known. Chi squared-statistics are reported in parenthesis 
below the coefficient. The third last row of the tables shows the sample size, second last row gives the log 
likelihood and last row reports the pseudo- goodness of fit measure.  
 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 
Intercept -1.31*** -0.97*** -0.45 1.01 -3.11*** -6.21** -7.92** 
 [-15.70] [-2.55] [-0.85] [1.54] [-2.79] [-2.39] [-2.38] 
Post SEC act 0.90*** 0.92*** 1.00*** 1.16*** 1.25*** 1.10*** 1.27*** 
 [5.66] [5.66] [5.89] [5.60] [5.53] [4.01] [3.75] 
Log assets  -0.08 -0.25** -0.75*** -0.55*** -0.55*** -0.77*** 
  [-0.84] [-2.26] [-4.98] [-3.11] [-3.08] [-3.25] 
Leverage  -0.51 -0.32 0.56 0.29 0.33 -0.13 
  [-1.41] [-0.83] [1.19] [0.56] [0.62] [-0.20] 
Sales growth   -2.01*** -1.88*** -1.41** -1.55*** -1.12 
   [-3.86] [-3.21] [-2.45] [-2.60] [-1.55] 
Global industry q   0.17 0.23 0.28 0.33 0.03 
   [1.01] [1.18] [1.35] [1.51] [0.12] 
Ownership    -0.19 0.97 1.02* 0.97 
    [-0.36] [1.60] [1.67] [1.20] 
Legal index     0.08*** 0.09*** 0.13*** 
     [4.88] [4.79] [4.35] 
Stock market cap/GDP      -0.16 -0.24 
      [-0.65] [-0.59] 
Log GDP      0.63 0.89 
      [1.27] [1.51] 
N 523 522 504 423 423 423 396 
LogL -193.91 -191.72 -179.17 -120.43 -105.66 -104.43 -65.85 
Pseudo-  0.075 0.085 0.133 0.195 0.294 0.302 0.399 
***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
was announced after the enactment of SEC Exchange Act 12-6h, i.e. post March 21, 2007. As 
is evident, with this specification the coefficient for Post SEC act is statistically significant at 
the 1% level (t-value 5.66). The coefficient actually remains statistically significant at the 1% 
level in all the models in the table, i.e. even when we control for a number of firm and country 
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level variables which are hypothesized as contributing to the decision to cross-delist. This 
implies that the new exchange act has substantially increased cross-delisting activity, which is 
in line with the notions of Dobbs and Goedhart (2008) and Doidge et al. (2008) and consistent 
with the pattern visible in the cross-delisting data presented in section 5.1.6. 
Model 2 introduces to the regression the size of the company measured by the logarithm of 
assets and the leverage of the company, defined as total debt over total assets. Supporting the 
findings of Doidge et al. (2008), the size of the company seems to be negatively related to the 
likelihood of cross-delisting. The coefficient for Log assets in Model 2 is not statistically 
significant at the conventional levels, however, after we control for growth opportunities in 
Model 3, the coefficient turns significant at the 5% level and remains statistically significant 
throughout Models 3-7. This suggest that the larger the company, less likely it is to cross-
delist. This is what one would expect based on the fact that the burdensome reporting 
requirements prevalent in the U.S. pose relatively more costs on smaller companies and, 
consequently, these companies are most likely to delist in order to save on the costs. The 
coefficient of Leverage is not consistently positive or negative, perhaps indicating that 
leverage plays no real role in the decisions to cross-delist.  
Three-year average sales growth and global industry Tobin‟s q ratio are used to control for 
growth options of the sample companies in Models 3-7. As is evident from the table, sales 
growth seems to be negatively related with the likelihood of cross-delisting and the 
coefficient is statistically significant in Models 3-6, whereas it falls somewhat short of 
conventional statistical significance in Model 7. Global industry q, on the other hand, seems 
to be positively related with the likelihood of cross-delisting, however, its coefficient is not 
statistically significant in any of the Models. Similar results are obtained by Doidge et al. 
(2008), who conclude that companies tend to cross-list to obtain financing for growth 
opportunities at the lowest possible cost, and when these growth opportunities disappear, the 
cross-listing becomes less valuable and the companies are likely to cross-delist. 
Model 4 introduces the variable Ownership, which is the Worldscope data item „Closely held 
shares‟. Contrary to the findings of Doidge et al. (2008), the coefficient for Ownership is 
positive in all the Models except in Model 4. However, the coefficient is insignificant in most 
of the models and, thus, there is no evidence that insider ownership plays a role in the 
decision to cross-delist.  
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Model 5 adds a new variable, Legal index, which is a proxy for anti-director rights and for the 
strength of the rule of law in the acquirer‟s country of domicile. Contrary to the results 
obtained by Doige et al. (2008), Legal index seems to be positively related with cross-
delisting and the coefficient is highly statistically significant in all the models, indicating that 
companies from countries with better shareholder protection are more likely to cross-delist. 
This might be attributable to the fact that these companies do not need to submit themselves 
to the stringent regulation of the U.S. stock market as also the regulation in their home 
country is adequate to protect shareholders. The inconsistency with the findings of Doidge et 
al. is somewhat puzzling, however, it should be noted that the results obtained by Doidge et 
al. were not statistically significant and the authors did not control for the effect of the change 
in the deregistering requirements. 
Finally, Model 6 introduces the variables Stock market cap / GDP and Log GDP, giving the 
full model for cross-delisting likelihood. Consistent with the findings of Doige et al. (2008), 
the coefficient for Stock market cap / GDP is negative, while the coefficient for Log GDP is 
positive. However, neither of the variables are statistically significant and, hence, they do not 
seem to contribute to the cross-delisting decision. The specification of Model 7 is identical to 
that of Model 6, but as it is the one used as the first stage of the Heckman (1979) two-stage 
process, it only includes those transactions for which all the second stage variables are known. 
The pseudo-  of the final model is an adequate 0.399. In sum, It seems that smaller 
companies, who have poorer growth prospects and who come from countries with high 
shareholder protection are most likely to cross-delist, while the effect of other firm or country 
level variables are negligible. However, also SEC exchange Act Rule 12h-6 seems to 
contribute heavily to the decision to cross-delist, as one would expect based on the huge surge 
in cross-delistings after the enactment of the rule. 
CAR regressions 
Table 20 shows the results of CAR regressions for Sample 2. Similarly than with Sample 1, I 
again present 12 models, of which Models 11 and 12 are the self-selection models, and only 
include the transactions which are made during cross-listing or after cross-delisting, i.e. 
transactions made prior to cross-listing are excluded. In going through the results in Table 20, 
I concentrate on the dummy variables Before and After as well as on Log mcap*After, and 
comment on the additional variables only when they are materially different from those 
reported in connection with Sample 1. 
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Table 20: Determinants of acquirer wealth creation for cross-listers before, during, and after cross-listing 
This table shows the results of four OLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the three day, [-1;+1], cumulative abnormal percentage return to the acquirer 
shareholders as measured by the market model. Sample includes 628 M&A transaction carried out by a sample of 281 European companies that have been cross-listed in the 
U.S. during 1.1.1996-31.12.2008, excluding those companies that cross-listed prior to 1980. Financial companies (first digit of SIC code 6) are excluded due to differences in 
their financial reporting. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK. The sample acquisitions are retrieved from the Thomson Financial SDC 
database (SDC), and include only completed acquisitions that result in majority ownership of the target by the bidder, and deal size is at minimum $1m. Models 11 and 12 
only include exclude transactions made before cross-listing.  is the inverse Mills ratio, estimated as the first stage of the Heckman (1979) two-stage model. Before is a 
dummy variable, which receives a value of one if the acquirer has not yet been cross-listed in the U.S. at the time of the acquisition. After is a dummy variable, which takes a 
value of one if the acquirer has cross-delisted from the U.S. at the time of the acquisition. % Equity is the percentage of the purchase price paid with equity as in SDC. 
Toehold is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one, if the acquirer has ownership in the target prior to the announcement of the deal according to SDC. Diversify is a 
dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the bidder and target are from different major industries as defined by the first two digits of the SIC code as in Thomson 
Financial Worldscope database (Worldscope). Language is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the official language of the acquirer‟s home country is English. 
Relative exchange rate, Rer, measures the deviation from the average exchange rate of local currency against U.S. dollar during the sample period. Log mcap is the logarithm 
of the market cap of the acquirer 21 trading day prior to announcement of the deal in $m as in Thomson Financial Datastream database. All accounting variables are retrieved 
from Worldscope and are from the last full year financial statement filed prior to the deal and refer to acquirer characteristics. EBIT margin is the ratio of operating income to 
sales. Cash ratio is the ratio of the cash and short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market cap. Non-public is a dummy variable, which 
takes a value of one if the target is defined as a private company or a subsidiary of a public company in SDC. Deal size is the logarithm of the value of the transaction as 
shown in SDC in $m. Log mcap*After is an interaction term. Publication is the number of times the name of the company was mentioned in the headline of Business Week, 
Financial Times or Wall Street Journal during a one-year period ending 10 days after the announcement on an M&A transaction by the sample company as in LexisNexis 
database. Publication*After is an interaction term.  is the inverse Mills ratio, estimated as the first stage of the Heckman (1979) two-stage model. The regressions also 
include year, industry, and country dummies, but they are not reported. T-statistics are reported in parenthesis below the coefficient. Second last row of the table shows the 
sample size and last row reports the goodness of fit measure. 
            Treatment effects 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10  Model 11 Model 12 
Intercept -0.011 -0.024 -0.023 -0.024 0.028 0.014 0.011 0.004 -0.014 -0.013  0.032 0.034 
 [-0.57] [-0.76] [-0.75] [-0.75] [0.69] [0.32] [0.25] [0.09] [-0.30] [-0.29]  [0.46] [0.49] 
Before -0.005 -0.007 -0.008 -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006    
 [-0.74] [-0.67] [-0.84] [-0.80] [-0.95] [-0.66] [-0.68] [-0.68] [-0.61] [-0.61]    
After 0.012 0.011 0.009 0.007 0.012 0.013 0.013 0.074 0.012 -0.018  0.010 0.232* 
 [1.52] [1.02] [0.79] [0.65] [1.03] [1.07] [1.11] [1.07] [0.85] [-1.24]  [0.58] [1.66] 
% Equity  -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 -0.009 -0.010 -0.011 -0.011  -0.014 -0.014 
  [-0.86] [-1.01] [-1.05] [-1.01] [-0.77] [-0.82] [-0.89] [-1.01] [-0.99]  [-1.00] [-0.96] 
Toehold   -0.029** -0.028** -0.024* -0.018 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 -0.018  -0.017 -0.017 
   [-2.30] [-2.17] [-1.77] [-1.31] [-1.26] [-1.30] [-1.27] [-1.24]  [-1.00] [-1.03] 
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Table 20: Determinants of acquirer wealth creation for cross-listers before, during, and after cross-listing (continued) 
            Treatment effects 
 Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10  Model 11 Model 12 
Diversify   0.001 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.002 0.003  0.004 0.005 
   [0.22] [0.25] [0.34] [0.10] [0.19] [0.16] [0.33] [0.36]  [0.41] [0.53] 
Language    0.003 -0.006 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.016 -0.015  -0.032 -0.042 
    [0.29] [-0.45] [-0.51] [-0.52] [-0.56] [-0.97] [-0.91]  [-0.72] [-0.95] 
Rer    0.097 0.070 0.070 0.069 0.066 0.092 0.097  0.089 0.064 
    [1.09] [0.76] [0.77] [0.75] [0.72] [0.99] [1.03]  [0.68] [0.49] 
Log mcap     -0.011** -0.010* -0.011* -0.010 -0.006 -0.006  -0.011 -0.008 
     [-2.04] [-1.83] [-1.86] [-1.63] [-0.83] [-0.86]  [-0.88] [-0.62] 
EBIT margin     0.009 0.008 0.008 0.005 0.005 0.004  0.068* 0.062* 
     [0.47] [0.43] [0.38] [0.26] [0.25] [0.22]  [1.56] [1.43] 
Cash ratio     0.0004 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 0.004 0.005  0.010 0.005 
     [0.02] [-0.06] [-0.05] [-0.12] [0.16] [0.19]  [0.27] [0.14] 
Leverage     -0.011 -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.011 -0.011  -0.003 -0.001 
     [-1.09] [-1.13] [-1.11] [-1.11] [-1.06] [-1.07]  [-0.16] [-0.05] 
Non-public      0.013* 0.014* 0.014* 0.019** 0.019**  0.029*** 0.031*** 
      [1.66] [1.69] [1.66] [2.16] [2.15]  [2.60] [2.74] 
Deal size       0.002 0.003 0.005 -0.005  0.010 0.011 
       [0.42] [0.53] [0.93] [-0.23]  [1.41] [1.54] 
Log mcap*After        -0.016     -0.065 
        [-0.89]     [-1.60] 
Publication         -0.0002* -0.0002*    
         [-1.85] [-1.81]    
Publication*After          0.001    
          [0.57]    
            -0.009 -0.013 
            [-0.60] [-0.84] 
Year dummies √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ 
Industry dummies √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ 
Country dummies √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √ √  √ √ 
N 628 407 407 407 397 397 397 397 377 377  396 396 
 0.056 0.064 0.078 0.081 0.097 0.104 0.104 0.106 0.119 0.120  0.169 0.169 
***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively.  
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Model 1 includes only intercept and the dummies Before and After. As is evident, the 
coefficient for Before is negative, contrary to the suggestion of Hypothesis 6, but in line with 
the descriptive statistics in section 6.2.2. In fact, the coefficient for Before remains negative, 
yet statistically insignificant, throughout all the models reported in Table 20. Hence, it seems 
that there are no notable differences in the profitability of transactions made prior to cross-
listing and after cross-delisting. This is consistent with the view that the companies that 
choose to eventually cross-list are active acquirers already prior to the actual cross-listing 
(Tolmunen and Torstila, 2005). Consequently, Hypothesis 6 is outright rejected. 
The coefficient of After is almost statistically significant at the 10% level in Model 1 with a  
t-value of 1.52. Cross-delisting seems to contribute an additional return amounting to 1.2% in 
this model. Disappointingly, after we control for the effect of method of payment, the 
coefficient decreases and becomes even less statistically significant. Also the introduction of 
variables Toehold, Diversify, Language and Rer in Models 3-4 further decrease the statistical 
significance of the coefficient of After. On the other hand, when we introduce variables Log 
mcap, EBIT margin, Cash ratio, Leverage, Non-public and Deal size, the coefficient of After 
grows to 1.3% in Model 7, indicating that M&A transactions by cross-delisted companies 
create substantially more value than the deals by cross-listed companies. However, the t-value 
of the After coefficient is only 1.11 in Model 7 and, hence, not statistically significant. 
Model 8 introduces the interaction term Log mcap*After to account for the difference in the 
effect of cross-delisting between firms of different size. As could have been expected based 
on the regression analysis of Sample 1, also the effect of cross-delisting to returns from M&A 
is more intense for smaller companies, however, the coefficient is statistically insignificant. 
The negative sign on the coefficient of Log mcap*After is likely to be related to the idea 
presented earlier, i.e that small firms that choose to cross-list do so for dubious hubris reasons 
and, hence, the decision to cross-delist is likely to be optimal from the viewpoint of the firm, 
and it implies better judgment by the management of the company. This better judgment is 
then also visible in better M&A performance. Consequently, Hypothesis 9 is rejected. 
Introduction of the variables Publication in Model 9 and Publication*After in Model 10 do 
not materially affect the sign or significance of the before and after dummies. The coefficient 
for publication is negative and statistically significant at the 10% level, further supporting 
Hypothesis 2. The coefficient for Publication*After is, disappointingly, insignificant.  
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When we take into account self-selection in Model 11, the coefficient of After is not 
materially affected. However, Model 12, which is the self-selection equivalent of Model 7, 
indicates that when we account for self-selection and the interaction between firm size and 
cross-delisting, the variables After and Log mcap*After become closer to statistical 
significance with t-values of 1.66 and 1.60, respectively. This would hint that the self-
selection of cross-delisting companies is likely to affect the results. However, the coefficient 
for the inverse Mills ratio is insignificant. Thus, there is no evidence of self-selection. 
Although not statistically significant, the results imply that small companies benefit from 
cross-delisting, whereas the effect of cross-delisting decreases as the size of the company 
grows. Interpreting the regression literally, it seems that cross-delisting has a favorable effect 
on the acquisition performance of companies which have a market cap below $3.7 billion, 
whereas larger companies‟ M&A performance deteriorates on average when they cross-delist. 
There are only some very minor differences in the coefficients of the control variables 
between Samples 1 and 2. Rer is positively related to value creation in Sample 2, as one 
would expect, but contrary to Sample 1. However, Rer is not statistically significant in neither 
of the samples. Also EBIT margin and Cash ratio report coefficients with differing signs to 
regressions for Sample 1, but again, the results are statistically insignificant. Hence, there are 
no significant differences in the coefficients of the control variables between Samples 1 and 2. 
6.3.3 Robustness check – CAR in various subsamples 
I also run a robustness check, where I examine the bidder CARs, both samples divided into 
nine subsamples based on four deal characteristics which prior literature has shown to relate 
to acquirer value creation, i.e. method of payment, company status of the target, deal size, and 
acquirer size. This analysis provides no surprises as it indicates that stock deals are worse than 
cash deals, takeovers of non-public targets are more value creative than takeovers of public 
firms, and that generally larger deals and deals by larger firms are worse. There are, however, 
two notable exceptions. The positive coefficient of the Deal size variable in the regressions 
for Sample 1 seems to relate to the fact that the control group‟s deals are better when they are 
larger, whereas cross-listers fare better in their smaller deals. Also consistent with the 
regression results, large cross-listers seem to make better deals than small cross-listers, further 
supporting the idea, according to which small cross-listers are affected by hubris. 
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7 Summary and conclusions 
This thesis examines the relation between cross-listing and cross-delisting, and acquirer 
wealth creation in transatlantic M&A. The study was inspired by the findings of Tolmunen 
and Torstila (2005), who show that European companies cross-listed in the U.S. are 
substantially more active in acquiring U.S. based targets than their non-cross-listed peers. 
More importantly, the authors showed that the acquisitions by cross-listers are larger and 
more equity-financed. This raises the obvious question: are the acquisitions by cross-listed 
companies wealth creative, given the fact that poor returns from acquisitions are generally 
associated with both larger (Moeller et al., 2004) and more equity financed transactions (see, 
e.g., Travlos, 1987; Amihud et al., 1990; Andrade et al., 2001). 
In addition to the pressing need to determine whether acquisitions by cross-listed companies 
are significantly wealth destroying as hinted by the evidence of Tolmunen and Torstila 
(2005), this thesis was also motivated by the non-existence of empirical studies on the relation 
between cross-delisting and M&A. Already the knowledge on cross-delisting is limited to two 
academic research papers (Witmer, 2005; Doidge et al., 2008), but there is not a single study 
on the association between cross-delisting and M&A. Furthermore, deregistering 
requirements were alleviated on March 21, 2007, when the SEC adopted Exchange Act Rule 
12h-6, after which a large number of companies have cross-delisted and subsequently made 
acquisitions. Consequently, it is now possible to examine the relation between cross-delisting 
and M&A with a meaningful dataset. 
The company sample used in the study consists of 281 European companies that have been 
cross-listed in the U.S. between 1.1.1980 and 31.12.2008, and of 668 non-cross-listed control 
group companies from the Dow Jones STOXX total market index for Europe. M&A 
transactions in the U.S. by these companies are gathered from SDC. The first acquisition 
sample consists of 451 takeovers by the cross-listed companies and 951 by the control group. 
The second M&A sample consist of the same 451 takeovers by the cross-listed companies, as 
well as 105 acquisitions by these companies prior to cross-listing, and 72 acquisitions after 
cross-delisting. In order to evaluate managerial hubris, I gather a unique database of 
publication hits through LexisNexis. I also gather stock price, index price, and money market 
rate data from Datastream for the calculation of the acquirer CARs. Furthermore, I gather 
financial statement data from Worldscope, and exchange rate data from Datastream.  
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7.1 Overview of the empirical results 
Table 21 below summarizes the main findings of the thesis. Consistent with the idea that 
cross-listed companies more frequently suffer from managerial issues and hubris, it seems 
that the cross-listing status substantially increases the firm‟s visibility in prestigious business 
publications. My results indicate that cross-listed companies appear on the headline of 
Business Week, Financial Times, and Wall Street Journal on average 30.6 times during a one- 
year time period leading to a takeover, while the non-cross-listers appear only 12.8 times. 
Furthermore, the results remain robust even after controlling for the size of the company, and 
the difference seems to be even larger when we look at the median figures, those being 16 for 
the cross-listers and 5 for the non-cross-listers. It seems that the management of cross-listed  
companies  like  seeing  their  company  in  the  headlines and,  consequently, they  engage  in 
Table 21: Summary of findings 
This table summarizes the key findings of the thesis. 
Hypothesis Evidence 
: Cross-listed companies are more visible 
in prestigious business publications than 
their non-cross-listed peers around takeover 
announcements 
 
Strong evidence found. The average number of hits in Business 
Week, Financial Times, and Wall Street Journal is 30.6 for the 
cross-listers and 12.8 for the control group. The differences in 
both average and median figures are significant at the 1% level. 
: The higher the visibility of the acquirer 
in prestigious business publications, the 
lower the returns from M&A 
Support found. The coefficient for Publication hits is -0.02%, 
which is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
: Cross-border acquisitions by cross-
listed acquirers are less value creative than 
cross-border acquisitions by non-cross-
listed companies 
 
Only weak evidence found. The average control group CAR is 
0.55% whereas the average CAR for cross-listers is 0.19%. The 
difference, however, is not consistently statistically significant. 
The regression coefficient for Cross-dummy is also insignificant. 
: The difference in acquirer gains 
between cross-listed and non-cross-listed 
companies is higher for larger companies 
 
No support found.  
 
: Acquisitions by cross-listed acquirers 
are wealth destroying  
Some evidence found in support of . Although the average 
CAR of 0.19% suggests that cross-listers roughly break even, the 
average $CAR is -93.8$m indicates substantial value destruction. 
 
: Gains from acquisitions decrease after 
company cross-lists 
 
No evidence in support of  found.  
 : Gains from acquisitions increase after 
company cross-delists 
 
Some evidence found. The average CAR rises after cross-
delisting from 0.19% to 0.72%. The difference, however, is not 
consistently significant. Also after controlling for other deal 
characteristics in the regression analysis, the difference is 
statistically insignificant potentially due to the small sample size. 
 
: Visibility in prestigious publications is 
smaller for cross-delisted companies than 
for cross-listed companies 
 
Strong evidence in support of  The average number of 
publication hits drops to 6.8 after cross-delisting, which is 
statistically different from the cross-listers‟ figure at the 1% level. 
: The effect of cross-delisting to acquirer 
returns is more intense for larger companies 
No support found. 
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flashy corporate transactions that are more likely to boost their own egos than the company‟s 
share price. Consistent with this remark, the regression analysis shows that there is a negative 
relation between the number of hits in the above mentioned publications and gains from 
acquisitions. The regression analysis implies that for every extra 10 hits in these publications, 
the CAR of the takeover goes down by 0.2%, which is a substantial drop, given the fact that 
acquisitions tend to be roughly break-even corporate transactions for the acquirer. 
Contradicting with the idea that cross-listers are heavily affected by managerial issues, 
Doidge, Karolyi, Lins, Miller, and Stulz (2009) show that the companies which have large 
private benefits available for controlling shareholders or are controlled by the management of 
the company, are less likely to cross-list in the U.S. due to constraints on the consumption of 
private benefits resulting from the listing. However, the difference in the strictness of 
reporting and corporate governance legislation between Europe and the U.S. is not substantial 
and, hence, it might be that subjecting oneself to the U.S. regulations does not diminish 
possibilities for managerialism materially for European companies. Furthermore, although 
managerial issues would be somewhat relieved by cross-listing, the management of cross-
listers could still be suffering from hubris and, hence, make worse acquisitions than the 
control group due to over-optimism in picking and valuing acquisition targets. 
The descriptive statistics indicate that the deals made by the cross-listers are roughly  
break-even corporate events for the acquirers with an average CAR of 0.19% during the 3-day 
event window. The average CAR for the control group is somewhat higher; 0.55%, however, 
the difference between the CARs of the cross-listers and the control group is not consistently 
statistically significant. Interesting results are also obtained by observing the dollar weighted 
abnormal returns, as the average $CAR is a substantial loss of -$93.8m for the cross-listers 
and a slightly value creating $0.9m for the control group. This in line with the findings of 
Moeller et al. (2004), who show that $CARs tend to be substantially more frequently negative 
than CARs, indicating that acquisitions by larger companies are usually worse. 
The regression analysis provides similar results than the descriptive statistics, as cross-listing 
seems to have a decreasing effect on the returns from M&A, but the coefficient for cross-
listing dummy is not consistently significant. Furthermore, when we take into account the 
effect of self-selection by cross-listed companies, the significance of the coefficient decreases 
to very low levels. In sum, there is some weak evidence that cross-listers make worse 
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acquisitions than non-cross-listers even after controlling for a number of deal characteristics, 
however, the negative relation between cross-listing and returns from M&A is weak at best. 
Evidence regarding firm size and cross-listings effect to acquisition performance hints that the 
effect of cross-listing to returns from M&A might be more intense for smaller companies, 
even though the opposite was expected. Although being statistically insignificant, this result 
might relate to the fact that smaller companies benefit less from cross-listing due to relatively 
higher costs (see, e.g., Zingales, 2007). Consequently, those small companies that 
nevertheless choose to cross-list, do so for dubious reasons, such as following a fad or seeking 
to increase the management‟s prestige. This would indicate that the managers of these 
companies are more prone to hubris, which is then visible in poor acquisition performance. 
Interesting results are obtained with regards of publication hits in prestigious business 
publications before cross-listing, during cross-listing, and after cross-delisting. It seems that 
the publicity gotten by the sample companies does not change substantially as they cross-list, 
but the publicity collapses after cross-delisting.  
In line with the publication hits results, there does not seem to be any significant differences 
between the acquisition performance of companies prior and during cross-listing. This is 
likely to relate to the fact that companies which ultimately choose to cross-list have been 
shown to be active acquirers in the U.S. already prior to cross-listing (Tolmunen and Torstila, 
2005), indicating that cross-listing does not change the acquisition behavior of a company 
and, hence, returns from M&A are unaffected by cross-listing.  
The descriptive statistics on acquisition performance after cross-delisting show that these 
transactions are substantially more value creative than those made while being cross-listed, as 
the average CAR jumps from 0.19% to 0.72%, the latter being statistically different from 
zero. However, the difference in the CARs is only statistically significant in the somewhat 
noisy 7-day event period. Similar pattern is also visible in the $CARs, as the 3-day $CAR 
after cross-delisting is -$49.3 and, hence, substantially higher than -$93.8 during cross-listing. 
The difference in the $CARs, however, is not statistically significant either. 
As there were only 53 transactions after cross-delisting with known method of payment, also 
the regression results regarding cross-delisting‟s effect to value creation are insignificant, 
although the sign is as expected. Furthermore, contrary to what was hypothesized, the effect 
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of cross-delisting seems to be more intense for smaller companies, although also this result is 
statistically insignificant. This might be associated with the fact that small companies choose 
to cross-list for irrational reasons and, hence, the decision to cross-delist is evidence of better 
judgment by the management, which is then likely to lead to better M&A performance. 
Both the publication hits and acquisition performance results support a view, according to 
which cross-listing in itself does not change the behavior of a company, but it is a symptom of 
larger hubris and agency cost issues prevalent in the firm. Furthermore, cross-delisting is 
likely to be a sign of a change in the company to a better direction, as it seems that the cross-
delisted companies concentrate more on creating shareholder value as opposed to irrational 
empire building, which then leads to better M&As and diminished search for publicity. 
7.2 Potential biases in the study 
My results include a number of potential biases inherent in the methods used. First, event 
study as a method to investigate wealth effects has been criticized as it leans on short-term 
market reactions, which might be impossible to separate from the noise present in the market. 
Furthermore, even in the absence of noise, M&A transactions are often complicated deals, 
which even experienced corporate finance professionals have hard time valuing. Therefore, 
the market is quite likely to misinterpret the value created in these transactions. As the 
measurement of long-term returns from M&A suffers from even larger caveats, short-term 
market model is, nevertheless, the prevailing method of assessing the value creation in M&A. 
Second potential source of bias emanates from inadequate sample size. The sample size is 
sufficient for cross-lister and control group acquisitions, but the poor availability of 
observations of M&A deals by the cross-listers prior to cross-listing and after cross-delisting 
makes it problematic to generalize the results. The problem is most obvious with cross-
delisted companies, as there were only 72 transactions announced after cross-delisting. 
Third, the multivariate analysis is likely to suffer from omitted variable bias. Although I 
employ 11 control variables in addition to industry, year, and country dummies, the 
coefficient of determination of my final model is at times unsatisfactory. Obviously there are 
a number of additional aspects, which might relate to value creation, but are generally not 
measurable. Also some measurable aspects, such as managerial and government ownership of 
the acquiring firm, had to be left out due to the scarce availability of data. 
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7.3 Suggestions for future research 
As the present study is the third stand-alone piece of academic research to date to study the 
relation between cross-listing and M&A transactions, there is a wide avenue for possible 
future research. The most obvious extension of this study would be to examine the acquirer 
wealth creation with a broader geographical scope. On one hand, one could include all the 
companies that are cross-listed in the U.S. to determine whether the relation between acquirer 
returns from M&A and cross-listing is similar with also other companies than European ones. 
On the other hand, one could take the analysis a step further and study the relation on another 
market of cross-listing. One could for example turn the research problem upside down and 
study the transatlantic acquisitions performance of U.S. companies cross-listed in Europe. It 
would be interesting to see whether this would have a material impact on the results. 
As this study only addresses the value creation to the shareholders of the bidder, another 
obvious topic for further research could be target and combined gains in acquisitions. This 
would make it possible to investigate further the difference between the returns in M&A 
between cross-listed and non-cross-listed companies. Specifically, it would be interesting to 
see whether the deals made by the cross-listers are wealth destroying as a whole, or if the 
suboptimal performance of the cross-listers relates to the fact that cross-listers overpay in 
acquisitions and, hence, the target reaps most of the returns. 
Perhaps the most promising avenue for further research is the relation between cross-delisting 
and M&A, as this thesis is the first academic research paper to investigate the matter. The 
most obvious extension of this study with regards of cross-delisting would be to employ a 
larger dataset to be able to get more meaningful results as my findings hinted the existence of 
a relation between cross-delisting and returns from M&A, yet, the very small sample size 
rendered the multivariate results insignificant. By allowing more time to pass by, a larger 
number of companies are likely to deregister from the U.S. exchanges and, furthermore, the 
large number of companies that already cross-delisted during 2007 are likely to keep 
acquiring U.S. companies. One interesting avenue for further research in the realms of cross-
delisting would be to build on the work by Tolmunen and Torstila (2005) to formally check 
whether the acquisition behavior of a company changes after it cross-delists. This is certainly 
indicated by the descriptive statistics on method of payment and transaction size in the present 
study.  
108 
References 
Alexander, G., Eun, C., Janakiramanan, S., 1987. Asset pricing and dual listing on foreign 
capital markets: A note. The Journal of Finance 42, 151-158. 
Alexander, G., Eun, C., Janakiramanan, S., 1988. International listings and stock returns: 
Some empirical evidence. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 23, 135-151. 
Allen, F., 1993. Stock markets and resource allocation. In: Mayer, C., Vives, X., (Ed.), 
Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Amihud, Y., Lev, B., 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. 
Bell Journal of Economics 12, 605-617. 
Amihud, Y., Lev., B., Travlos, N., 1990. Corporate control and the choice of investment 
financing: the case of corporate acquisitions. Journal of Finance 45, 603-616. 
Andrade, G., Mitchell, M., Stafford, E., 2001. New evidence and perspectives on mergers. 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 15, 103-120. 
Asquith, P., Bruner, R., Mullins, D., 1983. The gains to bidding firms from merger. Journal of 
Financial Economics 11, 121-139. 
Asquith, D., Kieschnick, R., 1999. An examination of initial shareholdings in tender offer 
bids. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting 12, 171–188. 
Bagnoli, M., Lipman, B., 1996. Stock price manipulation through takeover bids. RAND 
Journal of Economics 27, 124-147. 
Baker, H., Nofsinger, J., Weaver, D., 2002. International cross-listing and visibility. The 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 37, 495-521. 
Bancel, F., Mittoo, U., 2001. European managerial perceptions of the net benefits of foreign 
stock listings. European Financial Management 7, 213-236. 
Bank of New York web pages, 2008. (www.bnymellon.com) 
109 
Bendaniel, D., Rosenbloom, A., 1998. International M&A, Joint Ventures, and Beyond. 
Wiley, New York. 
Berger, P., Ofek, E., 1996. Bustup takeovers of value-destroying firms. The Journal of 
Finance 4, 1175-1200. 
Betton, S., Eckbo, B., 2000. Toeholds, bid jumps and expected payoffs in takeovers. Review 
of Financial Studies 13, 841-882. 
Blass, A., Yafeh, Y., 2001. Vagabond shoes longing to stray: Why foreign frms list in the 
United States. Journal of Banking and Finance 25, 555-572. 
Bradley, M., Desai, A., Kim, E., 1983. The rationale behind interfirm tender offers: 
Information or synergy. Journal of Financial Economics 11, 183-206. 
Bradley, M., Desai, A., Kim, E., 1988. Synergistic gains from corporate acquisitions and their 
division between the stockholders of target and acquiring firms. Journal of Financial 
Economics 21, 3-40. 
Brennan, M. Cao, H., 1997. International portfolio investment flows, Journal of Finance 52, 
1851-1880. 
Bris, A., 1998. When do bidders purchase a toehold? Theory and tests. Unpublished Working 
paper. Yale University, New Haven. 
Brown, S., Warner, J., 1985. Using daily stock returns – The case of event studies. Journal of 
Financial Economics 14, 3-31. 
Buckley, P., Casson, M., 1998. Analyzing foreign market entry strategies: Extending the 
internalization approach. Journal of International Business Studies 29, 539-562. 
Bulow, J., Huang, M., Klemperer, P., 1999. Toeholds and takeovers. Journal of Political 
Economy 107, 427–54. 
Burns N., 2004. The role of cross-listed stock as an acquisition currency: Evidence from 
takeovers of U.S. firms. Unpublished Working Paper. Ohio State University, Columbus. 
110 
Burns, N., Francis, B., Hasan, I., 2007. Cross-listing and legal bonding: Evidence from 
mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Banking and Finance 31, 1003-1031. 
Cakici, N., Hessel, C., Tandon, K., 1996. Foreign acquisitions in the United States: Effect on 
shareholder wealth of foreign acquiring firms. Journal of Banking and Finance 20, 307-329. 
Cantale, S., 1996. The choice of a foreign market as a signal. Unpublished Working Paper. 
Tulane University, Los Angeles. 
Caves, R., 1971. International corporations: The industrial economics of foreign investment. 
Economica 38, 1-28. 
Chaplinsky, S., Ramchand, L., 2000. The impact of global equity offerings, Journal of 
Finance 55, 2767-2789. 
Christofferson, S., McNish, R., Sias, D., 2004. Where mergers go wrong. The Mckinsey 
Quarterly 2, 92-99. 
Chowdhry, B., Jegadeesh, N., 1994. Pre-tender share acquisition strategy in takeovers. 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 29, 117–129. 
Citigroup Depositary Receipt Service web pages, 2008. (http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/www/) 
Citigroup, 2005. Depositary receipts information guide, available at 
http://wwss.citissb.com/adr/common/file.asp?idf=574. 
Cools, C., Gell, J., Kengelbach, J., Roos, A., 2007. The brave new world of M&A – How to 
create value from mergers and acquisitions. The Boston Consulting Group Research Report. 
Datta, D., Puia, G., 1995. Cross-border acquisitions: An examination of the influence of 
relatedness and cultural fit on shareholder value creation in U.S. acquiring firms. 
Management International Review 35, 337-359. 
Djankov, S., La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., 2008. The law and economics of 
self-dealing. Journal of Financial Economics 88, 430-465. 
111 
Dobbs, R., Goedhart, M., 2008. Why cross-listing shares doesn‟t create value. McKinsey on 
Finance 29, 18-23. 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G., Stultz, R., 2004. Why are foreign firms listed in the US worth more? 
Journal of Financial Economics 72, 519-553. 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G., Stulz, R., 2008. Why do foreign firms leave U.S. equity markets? An 
analysis of deregistrations under SEC Exchange Act Rule 12h-6. Unpublished Working 
Paper. Fisher College of Business, Columbus. 
Doidge, C., Karolyi, G., Lins, K., Miller, D., Stulz, R., 2009. Private benefits of control, 
ownership, and the cross-listing decision. Journal of Finance 64, 425-466. 
Domowitz, I., Glen, J., Madhavan A., 1998. International cross-listing and order flow 
migration: Evidence from an emerging market. Journal of Finance 53, 2001-2027. 
Dos Santos, M., Errunza, V., Miller, D., 2008. Does corporate international diversification 
destroy value? Evidence from cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Journal of Banking and 
Finance 32, 2716–2724. 
Doukas, J., Travlos, N., 1988. The effect of corporate multinationals on shareholders‟ wealth: 
Evidence from international transactions. The Journal of Finance 43, 1161-1175. 
Eiteman, D., Stonehill A., Moffett M., 1998. Multinational Business Finance. Addison-
Wesley Publishing Company, Indianapolis. 
Errunza, D., Miller, V., 2000. Market segmentation and the cost of capital in international 
equity markets. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35, 577-600. 
Eun, C., Kolodny R., Scheraga, C., 1996. Cross-border acquisitions and shareholder wealth: 
Tests of the synergy and internalization hypothesis. Journal of Banking and Finance 20, 1559-
1582. 
Fama, E., Fisher, L., Jensen, M., Roll, R., 1969. The adjustment of stock prices to new 
information. International Economic Review 10, 1-21. 
112 
Fanto, J., Karmel, S., 1997. A report on the attitudes of foreign companies regarding a U.S. 
listing. Stanford Journal of Law, Business and Finance, 51-83. 
Fatemi, A., 1984. Shareholder benefits from corporate international diversification. Journal of 
Finance 39, 1325–1344. 
Foerster, S., and Karolyi, G., 1993. International listings of stocks: The case of Canada and 
the U.S.. Journal of International Business Studies 24, 763-784. 
Foerster, S., Karolyi, G., 1998. The long-run performance of global equity offerings. Journal 
of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 8, 393-412. 
Foerster, S., Karolyi, G., 1999. The effects of market segmentation and investor recognition 
on asset prices: Evidence from foreign stocks listing in the United States. Journal of Finance 
54, 981-1013. 
Foerster, S., Karolyi, G., 2000. Multimarket trading and liquidity: A transactions data analysis 
of Canada-U.S. interlistings. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 35, 499-528. 
Froot, K., Stein, J., 1991. Exchange rates and foreign direct investment: An imperfect capital 
market approach. Quarterly Journal of Economics 106, 1191-1217. 
Fuerst, O., 1998. A theoretical analysis of the investor protection regulations argument for 
global listing of stocks. Unpublished Working Paper. Yale School of management, New 
Haven. 
Fuller, K., Netter, J., Stegemoller, M., 2002. What do returns to acquiring firms tell us? 
Evidence from firms that make many acquisitions. Journal of Finance 57, 1763-1793. 
Gehrig, T., 1993. An information based explanation of the domestic bias in international 
equity investment. Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 97-109. 
Geringer, J., Beamish, P., DaCosta, R., 1989. Diversification strategy and internalization: 
implications for MNE performance. Strategic Management Journal 10, 109-119. 
Graham, J., Lemmon M., Wolf, J., 2002. Does corporate diversification destroy value? 
Journal of Finance 57, 695–720. 
113 
Green, H., 1993. Econometric Analysis. Macmillan Publishing Company, New York. 
Grossmann, S., Hart, O., 1980. The free-rider problem, and the theory of the corporation. The 
Bell Journal of Economics 11, 42-64. 
Halling, M., Pagano, M., Randl, O., Zechner, J., 2006. Cost of capital effects of U.S. cross-
listings. Unpublished Working Paper. University of Chicago, Chicago. 
Harford, J., 1999. Corporate cash reserves and acquisitions. Journal of Finance 6, 1969-1997. 
Hargis, K., Mei, J., 2006. Is country diversification better than industry diversification? 
European Financial Management 12, 319-340. 
Harris, S., Ravenscraft, D., 1991. The role of acquisitions in foreign direct investment: 
Evidence from the US stock market. Journal of Finance 46, 825-844. 
Hazelkorn, T., Zenner, M., Shivdasani, A., 2004. Creating value with mergers and 
acquisitions. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 16, 81-89. 
Heckman, J., 1979. Sample selection bias as a specification error. Econometrica 47, 153-161. 
Hirshleifer, D., Titman, S., 1990. Share tendering strategies and the success of hostile 
takeover bids. Journal of Political Economy 98, 295–324. 
Huddart, S., Hughes, J., Brunnermeier, M., 1999. Disclosure requirements and stock 
exchange listing choice in an international context. Journal of Accounting and Economics 26, 
237–269. 
Jensen M., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance and takeovers. American 
Economic Review 76, 323-329. 
Jensen M., Meckling W., 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and 
ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-360. 
JP Morgan, 2005. The depositary receipt reference guide, available at 
http://www.adr.com/Common/Downloadcontent.aspx?filename=DR_Reference_Guide.pdf. 
114 
Kadlec, G., McConnell, J., 1994. The effect of market segmentation and illiquidity on asset 
prices: Evidence from exchange listings. Journal of Finance 49, 611-636. 
Kang, 1993. The international market for corporate control. Journal of Financial Economics 
34, 345-371. 
Kang, J., Stulz, R., 1994. Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio equity 
ownership in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics 29, 123-141. 
Karolyi, G., 1998. Why do companies list shares abroad? A survey of the evidence and its 
managerial implications. Financial Markets, Institutions an Instruments 7. Blackwell 
Publishers, Boston. 
Karolyi, G., 2006. The world of cross-listings and cross-listings of the world: Challenging 
conventional wisdom. Review of Finance 10, 73-115. 
Kolasinski, A., 2006. Is the Chinese wall too high? Investigating the costs of new restrictions 
on cooperation between analysts and investment bankers. Unpublished Working Paper. 
University of Washington, Washington. 
Lang, M., Lins, K., Miller, D., 2003. ADRs, analysts, and accuracy: Does cross-listing in the 
United States improve a firm's information environment and increase market value? Journal 
of Accounting Research 41, 317-345. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Schleifer, A., Vishny, R., 1998. Law and Finance. Journal 
of Political Economy 106, 1113-1155. 
Lau, S., Diltz, D., Apilado, V., 1994. Valuation effects of international stock exchange 
listings. Journal of Banking and Finance 18, 743-755. 
Litvak, K., 2008. The long-term effect of the Sarbanes-Oxley act on cross-listing premia. 
European Financial Management 14, 875-920. 
Lombardo, D., Pagano, M., 1999. Law and equity markets: a simple model. Unpublished 
Working Paper. Stanford University, Stanford. 
115 
Madhavan, A., 1995. Consolidation, fragmentation and the disclosure of trading information, 
Review of Financial Studies 8, 579-603. 
Madura, J., Vasconcellos, G., Kish, R., 1991. A valuation model for international 
acquisitions. Management decision 29, 31-38. 
Malatesta, P., 1983. The wealth effect of merger activity and the objective function of 
merging firms. Journal of Financial Economics 11, 155-182. 
Maloney, M., McCormick, R., Mitchel, M., 1993. Managerial decision making and capital 
structure. Journal of Business 66, 189–218. 
Manne, H., 1965. Mergers and the market for corporate control. Journal of Political Economy 
73, 110-220. 
Martin, P., Rey, H., 2000. Financial integration and asset returns. European Economic Review 
44, 1327-1350. 
Merton, R., 1987. A simple model of capital market equilibrium with incomplete information. 
Journal of Finance 42, 483-510. 
Miller, D., 1999. The market reaction to international cross listings: Evidence from depositary 
receipts. Journal of Financial Economics 51, 103-123. 
Mittoo, U., 1992. Managerial perceptions on the net benefits of foreign listing; Canadian 
evidence. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 4, 40-62. 
Moeller, S., Schlingemann F., Stulz, M., 2004. Firm size and the gains from acquisitions. 
Journal of Financial Economics 73, 201-228.  
Morck, R., Schleifer A., 1990. Do managerial objectives drive bad acquisitions? Journal of 
Finance 45, 31-48. 
Morck, R., Yeung, B., 1992. Internalization: An event study test. Journal of International 
Economics 33, 41-56. 
116 
Myers, S., Majluf, N., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions when firms have 
information that investors do not have. Journal of Financial Economics 13, 187-221. 
National Association of Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) web pages, 
2008. (www.nasdaq.com) 
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) web pages, 2008. (www.nyse.com) 
Noronha, G., Sarin, A., Saudagaran, S., 1996. Testing for liquidity effects of international 
dual listings using intraday data. Journal of Banking and Finance 20, 965-983. 
Pagano, M., 1989. Trading volume and asset liquidity, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, 
255-274. 
Pagano, M., Panetta, F., Zingales, L., 2002. The geography of equity listing: Why do 
companies list abroad? Journal of Finance 62, 2651-2694. 
Pike, R., Neale, B., 2003. Corporate Finance and Investment: Decisions and Strategies. 
Prentice Hall, Harlow. 
Pulatkonak, M., Sofianos, G., 1999. The distribution of global trading in NYSE-listed non-
U.S. stocks. Unpublished Working Paper. NYSE 99-03. 
Ravid S., Spiegel, M., 1999. Toehold strategies, takeover laws and rival bidders. Journal of 
banking and Finance 23, 1219-1242. 
Roll, R., 1986. The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers. Journal of Business 59, 197-
216. 
Sarkissian, S., Schill, M., 2004. The overseas listing decision: New evidence of proximity 
preference. The Review of Financial Studies 17, 769-809. 
Saudagaran, S., 1988. An Empirical study of selected factors influencing the decision to list 
on foreign stock exchanges. Journal of International Business Studies, 101-127. 
Saudagaran, S., Biddle, G., 1992. Financial disclosure levels and foreign stock exchange 
listing decisions. Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting 4, 106-148. 
117 
Saudagaran, S., Biddle, G., 1995. Foreign listing location: A study of MNCs and stock 
exchanges in eight countries. Journal of International Business Studies 26, 319-341. 
Scanlon, K., Trifts, J., Pettway, R., 1989. Impacts of relative size and industrial relatedness on 
returns to shareholders of acquiring firms. The Journal of Financial Research 12, 103-112. 
Schin H., Kim Y., 2002. Agency costs and efficiency of business capital investment: evidence 
from quarterly capital expenditures. Journal of Corporate Finance 8, 139-158. 
Schleifer, A., Vishny, R., 2003. Stock market driven acquisitions. Journal of Financial 
Economics 70, 295-311. 
Seth, A., 1990. Sources of value creation in acquisitions: an empirical investigation. Strategic 
Management Journal 11, 431-446. 
Seth, A., Song, K., Richardson, P., 2002. Value creation and destruction in cross-border 
acquisitions: An empirical analysis of foreign acquisitions of U.S. firms. Strategic 
Management Journal 23, 921-940. 
Stapleton, R., Subrahmanyam, M., 1977. Market imperfections, capital market equilibrium 
and corporate finance. The Journal of Finance 32, 307-319. 
Stulz, R., 1999. Globalization of equity markets and the cost of capital. Unpublished Working 
paper. Ohio State University, Columbus. 
Tolmunen, P., 2001. Cross-listings and M&A activity: Transatlantic evidence. Master‟s 
Thesis 8371, Helsinki School of Economics. 
Tolmunen P., Torstila S., 2005. Cross-listings and M&A activity: Transatlantic evidence. 
Financial Management 34, 123-142. 
Travlos, N., 1987. Corporate takeover bids, methods of payment, and bidding firm‟s stock 
returns. Journal of Finance 42, 943-963. 
Vermeulen, G, Barkema, H., 2001. Learning through acquisitions. Academy of Management 
Journal 44, 457-476. 
118 
Wang, Q., Boateng, A., 2007. Cross-border M&As by Chinese firms: An analysis of strategic 
motivation and performance. International Management Review 3, 19-29. 
Weston, J., Mitchell, M., Mulherin, J., 2004. Takeovers, Restructuring, and Corporate 
Governance. Pearson Education, New Jersey. 
Witmer, J., 2005. Why do firms cross-(de)list? An examination of the determinants and 
effects of cross-delisting. Unpublished Working Paper. Queen‟s University, Kingston. 
You, V., Caves, R., Smith, M., Henry, J., 1986. Mergers and bidders‟ wealth: Managerial and 
strategic factors. In: Thomas, L. (Ed.), The Economics of Strategic Planning: Essays in Honor 
of Joel Dean. Lexington Books, Lexington, 201-221. 
Zingales, L., 2007. Is the U.S. capital market losing its competitive edge? Unpublished 
Working Paper. University of Chicago, Chicago. 
119 
Appendices 
Appendix A – Correlation matrices 
Table 22: Correlation matrix for the explanatory variables in Sample 1 regression models 
The table reports the pearson correlation coefficients between a number of variables that are used to explain acquirer wealth effects. Cross is a dummy variable, which takes a 
value of one if the acquirer is cross-listed in the U.S. at the time of the acquisition. Log is the inverse Mills ratios, estimated as the first stage of the Heckman (1979) two-
stage model. % Equity is the percentage of the purchase price paid with equity according to Thomson Financial SCD database (SDC). Toehold is a dummy variable, which 
takes a value of one, if the acquirer has ownership in the target prior to the announcement of the deal according to SDC. Diversify is a dummy variable, which takes a value 
of one if the bidder and target are from different major industries as defined by the first two digits of the SIC code as in Thomson Financial Worldscope database 
(Worldscope). Language is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the official language of the acquirer‟s home country is English. Relative exchange rate, Rer, 
measures the deviation from the average exchange rate of local currency against U.S. dollar during the sample period. Log mcap is the logarithm of the market cap of the 
acquirer 21 trading day prior to announcement of the deal in $m as in Thomson Financial Datastream database. All accounting variables are retrieved from Worldscope and 
are from the last full year financial statement filed prior to the deal and refer to acquirer characteristics. EBIT margin is the ratio of operating income to sales. Cash ratio is the 
ratio of the cash and short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market cap. Non-public is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the 
target is defined as a private company or a subsidiary of a public company in SDC. Deal size is the logarithm of the value of the transaction as shown in SDC in $m. 
Publication is the number of times the name of the company was mentioned in the headline of Business Week, Financial Times or Wall Street Journal during a one-year 
period ending 10 days after the announcement on an M&A transaction by the sample company as in LexisNexis database. 
 Cross  % 
Equity 
Toehold Diversi 
fy 
Langua
ge 
RER Log 
mcap 
EBIT 
margin 
Cash 
ratio 
Levera 
ge 
Non-
public 
Deal 
size 
Publicat
ion 
Cross 1.000 -0.332 0.208 0.061 -0.038 -0.170 0.073 0.298 -0.046 0.105 -0.052 -0.067 0.155 0.286 
  1.000 -0.217 -0.052 0.058 0.519 -0.009 -0.593 0.109 -0.028 -0.101 0.256 -0.389 n/a 
% Equity   1.000 0.009 -0.044 -0.154 0.160 0.011 -0.153 0.143 0.028 -0.051 0.106 0.108 
Toehold    1.000 0.031 0.033 -0.012 0.068 -0.010 0.008 0.001 -0.034 0.026 0.043 
Diversify     1.000 0.012 -0.021 0.005 -0.048 -0.035 0.046 0.050 -0.098 0.047 
Language      1.000 -0.052 -0.248 0.145 -0.004 -0.128 0.180 -0.232 -0.048 
Rer       1.000 -0.098 -0.063 -0.075 0.035 -0.026 -0.033 0.118 
Log mcap        1.000 0.077 -0.081 -0.144 -0.223 0.395 0.505 
EBIT margin         1.000 0.032 -0.082 0.022 0.036 -0.029 
Cash ratio          1.000 -0.154 -0.035 -0.005 -0.015 
Leverage           1.000 -0.007 -0.017 -0.016 
Non-public            1.000 -0.460 -0.143 
Deal size             1.000 0.232 
Publication              1.000 
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Table 23: Correlation matrix for the explanatory variables in Sample 2 regression models 
The table reports the pearson correlation coefficients between a number of variables that are used to explain acquirer wealth effects. Before is a dummy variable, which 
receives a value of one if the acquirer has not yet been cross-listed in the U.S. at the time of the acquisition. After is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the 
acquirer has cross-delisted from the U.S. at the time of the acquisition.  is the inverse Mills ratio, estimated as the first stage of the Heckman (1979) two-stage model. % 
Equity is the percentage of the purchase price paid with equity according to Thomson Financial SCD database (SDC). Toehold is a dummy variable, which takes a value of 
one, if the acquirer has ownership in the target prior to the announcement of the deal according to SDC. Diversify is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the 
bidder and target are from different major industries as defined by the first two digits of the SIC code as in Thomson Financial Worldscope database (Worldscope). Language 
is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the official language of the acquirer‟s home country is English. Relative exchange rate, Rer, measures the deviation from 
the average exchange rate of local currency against U.S. dollar during the sample period. Log mcap is the logarithm of the market cap of the acquirer 21 trading day prior to 
announcement of the deal in $m as in Thomson Financial Datastream database. All accounting variables are retrieved from Worldscope and are from the last full year 
financial statement filed prior to the deal and refer to acquirer characteristics. EBIT margin is the ratio of operating income to sales. Cash ratio is the ratio of the cash and 
short-term investments to total assets. Leverage is the ratio of total debt to market cap. Non-public is a dummy variable, which takes a value of one if the target is defined as a 
private company or a subsidiary of a public company in SDC. Deal size is the logarithm of the value of the transaction as shown in SDC in $m. Publication is the number of 
times the name of the company was mentioned in the headline of Business Week, Financial Times or Wall Street Journal during a one-year period ending 10 days after the 
announcement on an M&A transaction by the sample company as in LexisNexis database. 
 Before After  % 
Equity 
Toe 
hold 
Diversi 
fy 
Langua
ge 
RER Log 
mcap 
EBIT 
margin 
Cash 
ratio 
Levera
ge 
Non-
public 
Deal 
size 
Publica
tion 
Before 1.000 -0.161 n/a 0.059 -0.047 -0.014 0.196 0.028 -0.032 0.003 0.01 -0.003 -0.066 0.045 0.049 
After  1.000 -0.443 -0.145 -0.053 0.122 0.064 -0.201 -0.069 0.038 0.009 -0.068 -0.004 -0.087 -0.183 
   1.000 0.184 0.205 -0.038 -0.689 0.239 0.561 -0.251 -0.232 0.18 -0.208 0.398 n/a 
% Equity    1.000 -0.051 -0.045 -0.112 0.231 -0.105 -0.217 0.112 -0.106 -0.122 0.113 0.028 
Toehold     1.000 -0.099 -0.126 -0.011 0.136 0.031 -0.019 0.098 -0.292 0.085 0.064 
Diversify      1.000 -0.064 -0.016 0.076 -0.042 -0.062 -0.009 0.087 -0.129 0.073 
Language       1.000 -0.093 -0.299 0.125 0.038 0.065 0.144 -0.202 -0.104 
Rer        1.000 -0.064 -0.082 -0.116 0.027 -0.022 0.02 0.147 
Log mcap         1.000 0.151 -0.24 -0.103 -0.156 0.356 0.520 
EBIT margin          1.000 0.045 -0.011 0.039 0.074 0.017 
Cash ratio           1.000 -0.177 0.023 -0.053 -0.132 
Leverage            1.000 0.032 -0.079 -0.001 
Non-public             1.000 -0.477 -0.132 
Deal size              1.000 0.231 
Publication 
Publ 
              1.000 
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Appendix B – Publication hits 
Table 24: Publication hits regression 
The table presents the results of an OLS regression, where the dependent variable is the number of times when a 
sample company has appeared in the headline of Wall Street Journal, Financial Times or Business week on a 
period of one year ending 10 days after the announcement of an M&A transaction by the sample company. The 
publication hits are obtained through LexisNexis keyword searches. Log mcap is the logarithm of the market cap 
of the acquirer 21 trading days prior to the announcement of the transaction in $m as in Thomson Financial 
Datastream Database. Cross is a dummy variable which takes a value of one if the company is cross-listed at the 
time of the acquisition. The acquisition sample includes 1,382 M&A transaction carried out by a sample of 281 
European companies while being cross-listed in the U.S. during 1.1.1996-31.12.2008, excluding those 
companies that cross-listed prior to 1980, or by the control sample, which includes those companies from the 
Dow Jones STOXX Total Market Index for Europe (December 2008 version) that are not cross-listed at the time 
of the acquisition. The sample excludes financial companies (first digit of SIC code 6) due to differences in their 
financial reporting. Europe is defined as the original EU-15 countries and Norway and UK. Both acquisition 
samples are retrieved from the Thomson Financial SDC database, and include only completed acquisitions that 
result in majority ownership of the target by the bidder, and deal size is at minimum $1m. Companies that hold 
5% or more of the total hit volume of a subsample are removed from the analysis. T-values are shown in 
parenthesis below the coefficient. The last row of the table reports the  goodness of fit measure. 
Variable OLS 
Intercept 2.23 
 [0.34] 
Log mcap 4.37*** 
 [2.51] 
Cross 11.4*** 
 [4.66] 
N 1382 
 0.154 
***, **, and * denote two-tailed statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. 
